Thomas v. Chicago Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 15 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95 C 4782.,95 C 4782.
• Citation: 919 F. Supp. 1159
• Parties: Dorothy J. THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation; the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"); Former HUD Secretary Jack Kemp and present HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

919 F. Supp. 1159

Dorothy J. THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, a Municipal Corporation; the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"); Former HUD Secretary Jack Kemp and present HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, Defendants.

No. 95 C 4782.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

March 15, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dorothy J. Thomas, Chicago, IL, pro se.

John Kenneth Kallman, Law Offices of John Kenneth Kallman, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff Dorothy J. Thomas.

David Keith Hill, Jordan E. Marsh, Chicago Housing Authority, Office of the General Counsel, Chicago, IL, for defendant Chicago Housing Authority, a Municipal Corporation.

Ann L. Wallace, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for defendant Jack Kemp, Secretary.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BUCKLO, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Dorothy J. Thomas, has filed suit against the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), former HUD Secretary Jack Kemp, and present HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros¹ (collectively, "federal defendants"), and the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA" or "state defendant"), a state housing authority. Both the state and federal defendants have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below both, the federal defendants' motion is granted and the state defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

Ms. Thomas is a public housing tenant residing in the Cabrini Extension project, one of three projects collectively known as "Cabrini-Green." In her complaint, Ms. Thomas makes numerous allegations.² Count one of the complaint alleges the following: 1) the federal and state defendants are charging plaintiff too much rent; 2) the federal and state defendants have rented plaintiff an unsanitary apartment; 3) plaintiff was attacked by another CHA resident on March 11, 1995, and her attacker has not been evicted; 4) the federal and state defendants have denied plaintiff access to common rooms to hold meetings for her various community groups;³ and 5) the CHA has reduced maintenance services by over 75 percent resulting in unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions.

Intermittently throughout Count one, Ms. Thomas cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 1437a; 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et. seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) & (3); and the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as the bases for her claims. Ms. Thomas' complaint states that she has lost income, suffered physical pain, emotional distress, mental anguish and humiliation, and been deprived of food and other "vital necessary" sic to maintain her welfare. Ms. Thomas seeks $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages, $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages, attorney fees, her alleged rent overcharge (calculated by plaintiff at $4,790.00) and equitable relief requiring proper maintenance of Cabrini-Green and correction of all housing code violations in all Cabrini-Green apartments.

In count two of the complaint, Ms. Thomas alleges as follows: 1) the CHA and HUD brought a "fraudulent" eviction action against her; 2) the CHA and HUD are demolishing Cabrini-Green buildings in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437p; and 3) the state and federal defendants have conspired to charge excessive rent from all CHA residents in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437a and 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-11. Count two reiterates the injuries and seeks the same monetary damages as count one.

Analysis

When deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true. Johnson v. Martin, 943 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir.1991). Any reasonable inferences from those facts must be made in the plaintiff's favor. Id. In addition, a pro se complaint, "however in artfully pleaded," is held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980). The court's role is to ensure that claims of pro se litigants are given "fair and meaningful consideration." Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir.1984). Accordingly, pro se complaints must be liberally construed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The complaint need not specify the correct legal theory, nor point to the correct statute in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.1992). Finally, a district court may dismiss a complaint only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at 10, 101 S.Ct. at 176.

As a threshold matter, I must address what distinction, if any, exists between defendants CHA and HUD. Ms. Thomas' complaint uses these parties interchangeably (and often simultaneously). CHA and HUD, however, play very different roles under the public housing statutory scheme. HUD provides monetary assistance to local public housing agencies ("PHAs"), such as the CHA, for the construction and operation of low-income housing. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437b-1437i. The PHAs may then charge below-market rent to eligible low income tenants. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a. In exchange for the subsidy, PHAs must comply with federal regulations promulgated by HUD under the United States Housing Act. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. The PHA retains responsibility for managing, maintaining, and operating the housing project. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 ("It is the policy of the United States ... to vest in local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of their housing programs."); 310 ILCS 10/2 (declaring that management responsibility be given to PHAs operating in Illinois).

The CHA is the PHA with jurisdiction over the City of Chicago, managing all public housing in Chicago. Thus the CHA is in charge of operating and managing Cabrini-Green, while HUD provides funds to allow the CHA to rent apartments at reduced rates.⁴ Due to the distinction between the CHA and HUD, I address the claims against each defendant separately.

I. The Federal Defendants — HUD, Jack Kemp, and Henry Cisneros

A. Count One

Ms. Thomas first alleges that she is being charged a monthly rent that exceeds the statutory limit. The rent formula of the United States Housing Act is supplied by 42 U.S.C. § 1437a. It provides in part:

A family shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter ... the highest of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar:

(A) 30 per centum of the family's monthly adjusted income;

(B) 10 per centum of the family's monthly income; or

(C) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family's actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the family's housing costs, the portion of such payment which is so designated.

42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1).

In her complaint, Ms. Thomas states that she has been charged 25-30 percent of her adjusted⁵ income.⁶ She contends that it should not exceed 10 percent of her income.

The plain language of the statute indicates that if subsection (c) does not apply, the higher rate calculated under subsection (a) or (b) is the maximum rent allowed. Ms. Thomas as admits that her rent has been set at 25-30 percent of her adjusted income. The rent she is paying therefore clearly falls within the guidelines provided under Section 1437a. Ms. Thomas repeatedly asserts that as a disabled and very low income person, the 10 percent rate should apply. Neither Ms. Thomas' briefs nor this court's independent review yielded any statutory support for a reduction in public housing rent for very low income or disabled residents.⁷ This claim is therefore dismissed.

Ms. Thomas also alleges that the defendants rented her an unsanitary apartment. Ms. Thomas notes the existence of various problems with her apartment, including faulty plumbing, cracked ceiling and floor tiles, and an infestation of mice and roaches. She contends that the state and federal defendants "willfully, intentionally, knowingly or should have known" sic of the apartment's condition when she rented it.

This claim must fail against the federal defendants because HUD has no duty to ensure the good conditions of apartments leased by the CHA. HUD does not own or manage Cabrini-Green. Ms. Thomas argues that HUD owes her such a duty based on the policy statement contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1437. While courts have implied private causes of action for certain provisions of the United States Housing Act, the broad policy statement in 42 U.S.C. § 1437 is not among them. See, e.g., Perry v. Housing Authority of the City of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir.1981) ("We therefore conclude that § 1437 — or the other policy statements, §§ 1441, 1441a — does not create any legally cognizable rights in tenants of programs funded under the housing statutes"); Hale v. Chicago Housing Authority, 642 F.Supp. 1107, 1109 (N.D.Ill.1986) (finding no private right of action to enforce HUD regulations governing safety and sanitation in the project). See also Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 432, 107 S.Ct. 766, 774, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (allowing plaintiff to maintain a Section 1983 action to enforce only "sufficiently specific and definite" provisions of the Housing Act). This claim is accordingly dismissed against the federal defendants.

Ms. Thomas next alleges that she was attacked by a CHA resident who was subsequently found guilty of assault but not evicted from public housing. Ms. Thomas asserts that the defendants should have evicted her attacker, but failed to do so.

Ms. Thomas does not explain her exact claim regarding this attack. I interpret it to encompass two potential legal theories. First, plaintiff could be alleging that the defendants are liable for the attack...