Thomas v. City of Springfield

• Citation: 88 S.W.3d 155
• Decision Date: 30 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 24849.,24849.
• Parties: William THOMAS, Claimant-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, Employer-Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 155

88 S.W.3d 155

William THOMAS, Claimant-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, Employer-Respondent.

No. 24849.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.

September 30, 2002.

Motion for Rehearing or Transfer Denied October 18, 2002.

Application for Transfer Denied November 26, 2002.

John C. Banning, Reynolds, Gold & Grosser, Springfield, for appellant.

Richard L. Schnake and Patrick J. Platter, Springfield, for respondent.

PHILLIP R. GARRISON, Judge.

William Thomas ("Thomas") appeals from the ruling of the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") affirming the decision of an administrative law judge ("ALJ") denying Thomas workers' compensation benefits for an injury sustained during his employment as a police officer by the City of Springfield, Missouri ("City"). The judgment of the Commission is affirmed.

Thomas is an eighteen-year veteran of the Springfield, Missouri Police Department ("Department"). At the time of the incident in question, he was, and since 1988 had been, a detective with the Department, having been promoted from patrolman. In 1993, Thomas joined the newly formed Major Case Response Team ("MCRT"), a four-person unit within the Department's detective corps that investigates major crimes such as homicide, kidnapping and rape. Thomas' duties with MCRT included obtaining information needed to acquire search warrants and supervising the execution of those warrants. During that same time, Thomas also was a member of the Southwest Central Major Case Squad, a multi-jurisdictional unit charged with investigating crimes of regional significance.

In April 1998, Thomas accepted what was to be a temporary assignment as acting sergeant of detectives in the Department's Crimes Against Persons unit. His duties as acting sergeant included supervising detectives assigned to the criminal investigations section, as well as responding to citizen concerns and inquiries regarding ongoing criminal investigations. From 1988 to 1998, the workload of Thomas' criminal investigations section increased steadily, while the number of new detectives assigned to the force remained virtually constant. Thomas remained an active member of MCRT during his entire stint as acting detective, until the incident in question on March 23, 1999. Essentially, he had been assigned two full-time jobs, and was the only person ever to have been assigned both roles in the Department.

On numerous occasions, beginning in January 1998, Thomas requested, unsuccessfully, to be relieved either from his duties with MCRT or, more frequently, from his duties as acting sergeant. Thomas' stated reasons included a desire to spend more time with his family, and to reduce what was becoming an unbearably stressful workload. The requests to be moved from MCRT were denied, at least in part because of a desire on the part of Thomas' supervisor, Lieutenant Steve Hamilton ("Hamilton"), not to disrupt what he considered to be a productive working relationship between Thomas and the other members of the team. The denial of requests to be relieved of acting sergeant duties stemmed, according to Hamilton, from a promotion freeze instituted by the Department in the face of civil litigation brought by the police officers' union.

In the six-month period leading up to the incident in question, an unprecedented spate of homicides occurred in Springfield, which greatly intensified the workload of MCRT. One of these cases involved the brutal slayings of a pregnant mother, her unborn child and her three minor children. Another involved the asphyxiation of a child by her mother ("Robbins case") in the course of an unsuccessful suicide attempt. Thomas was the lead investigator in the Robbins case, and was to testify at the nationally televised murder trial on March 24, 1999.

On the preceding evening of March 23, 1999, Thomas arrived home from work and withdrew to his bedroom to continue his study of the facts to which he was to testify the following day. For some time leading up to that night, Thomas had been suffering from an inability to recall or memorize the facts in the Robbins case. He became moody, withdrawn and unable to sleep or eat in the days leading up to the trial, as he became increasingly apprehensive about the possibility of "embarrassing" himself, his family, and the Department at trial. His concern was compounded by his perception that the defense attorney in the Robbins case had a penchant for attacking the personal credibility of Department witnesses, and by his fear that past voluntary treatment for alcohol abuse might be revealed during his televised testimony.

Sometime after retreating to his bedroom, Thomas got up from his bed and retrieved his service revolver from the top of a closet shelf. As was always the case, the gun was loaded. Thomas returned to his bed, lay down, and decided to shoot himself in the heart. He decided against shooting himself in the head, believing it would create too much of a "mess" for his wife and children. Thomas fired one shot into his chest or abdomen as he lay on the bed. Hearing the noise, Thomas' teenage son, and, later, Thomas' wife, came into the bedroom. Thomas, still conscious, instructed his son to "leave [him] alone," but his wife summoned an ambulance, and he was taken to Cox Medical Center in Springfield, where he was treated for injuries to his stomach, intestine, pancreas, and spine. The bullet severed his spinal cord, resulting in complete loss of sensation and function below the abdomen. He suffers now from persistent bedsores, and pain in his back where a metal cage has replaced a destroyed vertebra. He requires daily nursing, much of which is performed by his wife, and spends his days confined to a wheelchair or reclining lounge chair. He is totally and permanently disabled.

On May 3, 1999, Thomas filed a Claim for Compensation with the Division of Workers' Compensation ("Division") claiming that "[d]ue to performing his extraordinarily and unusually stressful job duties, [Thomas] suffered a mental injury that caused a physical injury." City filed a response on May 27, 1999, stating, inter alia, that "the injuries alleged in [Thomas'] claim were self-inflicted and, as a result, compensation cannot be awarded." Final hearing of Thomas' claim was held December 11-12, 2000 before an ALJ. During the hearing, extensive testimony was taken from Thomas, his wife, his detective peers, and medical experts, all of which established the high level of stress under which Thomas labored in the months leading up to his shooting. Sharply disputed, however, was whether that stress was so "extraordinary and unusual" as to be compensable, and whether Thomas had the "mental power" on March 23, 1999 to form the requisite intent to kill himself. If not, his injury would be non-compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law.¹

On August 27, 2001, the ALJ issued an award denying any compensation for Thomas. In his Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law, the ALJ acknowledged the "constant and significant" stress created by performing what essentially were two full-time jobs in MCRT and acting sergeant, coupled with the uncharacteristic rash of homicides in late 1998 and early 1999. However, this stress, in the view of the ALJ, "was not so extraordinary and unusual as to be compensable under Section 287.120.8" Additionally, the ALJ found that Thomas' injuries were self-inflicted and intentional, so that his injuries were not compensable, per Section 287.120(3). The ALJ found that Thomas "could recognize the consequences of his actions" on the night he shot himself, and that he "had the requisite mental status to appreciate the natural consequences of his actions when he shot himself with the intention of killing himself[.]"

Following a timely Application for Review, the Commission, over one dissent, issued a Final Award Denying Compensation. The Commission incorporated in toto the findings of fact and law enunciated by the ALJ, finding that they were "supported by competent and substantial evidence." Thomas appeals.

In cases considering an award granted by the Commission in a workers' compensation claim, we "review only questions of law" and may reverse the award only upon a finding that the commission exceeded its powers, the award was fraudulently procured, the facts found by the commission do not support the award, or there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record supporting the award. Section 287.495. The standard of appellate review of compensation awards of the Commission was aptly stated by the western district of this court in Davis v. Research Medical Center, 903 S.W.2d 557 (Mo.App. W.D.1995):

[we] may not substitute [our] judgment on the evidence for that of the Commission. The weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are ultimately for the Commission. [We apply] a two-step process designed to determine whether the Commission could have reasonably made its findings and award upon consideration of all the evidence before it. In the first step, [we examine] the whole record, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the award, to determine if the record contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award.... If there is competent and substantial evidence supporting the award, [we move] to the second step, where [we view] the evidence in the light most favorable to the award, but must consider all evidence in the record, including that which opposes or is unfavorable to the award, take account of the overall effect of all of the evidence, and determine whether the award is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. In doing so, [we] take into consideration the credibility determinations of the Commission[.] Findings and awards of the Commission which are clearly the interpretation or application of the law, as distinguished from a...