Thomas v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2765-04-2 (VA 2/28/2006), Record No. 2765-04-2.
| Decision Date | 28 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2765-04-2. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | SAMANTHA LEIGH THOMAS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, F. Ward Harkrader, Jr., Judge Designate.
Adam C. Rhea for appellant.
Karri B. Atwood, Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, McClanahan and Senior Judge Coleman.
Samantha Leigh Thomas was convicted in a bench trial of statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91, as a principal in the second degree. On appeal, Thomas contends that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to exclude evidence of her participation in a subsequent, similar burglary on the same night; and (2) finding the evidence sufficient to prove she was guilty of burglary. For the following reasons, we affirm her conviction.
On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party at trial. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). That principle requires us to "discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254, 584 S.E.2d 444, 446 (2003) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thomas drove Timothy Little (her half-brother), William Johnson, and Albert Felton from Charlottesville to Earlysville, where she parked her car in a church parking lot across the street from a local restaurant named Sal's Pizza (Sal's). It was late at night, between approximately 10:15 p.m. and 11:20 p.m.1 Sal's was closed, along with "[e]verything around it." Thomas waited in the car while the others walked across the street to Sal's, broke into the restaurant through the back door, and stole a cash register containing approximately ninety-five dollars.2 Within ten to fifteen minutes, the three men returned to the car with the stolen money, which they divided—including a share to Thomas. Thomas then drove them back to Charlottesville.
Little testified, over Thomas's objection, that later the same night Thomas drove Johnson, Felton, and him to Fox's Café (Fox's), in Charlottesville, which was also closed, whereupon he burglarized the cafe. Thomas testified that she parked her car nearby Fox's and again waited while the three men broke into the cafe and stole a small amount of cash. They returned to the car, and Thomas drove them away.
At her bench trial for the Sal's burglary, Thomas testified in her own behalf and denied any prior knowledge that Little, Johnson, and Felton intended to burglarize Sal's, claiming that she first learned about the burglary when they returned to the car with the stolen money. Thomas nevertheless admitted that she drove the three of them from Charlottesville to Earlysville and parked her car in the church parking lot across the street from Sal's late at night; watched the three men walk across the street to Sal's, even though Sal's and all of the other establishments in the area were closed; knew at the time "that something bad [was] going to happen there"; and waited for their return. Thomas also admitted that, after Little, Johnson, and Felton returned to the car, she received a share of the stolen money, and then drove them back to Charlottesville. Thomas's only explanation for why she drove the three men to Earlysville, and let them out in the dark in a church parking lot across the street from Sal's, was that one of the three men, Johnson, "was going to see a girl, one of his friends in Earlysville."
As to the Fox's burglary, Thomas admitted that she knowingly and willingly participated in that subsequent burglary, in her role as driver for Little, Johnson, and Felton. However, she argues that evidence concerning her participation in the Fox's burglary, to which she objected, was irrelevant, prejudicial and inadmissible.
The court found Thomas guilty of the Sal's burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-91. In announcing the verdict, the trial judge stated there was not "any question in the world" that Thomas "knew what was going on," which made her "a principal in both [burglaries]." The court sentenced Thomas to ten years, suspending all but eight months of the sentence.
Thomas first contends the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence, over her objection, the testimony of Little in relation to the Fox's burglary, including an account of Thomas's role in the crime.3 However, "[e]vidence of other crimes, which are `so intimately connected and blended with facts proving the commission of the offense charged may be admissible because it cannot be separated with propriety.'" Thornton v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 825, 829, 525 S.E.2d 646, 648 (2000) (quoting Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 246, 337 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1985)). That is, "[w]here a course of criminal conduct is continuous and interwoven, consisting of a series of related crimes, the perpetrator has no right to have the evidence `sanitized' so as to deny the jury knowledge of all but the immediate crime for which he is on trial." Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526-27, 323 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1984). Further, "[t]he fact-finder is entitled to all of the relevant and connected facts, including those which followed the commission of the crime on trial, as well as those which preceded it; even though they may show the defendant guilty of other offenses." Id.
The evidence of Thomas's knowing participation in the Fox's burglary was admissible because it tended to prove her knowing participation in the similar and just completed burglary of Sal's. The burglaries occurred close in time to each other; Thomas was the driver in both incidents; and she shared in the proceeds. A trial judge's determination to admit such evidence will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 88, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).
When considering on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence presented below, we presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct and reverse only if the trial court's decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99-100, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Correll v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 3, 12, 607 S.E.2d 119, 123-24 (2005) (). Thus, we do not "substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact." Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002). "Instead the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). "This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Id.
Thomas contends there was insufficient evidence to establish that she was guilty of anything more than being an accessory after the fact to statutory burglary.4 Her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the sole issue of whether she had prior knowledge of the perpetrators' intent to burglarize Sal's. Specifically, she asserts there was no proof of the requisite criminal intent on her part. We disagree.
Id. at 482, 611 S.E.2d at 554-55 (quoting Jones, 208 Va. at 372-73, 157 S.E.2d at 909). Such activity includes "`keeping watch or guard at some convenient distance'" during the commission of the crime. Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 93, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24-25 (1993) (quoting Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 99, 18 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1942)).
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