Thomas v. Cook

Decision Date10 December 1956
Docket NumberNo. 40304,40304
Citation229 Miss. 458,91 So.2d 275
PartiesR. C. THOMAS v. Fay Carolyn COOK.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Prewitt & Bullard, Vicksburg, for appellant.

Frank E. Shanahan, Jr., Vicksburg, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

This is an action of bastardy brought by the appellee against the appellant under Sections 383-398, Code of 1942. On the trial in the circuit court she obtained a substantial judgment against the appellant, from which this appeal is prosecuted.

A peremptory instruction was granted in favor of the appellee by the lower court, and this action of the court is the basis of the first assignment of error argued. Counsel seems to contend that a peremptory instruction is never proper in a case of this nature because the action is quasi criminal and the issue must be passed upon by a jury. In the case of Welford v. Havard, 127 Miss. 88, 89 So. 812, a case of the same nature, we said: 'The giving of the nine-jury verdict instruction and the instruction that informed the jury that they could return a verdict for the appellee on the mere preponderance of the evidence involves the consideration of one question, and that is, whether or not bastardy proceedings under chapter 15, Code of 1906, Secs. 268 to 283, inclusive, Hemingway's Code, chapter 7, Secs. 217 to 232, inclusive, is a civil or a criminal cause. The nine-jury verdict statute, chapter 162, Laws of 1916, Hemingway's Code, Sec. 2214, provides that in the trial of all 'civil suits in the circuit or chancery courts of this state' nine or more jurors may agree on a verdict; and that either party may request an instruction to that effect, and it shall be the duty of the judge to give it.

'If this proceeding, therefore, is a criminal and not a civil cause, clearly the giving of the nine-jury verdict instruction was error. And it is also true that if this is a criminal and not a civil cause, the giving of the instruction that the jury might return a verdict on the mere preponderance of the evidence was error, because it is universally held that in a criminal case the evidence must show the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.' We went on to point out the criminal aspects of the proceeding and also the civil aspects, and then we said: 'By the great weight of authority, bastardy proceedings are civil proceedings and are governed by the rules of procedure applicable in such cases. It is true that a small number of courts have held that such proceedings are criminal instead of civil and are governed by the rules obtaining in criminal cases. 7 Corpus Juris, Sec. 57.

'Also by the great weight of authority the parentage of the child in question may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence; proof beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases not being required. 7 Corpus Juris, Sec. 128. The cases bearing on these questions will be found collated in the notes to the two references above to Corpus Juris.'

Under this point the appellant also argues that even if it is a civil case, under the evidence produced at the trial there was an issue of fact for decision by a jury. In the case of Thomas v. Williamson, 185 Miss. 83, 187 So. 220, 221, where the plaintiff obtained a peremptory instruction, in passing upon the rule with reference to granting such an instruction, we said: 'A summary of these latest cases, as well as of numerous others going back almost to the beginning of the judicial history of this state, is that: When all the testimony in behalf of a party litigant is taken as a whole and is considered as if undisputed by the other party, and that testimony is reconcilable in essential features with the material facts which are undisputed, and when so reconciled, and taken together with the undisputed facts, is of such a real and substantial nature that impartial men of sound judgment could reasonably believe it, and prudently act thereon, and thence it furnishes a factual basis adequate to sustain the case of the party, a peremptory instruction should not be granted against him. But if the testimony in behalf of the party does not measure up to this established standard, it is insufficient and therefore is but a scintilla, as that term is to be understood in our law. See the recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States on this subject in National Labor Relations Board v. Columbiam, etc. Co., 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660.

'Under the record we think that the case here was one in which the scintilla rule was properly applicable, and that the action of the trial judge in granting the peremptory instruction was correct.'

In this case there was no substantial dispute as to the facts. The record shows that the appellee was a registered nurse at Vicksburg, Mississippi. The appellant started going with her about the first of 1951 and sometime later they started having illicit relations. At that time she thought that he was a single man but in fact he was married and had one child by his wife. She became pregnant sometime between October 15th and November 15th, 1953. She continued to live in Vicksburg until about July 1st, 1954, when she went to Greenville and rented an apartment and held herself out to be a married woman under the name of Mrs. Fay Thomas. On August 1, 1954, another nurse who was a friend of the appellee went to Greenville and lived with her until the child was born. The appellee was without funds to pay for hospitalization and the baby was delivered in her apartment by the nurse who was living with her on August 15, 1954. Beginning on August 5, 1954, and continuing for several months thereafter the appellant wrote to the appellee 29 letters in addition to sending her a Christmas card and also sending a Christmas card to the baby. In the first three letters, which were written before he had knowledge that the baby had been born, he was very solicitous about her condition and about the prospects of the birth of the child. In one of these letters he said, 'Darling, if the baby is a boy I will think of a name for him. Sure hope you get along O.K.' On August 17th he wrote her, 'Darling, take care of yourself and the baby and I will be looking forward to seeing you.' Shortly after the birth of the child he visited her in Greenville. The appellee was worried about making out a birth certificate and he told her to let the birth certificate show that he was the father of the child and that it was a legitimate child. On September 9, 1954, he wrote her and said among other things, 'Take care of the girl.' On September 14, 1954, he had just returned from a visit to see her and said, 'I sure was glad to see you and the baby. It was worth every cent it cost. * * * I have not got that picture yet. I hope nothing happens to it.'

After that letter appellee left Greenville and went to Ackerman, Mississippi, where she obtained employment as a registered nurse in a hospital. She did not advise appellant where she was until the latter part of October, when she wrote him about getting a car tag for her. On October 30th he acknowledged receipt of this letter and said, 'I had been trying for a month to find you and Carolyn and find out if you are O.K. * * * Darling, please let me know when you are coming down and bring Carolyn with you so I can see her, as I want to see her very much.' The name of the child is Carolyn Marie Thomas, which is the name that he suggested. On December 15, 1954, he wrote her, 'Darling, I love you more than ever after the way you did by Carolyn, when most girls would have gave her away. It just goes to show what a fine girl you are. Why do you want to change her name when my name is the name she should have. You have handled this fine the way you are going so why change--for her sake it should stay as is. * * * I will be glad when you send me a large picture of Carolyn. Well I will go for now. Kiss Carolyn for me.' On November 17, 1954, he wrote her, 'Darling, I was so glad to see you and Carolyn Sunday. Wish I was going to get to see you this Sunday. It sure did hurt leaving you Sunday night, not knowing when I would see you again. I have sure worried about Carolyn having a cold. Hope she is better.'

On December 18, 1954, appellant sent a Christmas card which reads: 'Merry Christmas Daughter. A little wish at Christmas filled with happiness and cheer and love and warm affection for a daughter who's a dear. Love Daddy.'

On the same date he sent a Christmas card to the appellee which contains a verse in very endearing terms. On December 7, 1954, he wrote appellee, 'How is that sweet baby? Darling I hope I can see you and Carolyn Christmas. Am going to get her something. * * * Kiss Carolyn for me and write real often and I will do the same.'

On January 3, 1955, he wrote the appellee, 'Had hoped to keep Carolyn out of this but looks like I can't get out any other way. Am going to get a party to tell Thelma (his wife) about Carolyn. Guess she will either quit me or kill me one. * * * Did you get the package I sent Carolyn?' On January 21, 1955, he wrote appellee, 'Was glad to get your letter this morning and know that Carolyn is some better. * * * Darling, I would give anything to see you and Carolyn. * * * I sat here on the gate and cried this morning thinking about you, Carolyn and Christine (his legitimate daughter), knowing that I love all three of you and always will.' On January 8, 1955, he wrote appellee that his wife knew about Carolyn but had not mentioned it to him, but that as soon as he can get nerve enough he is going to bring it up to her and try to get her to agree to a divorce. He also said, 'As for Carolyn, I know she is as much mine as Christine, and you know how much I love her. So you see both of those children are in my heart and on my mind every day and night that comes. Darling, I want to see you and Carolyn so bad. If you will come down one weekend I will send the money to make the trip.'

On August 15, 1954, which is the very day when Carolyn was born, h...

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1 cases
  • Dunn v. Grisham, 42812
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 25 de novembro de 1963
    ...are governed by the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. Welford v. Havard, 127 Miss. 88, 89 So. 812 (1921); Thomas v. Cook, 229 Miss. 458, 91 So.2d 275 (1956); 10 C.S.J. Bastards Sec. 32b; 10 Am.Jur.2d, Bastards, Sec. 75. Accordingly, the constitutional prohibition of ex post fa......

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