Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc.
Decision Date | 15 September 1989 |
Citation | 551 So.2d 343 |
Parties | Alvin THOMAS d/b/a Thomas Construction Company v. DIVERSIFIED CONTRACTORS, INC. 88-327. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John C. Cason of Hooper & Cason and Richard A. Lawrence, Montgomery, for appellant.
Marvin H. Campbell, Montgomery, for appellee.
Alvin Thomas appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Diversified Contractors, Inc. ("Diversified"). We address only one issue: Whether the jury selection standards announced by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), apply to civil cases. Because we hold that the standards set forth in Batson are applicable to civil cases, we reverse the judgment entered against Thomas and remand the cause. Appellant also argues that the arbitrary striking of all the blacks in the venire violated his rights under Sections 1, 11, and 13 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Because we hold that the appellant's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution were violated, we need not, and do not, address the question whether the appellant's rights under the Alabama Constitution were also violated.
The facts presented in the record show that Thomas is black, and that Dennis Thompson, the owner of Diversified, the plaintiff, is white. In selecting the jury, each side was allowed eight peremptory strikes. The jury venire consisted of four black members and 24 white members. All four black members of the venire were struck by the plaintiff.
Once the jury had been struck, but before the jurors were sworn, the appellant objected to the fact that all the black members of the venire had been struck by the appellee. The trial judge did not rule on this objection and proceeded to seat the jury.
In his motion for new trial, Thomas once again raised his challenge to Diversified's striking of the blacks. In his order on this motion, the trial judge stated:
As the trial court correctly pointed out, this Court has not answered the question whether Batson applies to civil cases. In the Perry decision, we noted that this issue had been raised for the first time on appeal and, therefore, we did not address it. Unlike Perry, the present appeal, in a case in which the striking of the jury was properly objected to at the trial level, squarely presents the opportunity to rule on that question.
The question whether the standards established in Batson apply to civil cases has not been definitively answered by the United States Supreme Court. Several federal courts, however, have addressed the issue, reaching different results. 1 Our Court of Civil Appeals has also dealt with this issue, holding that the Batson standards do not apply in civil cases, Parker v. Downing, 547 So.2d 1180 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). After reviewing Parker and the federal decisions that have discussed the application of the Batson standards to civil cases, we conclude that the better reasoned result is that these standards are applicable in civil cases.
In Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.1989) [cert. filed June 23, 1989], the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, after examining the policies and rights involved, held that Batson applies in civil cases as well as in criminal cases. We agree with both the reasoning and the result in that case and, therefore, we reverse the judgment in the present case and remand.
The procedural facts in Fludd are similar to those presented in the instant appeal. Fludd was a civil rights case where a black plaintiff sued a white police officer who had shot him. The two blacks on the jury venire of 15 were struck by the defendant. After the selection of the jury, but before the jurors were sworn, the appellant raised the issue of Batson and asked the court to require an explanation for the striking of the two blacks by the appellee. The trial judge ruled that Batson did not apply in a civil case and did not require the appellee to explain why he had struck the two blacks.
On appeal, Fludd argued that he had been denied the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment when the appellee was allowed to use his peremptory challenges to exclude both the blacks from the jury 2 The Court of Appeals agreed and held:
In the present case, the trial judge did not require the appellee to explain why it struck the four blacks. Nor does an examination of the record suggest why the blacks were struck. However, these facts, standing alone, do not mandate that a new trial automatically be granted to Thomas.
It is for the trial court to decide whether the striking of the four blacks in this case made out a prima facie case of discrimination against the appellant. If the trial court determines that the appellee sought to discriminate against the appellant through the use of his peremptory challenges, then the burden will shift to the appellee to provide a race-neutral explanation for these strikes. If no adequate race-neutral reason is provided, then the appellant must be given a new trial.
As the Supreme Court stated in Batson:
476 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. at 1725, 90 L.Ed.2d at 90.
Applying this language to a civil context, the Fludd court noted:
"If the district court concludes that appellees purposefully discriminated against the blacks they challenged, and appellees' counsel does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, the appellant must receive a new trial."
We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
This case presents the inevitable situation that has been anticipated since the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The fundamental principles of Batson forbid the prosecutor in a state criminal action to exercise peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's race from the venire. Those principles command the same result in a civil action among private litigants. I write specially in this case because I feel that if we were to limit the holding of Batson to criminal cases, we would betray the fundamental principles enunciated in Batson.
Alvin Thomas, who is black, appeals...
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