Thomas v. Forsyth Care Ctr.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 34151,SD 34151 |
| Citation | 534 S.W.3d 256 |
| Parties | Jennifer THOMAS, Claimant–Respondent, v. FORSYTH CARE CENTER, Employer–Appellant, and Missouri Nursing Home Insurance Trust, Insurer–Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("the Commission") awarded Jennifer Thomas ("Claimant") commutation of her workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits. Forsyth Care Center and Missouri Nursing Home Insurance Trust (collectively "Employer") contend on appeal that the commutation award is not supported by sufficient competent evidence. Finding no merit in Employer's contention, we affirm the Commission's decision.
Our review is limited by the Missouri constitution, article V, section 18, to a determination of whether the award is "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." This "standard is not met if the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Wagner v. Harbert Yeargin Constr. Co., 145 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Mo.App. 2004).
We do not re-weigh the evidence presented to the Commission; rather, we defer to the Commission's findings as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of a witness's testimony. Hornbeck v. Spectra Painting, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Mo. banc 2012). Accordingly, although we review questions of law de novo, we will not substitute our own judgment on issues of fact where the Commission has acted within its authority, even if we would have reached a different conclusion. Underwood v. High Road Indus., LLC, 369 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Mo.App. 2012).
On December 10, 2007, Claimant was awarded a Temporary or Partial Award of workers' compensation benefits in connection with an injury sustained performing her work duties at Forsyth Care Center. Employer failed to comply with that temporary award and Claimant was unable to obtain certain treatments, worsening her condition. Employer offered no explanation for its failure to comply, and the Commission found Employer's conduct to demonstrate "an attitude of brazen indifference toward its obligations to [Claimant] under the administrative law judge's award." Claimant was later determined to be permanently and totally disabled by an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and Employer appealed. The ALJ's decision was affirmed on appeal to the Commission and in an unpublished opinion from this Court (Appeal No. SD32768). Following that decision, Claimant filed a motion for commutation of her permanent and total disability benefits.
At a hearing on her motion, Claimant testified that her husband is disabled and receives a net $764 per month in disability benefits. Claimant receives a net $795.96 per month in workers' compensation benefits.
They receive no other income. In June of 2014, Claimant moved from Kirbyville, Missouri (near Branson), to Grain Valley, Missouri (near Kansas City). Despite her move to Grain Valley, Claimant still receives medical care from Dr. Paul Geiger in Branson every three months.2 At Employer's request, Claimant was evaluated by Drs. Steven Hendler and Ted Lennard, but neither initiated a doctor-patient relationship.
Claimant's visits to Dr. Geiger cost anywhere from $97 to $150, which she had to pre-pay and then wait "[a]lmost a month" for reimbursement. After Claimant filed for commutation, premised upon Employer's requirement that she pre-pay and then seek reimbursement and the financial hardship that imposed upon her and her family, Employer set up a payment mechanism whereby Dr. Geiger was paid directly by Employer. Before Employer set up a direct payment mechanism for Claimant's pharmacy, Claimant would also spend approximately $245 per month for prescriptions, which she then had to submit to Employer for reimbursement. Because of her family's limited and fixed income, waiting for reimbursement was a hardship for Claimant. Employer had been paying Claimant's mileage for her doctor trips but informed her after her last trip that that would be the last time they paid it.
The Commission found Claimant's testimony that commutation would help her avoid undue hardship to be credible in light of Employer's "well-documented history of disregarding the [ALJ's] temporary award." Although the Commission recognized that, after Claimant filed for commutation, Employer had stopped requiring Claimant to pre-pay and then seek reimbursement, the Commission remained concerned that Employer would "continue to ignore its obligations, jeopardizing the financial security of [Claimant's] family." The Commission found those to be "unusual circumstances" and awarded commutation. Employer timely appeals.
In a single point relied on, Employer contends:
The [Commission] erred in finding that the [Claimant] was entitled to a commutation of the Permanent Total Disability award, in that there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant commutation of the award under the statutory standards of § 287.530 R.S. Mo 2000 and for the further reason that the Commission erroneously interpreted said statute.
We disagree.
We initially observe that Employer's point is multifarious. Points containing multiple allegations of error do not comply with Rule 84.04 and are considered multifarious.3 Atkins v. McPhetridge, 213 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Mo.App. 2006). We need not further address that issue, however, because the point's second allegation of error—the Commission "erroneously interpreted" section 287.530—is not developed or addressed in any manner in the argument section of Employer's brief and is thereby abandoned. "When an appellant fails to support a point with relevant legal authority or argument beyond conclusory statements, the point is deemed abandoned." Smith v. Med Plus Healthcare, 401 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Mo.App. 2013).
We now turn to Employer's first allegation of error—"there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant commutation of the award[.]" Employer's point, as related to this legal reason challenging the award, fails to comply with Rule 84.04(d)(2)(C), which requires a point relied on to "explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, [this legal reason supports] the claim of reversible error." Employer's point completely omits any such explanation and leaves us with no context within which to evaluate Employer's challenge to the award. Employer's argument fares no better.
A successful against-the-weight-of-the-evidence argument completes four steps:
Jordan v. USF Holland Motor Freight, Inc., 383 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Mo.App. 2012) (citing Stewart v. Sidio, 358 S.W.3d 524, 527-28 (Mo.App. 2012); Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 187 (Mo.App. 2010)).
Section 287.530 provides:
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