Thomas v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-03498 |
| Parties | CHASSITY THOMAS, by and through her legal guardian, NINA PHILLIPS, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Chassity Thomas, an adult woman with Down syndrome, was employed as a janitor by Jewish Child and Family Services (“JCFS”), doing business as Jewish Vocational Services. Thomas alleges that she was sexually assaulted while cleaning a locker room at the Illinois Center for Rehabilitation and Education (“Rehab Center”). As a result, she has sued JCFS, the Illinois Department of Human Services (“IDHS”), the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago (“JFMC”), and her alleged assailant, Edward Ford. Now before the Court are JCFS's motion to dismiss Thomas's claims against it (Dkt. No 38), Thomas's motion to strike JCFS's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 49), IDHS's motion to dismiss all of Thomas's claims against it (Dkt. No. 43), JFMC's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 54), JFMC's motion for sanctions against Thomas (Dkt. No. 57), and Thomas's motion for sanctions against JCFS (Dkt. No. 65). For the reasons given below, the Court grants IDHS's motion to dismiss and denies the remaining motions.
For purposes of JCFS's and IDHS's motions to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in Thomas's First Amended Complaint as true and draws reasonable inferences in her favor. Regains v. City of Chicago 918 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2019). The Court does not vouch for the accuracy of those allegations, however. Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2018).[1] The First Amended Complaint alleges as follows.
Thomas is a 32-year-old Black woman with Down syndrome who experiences visual and verbal impairments. (First Am. Compl (“FAC”) ¶¶ 9, 32, Dkt. No. 24.) She worked as a janitor for JCFS, an employment agency that “specializes in finding employment positions for disabled persons.” (Id. ¶ 9.) JCFS was aware of Thomas's disabilities. (Id. ¶ 10.)
As a JCFS janitor, Thomas provided cleaning services at the Rehab Center, a Chicago-based residential school serving people with severe physical disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 9.) The Rehab Center was owned or operated by IDHS, an Illinois state agency. (Id. ¶ 2.) Thomas was assigned to clean the men's locker room at the Rehab Center, which she did without supervision. (Id. ¶ 10.) Neither JCFS nor IDHS assigned anyone to supervise Thomas when she cleaned bathrooms or the locker room, nor did they ensure that those spaces were empty before she cleaned them. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Ford was a student at the Rehab Center, who made inappropriate sexualized remarks to staff and other persons there. (Id. ¶ 12.) Even though the Rehab Center's superintendent received reports about Ford's threatening and sexualized comments, Ford was allowed to remain at the Rehab Center without supervision. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 18-19.) Further, the physical education instructor at the Rehab Center had been informed that Ford waited in the locker room for long periods of time when Thomas was scheduled to clean it. (Id. ¶ 14.) Yet the instructor did not ask Ford to leave the center or inform a supervisor of Ford's conduct. (Id.)
On June 27, 2019, Ford cornered Thomas in the locker room. (Id.) He sexually assaulted her, penetrating her vagina with his fingers and inserting his penis into her buttocks. (Id.) That same day, Thomas tried to report her assault to Rehab Center staff members but struggled to do so due to her disabilities. (Id. ¶ 15.) Instead of trying to understand why Thomas was upset and afraid, those staff members ignored her. (Id.) And JCFS suspended Thomas without pay for two days without investigating what happened. (Id.) Even after learning that Thomas had been sexually assaulted, JCFS did not compensate her for her unpaid suspension. (Id.)
On June 28, 2019, Thomas successfully communicated to a Rehab Center employee that Ford had sexually assaulted her. (Id. ¶ 16.) The Illinois State Police were called, Thomas underwent an emergency room “rape kit” examination, and a criminal investigation followed. (Id.)
JCFS never investigated the Rehab Center's safety record or safety policies. (Id. ¶ 22.) It also did not investigate whether the Rehab Center's students had criminal backgrounds or posed a risk of sexual misconduct. (Id.) Nevertheless, it allowed Thomas to work at the Rehab Center and to clean the men's locker room there without supervision. (Id.) JCFS did not require the Rehab Center to provide notice of the presence of potentially dangerous persons. (Id. ¶ 23.) JCFS also did not implement any safety requirements or policies to ensure Thomas's safety and never investigated the circumstances of Thomas's rape. (Id. ¶ 24.)
In March and April 2020, Thomas informed JCFS that she was pursuing legal claims against JCFS for discrimination based on her disability, race, and sex. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 54.) In April 2020, JCFS placed Thomas on an indefinite paid suspension. (Id.) JCFS informed Thomas's mother that JCFS would inform her when, and if, Thomas could return to work. (Id.)
Thomas now asserts numerous claims against JCFS, IDHS, and JFMC. She contends that JCFS discriminated against her based on her disability, race, and sex, and retaliated against her when she communicated her intent to pursue legal action. She also claims that IDHS excluded her from government programming based on her disabilities, denied her access to a place of public accommodation, and is liable to her under several state-law causes of action. And finally, Thomas claims that that JFMC was negligent under Illinois state law because it failed to protect her.[2]
The Court turns first to Thomas's claims against JCFS. JCFS moves to dismiss all of Thomas's claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 38.) In response, Thomas moves to strike JCFS's motion (Dkt. No. 49), contending that JCFS impermissibly seeks to rely on additional evidence beyond the pleadings.
With a few exceptions not applicable here, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court's inquiry is generally limited to the factual allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint.” Stobinske-Sawyer v. Village of Alsip, 188 F.Supp.2d 915, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The Court cannot consider “matters outside the pleadings” in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting that motion to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). And if matters outside the pleadings are considered, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id.
Pursuant to Rule 12(d), Thomas moves to strike JCFS's motion to dismiss and to require JCFS to file a new motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In the alternative, Thomas moves to strike JCFS's motion pursuant to Rule 12(f) for containing “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).
Indeed, JCFS's motion to dismiss presents extensive factual detail beyond the allegations of the First Amended Complaint. JCFS even argues that Thomas's complaint should be dismissed for lack of evidentiary support-that is, because her allegations will not ultimately be proven- which is plainly improper for a motion to dismiss. See Covington v. Ill. Sec. Serv., Inc., 269 F.3d 863, 865 (7th Cir. 2001). Yet JCFS has clarified that it does not ask the Court to consider any matters outside the pleadings. Rule 12(d) requires the Court to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment only if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Thomas has offered no reason why simply disregarding JCFS's additional material would not be an inadequate remedy.
Thomas also has not explained how JCFS's motion to dismiss contains “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Even when immaterial matters are pleaded, the Court can “with or without a motion to strike . . . eliminate from consideration any argument, conclusions, and assertions that are unsupported by the documented evidence of record.” Prince v. Chi. Pub. Sch., No. 09-CV-2010, 2011 WL 3755650, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011). So, instead of formally “striking” portions of JCFS's motion-a procedure that is generally disfavored, see Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989) -the Court simply disregards any factual allegations beyond the pleadings made by JCFS.
For these reasons, Thomas's motion to strike is denied.
The Court next turns to the adequacy of Thomas's pleading. In Count I, Thomas claims that JCFS violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. in several ways: by providing her a less favorable job posting, failing to ensure a safe working environment, suspending her for two days without pay after she was sexually assaulted, and suspending her with pay indefinitely after she indicated her intent to pursue legal action. JCFS moves to dismiss Thomas's claims against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
As an initial matter, JCFS contends that Thomas has violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 by bunching multiple claims into a single count. “If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence-and each defense other than a denial-must be stated in a separate count or defense.” Fed.R.Civ.P 10(b). The main purpose of this rule is “to give defen...
To continue reading
Request your trial