Thomas v. Northern Telecom, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 October 2000
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1:00CV00505.
• Citation: 157 F.Supp.2d 627
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Annie THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN TELECOM, INC., Defendant.

157 F.Supp.2d 627

Annie THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN TELECOM, INC., Defendant.

Civil No. 1:00CV00505.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

October 11, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Anita Beane Hunt, Durham, NC, for plaintiff.

Frank Pelouze Ward, Jr., Maupin Taylor & Ellis, P.A., Raleigh, NC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BULLOCK, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure brought by Defendant Northern Telecom, Inc.¹ ("Nortel"). In her complaint, Plaintiff Annie Thomas claims that Nortel discriminated against her due to race and disability. Plaintiff also alleges that Nortel terminated her employment in retaliation for contacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to complain about this discrimination.

Plaintiff's complaint asserts four federal claims. These include violations of (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"); (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 ("Section 1985"); and (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). Plaintiff also alleges supplemental state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. For the following reasons, Defendant's partial motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

FACTS²

Plaintiff, an African-American woman, worked intermittently on Defendant's assembly line from 1991 until January 1998, when she was terminated. In 1995, Plaintiff injured both of her shoulders while at work. After corrective surgery, Plaintiff returned to work in January 1997. Upon returning to work, Plaintiff's physician instructed her to go to physical therapy any time she experienced shoulder pain. Defendant's work site has a physical therapy center. The physician also recommended that Plaintiff be assigned to an assembly line position requiring minimal physical exertion. Despite the physician's instructions, Plaintiff was allowed to attend physical therapy only after receiving permission from her supervisor. Plaintiff alleges that several white employees were permitted to attend physical therapy without having to get supervisor permission and that they were allowed to stay at physical therapy as long as necessary. In addition, Plaintiff was originally assigned to a job on the assembly line requiring repetitive lifting and twisting movements. She received a new assignment to a less physically demanding job only after complaining to her supervisor.

In April 1997 Defendant's company physician diagnosed Plaintiff with a permanent partial disability rating of 15% in her right arm and 20% in her left arm. The physician advised her not to lift more than twenty pounds and to avoid repetitive movements.

While on disability leave in July 1997, Plaintiff stopped receiving disability insurance payments. When Plaintiff inquired why she was not getting paid, she discovered that Defendant had not been submitting the required paperwork to the insurance carrier.

When Plaintiff returned to work in late 1997, her position on the assembly line involved labeling computer boards. On November 7, 1997, a group of Nortel supervisors, nurses, and managers told Plaintiff that she had to label 650 boards per day or that she would face termination. Plaintiff claims that she was given this ultimatum even though fewer than 650 computer boards came down the assembly line daily. Plaintiff further alleges that, although her target volume of boards per day was later reduced, Defendant continued to insist that she label more computer boards than any of her co-workers. According to Plaintiff, this discriminatory treatment continued even after she complained to the Human Resources Department. Plaintiff's complaint states that the mistreatment culminated on November 19, 1997, when "a supervisor ... told the other employees to find something else to do, because only the Plaintiff will have to complete 400 boards." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 20).

On January 2, 1998, Plaintiff contacted the EEOC. Plaintiff's complaint to the EEOC alleged discrimination based on race and disability. Defendant fired Plaintiff on January 19, 1998. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fired her in retaliation for exercising her federal civil rights by contacting the EEOC.

DISCUSSION

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (citations omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss the court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations and views the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993).

Defendant has moved to dismiss all or part of each of Plaintiff's claims.

I. ADA Claim

Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA claim on the basis that Plaintiff's impairments do not constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff does not come under the ADA's protection. To establish a cause of action under the ADA, a plaintiff must first show that she has a "disability" as defined by the statute. See Doe v. University of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir.1995). The ADA defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities ...; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having such impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

A. Plaintiff's claim of a substantial limitation

Plaintiff claims that she has a disability as defined by the ADA because she has been diagnosed as having a "disability rating of 15% and 20% in both arms." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 14). In addition, a physician has instructed Plaintiff not to lift more than twenty pounds and to avoid repetitive motions. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 14). These particular impairments, however, fail as a matter of law to bring Plaintiff under the protection of the ADA.

Several courts, including those within the Fourth Circuit, have consistently held that a restriction on lifting twenty pounds does not constitute a substantial limitation on a major life activity. In Jennings v. Greenville Utilities Comm'n, a recent case from the Eastern District of North Carolina, the court granted a motion to dismiss in holding that a restriction on "any lifting or exertion over 20 pounds" failed as a matter of law to come within the ADA definition of disability. 1998 WL 696932, at *2, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6125, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 1998). The court in Jennings relied on a Fourth Circuit case, Williams v. Channel Master, which held that as a matter of law "a twenty-five pound lifting limitation ... does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other life activity." Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Avnet, Inc., 520 U.S. 1240, 117 S.Ct. 1844, 137 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1997). Other circuits have also found that a restriction of lifting no more than twenty pounds fails to satisfy the ADA definition of disability. See, e.g., McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1997); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 384-86 (8th Cir.1995).

Courts have also found that a restriction on engaging in repetitive motions does not amount to a substantial limitation of a major life activity. See, e.g., McKay, 110 F.3d at 373 (finding that as a matter of law plaintiff who could not engage in repetitive motions was not substantially limited in any major life activity); Young v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 1998 WL 849523, at *1, 1998 U.S.App. LEXIS 31000, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 1998) (holding that repetitive motion syndrome does not substantially limit a major life activity). While Plaintiff's impairment may disqualify her from certain assembly line positions, it does not "significantly restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes," and therefore does not constitute a disability under the ADA. McKay, 110 F.3d at 373.

Finally, Plaintiff's disability rating of 15% and 20% in both arms is not an ADA disability. The rating is not itself a physical impairment, but rather a quantitative measure of Plaintiff's inability to lift more than twenty pounds or to engage in repetitive motion. In addition, even more severe disability ratings have been held not to equate to a disability under the ADA's definition. See Piascyk v. City of New Haven, 64 F.Supp.2d 19, 28 (D.Conn. 1999), aff'd, 2000 WL 804610, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9969 (2d Cir. May 11, 2000) ("Even if the 20% limitation in his leg and the 10% limitation in his back are aggregated and translated directly into a 30% limitation ... that degree of limitation does not rise to the requisite level of substantiality to qualify as a disability under the ADA."); Howell v. Sam's Club # 8160/Wal-Mart, 959 F.Supp. 260, 267-68 (E.D.Pa.1997), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1998) (as a matter of law a record of 20% disability in entire body does not establish a substantial limitation on a major life activity).

B. Plaintiff's claim of "being regarded as" disabled

Plaintiff's complaint also attempts to bring her under the protection of the ADA by claiming that Defendant regarded her as disabled. Plaintiff's complaint asserts that she is "an individual whom Nortel has regarded as disabled." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 31). However, Plaintiff offers no factual support for this conclusion. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 31). While this court accepts the truth of all Plaintiff's factual allegations in considering the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), it need not accept unsupported legal conclusions. See District 28, United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v....