Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr.
| Decision Date | 12 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 07-40J. |
| Citation | 615 F.Supp.2d 411 |
| Parties | Charles Scott THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORR.; Cutshall; Officer Everhart; Greenleaf; Officer Harpster; Superintendent George Patrick; Regional Deputy Secretary William Stickman; Younkin; John Does, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Evalynn B. Welling, Mary Walsh, Community Justice Project, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.
Tracey A. Wilson, Office of the Attorney General, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.
AND NOW, this 12th day of May, 2009, after plaintiff, Charles Scott Thomas, filed an action in the above-captioned case, and after defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and after a Report and Recommendation was filed by the United States Magistrate Judge granting the parties until May 11, 2009 to file written objections thereto, and upon consideration of the objections filed by plaintiff, and upon independent review of the record and the motion, and upon consideration of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which is adopted as the opinion of this Court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 73] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, if the parties desire to appeal from this Order they must do so within thirty (30) days by filing a notice of appeal as provided in Rule 3, Fed.R.App.P.
Plaintiff Charles Scott Thomas ("plaintiff") is an above-the-knee amputee and a prisoner in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). He has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12203, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, et seq., as well as state law, by denying him a handicap cell that is adapted for persons with disabilities and, after losing his prosthetic leg, replacing it with an inferior model. Presently before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment wherein they argue that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that the record is otherwise devoid of evidence to create a genuine issue on plaintiff's claims brought under the Eighth Amendment, the ADA or the RA. Defendants also argue that because they are entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiff's federal claims, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that defendants' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 73] be granted.
Plaintiff was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill ("SCICH") from the Allegheny County Jail ("ACJ"), in May of 2004. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was informed that his prosthetic leg, which was not in his possession during the transfer, was in need of repairs which SCICH would arrange to have done. Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale ("SCIH") on August 23, 2004, and on September 21, 2004, plaintiff was informed that his prosthetic leg could not be repaired and that he would be provided with a new prosthesis. In the interim, plaintiff was provided with crutches and, on September 7, 2004, was placed in a handicap cell.
Plaintiff was referred for a consult with an outside orthopedic appliance vendor and fitted for a new prosthetic leg on October 25, 2004. Although he had not yet received his new prosthetic leg, plaintiff was removed from the handicap cell on November 4, 2004, and placed in a non-handicap cell. Plaintiff's subsequent requests to be returned to a handicap cell, where there were hand rails to assist him, were denied. Although it appears that a physician's assistant ordered that plaintiff be placed in a handicap cell on December 20, 2004, he withdrew the order after being informed that a handicap cell was not available and that a non-handicap cell was suitable.
At some point in late 2004 or early 2005, plaintiff was informed that his old prosthesis had been lost by the DOC. Plaintiff nevertheless received his new prosthetic leg in February of 2005. The new prosthesis, however, differed from his old prosthesis in that it had a slip socket and belt system instead of an S and S hydraulic joint with locking lever and vacuum socket, and caused plaintiff pain. Plaintiff also complained that he had difficulty walking down grades and on uneven surfaces. Consequently, plaintiff refused the new prosthesis and again requested that he be placed in a handicap cell. That request was again denied.
Thereafter, on December 18, 2005, plaintiff alleges that he was attacked in his cell and, on June 7, 2006, he fell and hurt his back. A meeting was apparently held on January 16, 2007, to discuss plaintiff's need for a handicap cell and was concluded without that assignment being made.
It also appears that during inclement weather plaintiff had to be carried to the dining hall due to the wet and slippery conditions and, although an earlier request had been denied, plaintiff was issued a wheelchair to use in inclement weather on January 25, 2007.
Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, filed the instant complaint on February 23, 2007, bringing claims against the DOC; Jerry L. Everhart, plaintiff's Unit Manager; Craig Harpster, another of plaintiff's Unit Managers; Norene Greenleaf, the Corrections Health Care Administrator at SCIH; George Patrick, the Superintendent of SCIH; William Stickman, the Regional Deputy Secretary for the Western Region; and Debra Younkin, the Acting Corrections Health Care Administrator at SCIH.1 Plaintiff alleges that defendants denied him meaningful access to exercise equipment, job opportunities, and prison dining facilities and deprived him of the benefit of those prison programs, services and activities by failing to replace plaintiff's old prosthesis with an equivalent prosthesis in violation of the ADA and the RA; that defendants violated the ADA and RA by refusing to place him in a handicap cell which denied him meaningful access to the toilet, sink, and shower, interfered with his ability to dress himself and posed a threat of serious harm; that defendants further violated the ADA by failing to accommodate him with a handicap cell in retaliation for refusing to accept the new prosthetic leg;2 that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs by delaying the replacement of his prosthesis and by refusing his requests for a handicap cell in violation of the Eighth Amendment; that defendants' policy, custom, practice and/or procedure of assigning cells to disabled inmates further violated the Eighth Amendment; and that defendants Everhart, Greenleaf, Patrick, Stickman and Younkin failed to protect plaintiff from physical injury at the hands of other inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying his request for a handicap cell. Complaint ¶¶ 85-92.
Plaintiff also brings state law claims of common law bailment and common law conversion and/or negligent dispossession against the DOC for losing his old prosthesis. Id. at ¶¶ 93, 94.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that his constitutional rights were violated, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and costs, fees and litigation expenses as well as any other relief that is warranted. Id. at ¶ 95.
Summary judgment is warranted only where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir.2004). When the moving party has met this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The mere existence of some evidence favoring the non-moving party, however, will not defeat the motion. There must be enough evidence with respect to a particular issue to enable a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363-64 (3d Cir.2005). In evaluating the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Matreale v. New Jersey Dept. of Military & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 899, 169 L.Ed.2d 728 (2008).
Defendants first argue that the individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiff's federal claims because they are protected under the Eleventh Amendment.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, states are generally immune from suit brought in federal court by private parties.3 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir.2003). "This protection from suit extends to state agencies as well as state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages." Id. Cf. Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 178-79 (3d Cir....
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