Thomas v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 07 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:17-cv-662-TJC-JBT |
| Parties | WILLIAM GREG THOMAS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner William Greg Thomas is a Florida prisoner convicted and sentenced to death for kidnapping and murdering his wife (“the wife-murder”). Thomas v. State 693 So.2d 951, 951 (Fla. 1997) (“Thomas I”).[1] This case is about his second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as it relates to the wife-murder. (Doc. 1, “Second Petition.”)[2] Petitioner raises two grounds: (1) that throughout the trial and collateral proceedings, the State violated its obligation to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence under Mooney v Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (“Brady/Giglio claims”); and (2) that Petitioner's death sentence is illegal because the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the retroactive application of Florida Statutes section 921.141 (2017)[3], which was passed after Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from by State v. Poole, 297 So.3d 487 (Fla. 2020) (the “Hurst-type claim”).
Respondents argue that the claims in the Second Petition are untimely, procedurally defaulted, and meritless. (Doc. 8, Response.) Respondents also move to dismiss the Second Petition as an unauthorized successive habeas application. (Doc. 24, Motion to Dismiss; see also Doc. 8 at 8-13.) Petitioner has replied to the Response (Doc. 13, Reply) and responded to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39, Response to Motion to Dismiss).
The Second Petition will be dismissed. Because litigation on the merits of the First Petition had concluded in this Court when the Second Petition was filed, and because neither ground in the Second Petition is exempt from the “second or successive” bar under Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), the Second Petition is an unauthorized successive habeas application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). As a result, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.
In 1991, Petitioner planned and executed the murder of his wife, Rachel, to avoid paying his part of a settlement agreement in their pending divorce. Thomas I, 693 So.2d at 951. Petitioner later “killed his own mother to keep her from talking to police about Rachel's death.” Id. at 953. Petitioner admitted to killing his mother and, for that crime, he was sentenced to life in prison. For the wife's murder, a jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder, burglary, and kidnapping and recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one. Id. at 951. The judge imposed a death sentence based on five aggravating factors and no mitigating circumstances. Id. (footnote omitted). On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences, including the death sentence. See Id. at 953. His convictions and sentences became final on November 17, 1997, when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Thomas v. Florida, 522 U.S. 985 (1997). Later, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, finding that Petitioner had received the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Thomas II, 838 So.2d 535.
On March 24, 2003, attorney Mary Catherine Bonner moved this Court to be appointed as Petitioner's counsel for his yet-to-be-filed federal habeas petition, suggesting that time was of the essence. (First Habeas Case, Doc. 1.) On April 2, 2003, the Court granted that motion and appointed Bonner to represent Petitioner. (Id., Doc. 4.) Nearly a year went by before finally, on March 22, 2004-after AEDPA's[4] limitations period had expired-Ms. Bonner filed the First Petition on Petitioner's behalf, raising eight grounds for relief. (Id., Doc. 12.)[5] At first, the Court dismissed the First Petition with prejudice because it was barred by AEDPA's statute of limitations and the Court found that Petitioner did not qualify for equitable tolling. Thomas III, 452 F.Supp.2d at 1218. But then, on Petitioner's motion, the Court agreed to reconsider the matter, scheduled an evidentiary hearing, and heard testimony from Petitioner and Ms. Bonner. In the meantime, the Eleventh Circuit decided Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2008), and Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008), rev'd 560 U.S. 631 (2010), which elaborated on the standard for establishing a right to equitable tolling under AEDPA. Given those decisions and the facts developed at the evidentiary hearing, the Court determined that Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling based on the egregious misconduct of his federal habeas counsel, Ms. Bonner. Thomas IV, 2009 WL 9081403, at *5-10.
Having found that the statute of limitations did not bar the First Petition, the Court entered an order on the merits in 2013 finding that Petitioner's claims did not entitle him to relief. Thomas V, 2013 WL 11326723.[6] Thus, the Court denied the First Petition, granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on three ineffective assistance subclaims, denied a COA on the rest of the claims, and entered judgment against Petitioner. See id. at *33.
Petitioner appealed the denial of the First Petition on the merits and Respondents cross-appealed the decision to give Petitioner the benefit of equitable tolling. In 2015, in light of more intervening decisions from the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, the court of appeals remanded the case for additional findings of fact concerning equitable tolling. Thomas VI, 795 F.3d at 1296-97. The Eleventh Circuit's remand was limited to the equitable tolling issue. Id. at 1297 n.3. As a result, the merits were outside the scope of the limited remand and remained pending before the appeals court.
After the mandate issued in Thomas VI, this Court ordered additional briefing and held another hearing about whether Ms. Bonner's conduct was egregious enough to warrant equitable tolling. (The hearing was non-evidentiary because Respondents stipulated that Ms. Bonner willfully missed the filing deadline to tee up a challenge to AEDPA's statute of limitations.) The Court made additional findings of fact and concluded “that Ms. Bonner was dishonest with her client,” that “she acted in bad faith and with divided loyalty,” and that “Ms. Bonner's bad faith, dishonesty, and divided loyalty resulted in her ‘effectively abandoning' her client.” Thomas VII, 2018 WL 733631, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2018). Thus, the Court concluded that Petitioner remained entitled to equitable tolling. Id. at *22. The Eleventh Circuit then affirmed both the ruling that Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling and the denial of the First Petition on the merits. Thomas VIII, 992 F.3d 1162.
While the First Petition was before this Court on the limited remand, Petitioner filed the Second Petition in a separate case. But on March 29, 2018- after the Court issued additional findings of fact in response to the limited remand and returned the First Habeas Case to the Eleventh Circuit- Petitioner moved for leave to amend the First Petition to add the new Brady/Giglio and Hurst-type claims or to consolidate this case with the First Habeas Case. (First Habeas Case, Doc. 241, Motion for Leave to Amend or Consolidate.) The Court denied that motion without prejudice to refiling, if appropriate, after the appeal was resolved. (Id., Doc. 248.) Petitioner did not renew the motion after the Eleventh Circuit decided Thomas VIII.
Petitioner raises two grounds in the Second Petition. First, he contends that the State violated his right to due process by presenting false testimony or suppressing exculpatory or impeachment evidence, in violation of Mooney, 294 U.S. 103, Brady, 373 U.S. 83, Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, and Banks, 540 U.S. 668. (Doc. 1 at 7-57.) Federal habeas counsel[7]states that he stumbled upon the factual basis for this ground in June 2016 while conducting a routine criminal history check on Ahmad Dixon, one of the State's witnesses at Petitioner's trial. (See id. at 8-13.) Dixon testified at the guilt phase that, in late August 1993 when he was an inmate at the Duval County jail, he walked in on a conversation between Petitioner and an inmate named Adrian Cason. During that conversation, according to Dixon, Petitioner admitted “he had chopped the bitch [Petitioner's wife] in the throat” and killed her. Thomas I, 693 So.2d at 952 n.3. When Dixon testified at Petitioner's trial, he acknowledged he was facing a federal drug charge and that he had pleaded guilty to it, but he denied facing any state charges. (See Doc. 1 at 28-29.) Petitioner's habeas counsel discovered in June 2016 that Dixon was arrested on July 17, 1993, for a state drug crime and an attempted sexual battery, that the state drug charge was filed and dropped on August 9, 1993, and that an attempted sexual battery charge in state court was dropped on January 26, 1994. (Id. at 8-13, 42-46.) Thus, Petitioner alleges, Dixon lied and the State knowingly presented false testimony when Dixon denied being the subject of state criminal charges.
Also in Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the State failed to disclose that Adrian Cason-who was himself charged with first-degree murder- struck a plea agreement in August 1993 to help the State prosecute Petitioner. (Id. at 14-20, 33-42.) In exchange for being spared the death penalty, Cason would plead guilty in his case and help gather evidence against Petitioner. So Pet...
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