Thomas v. State, s. 88-202
Decision Date | 21 December 1989 |
Docket Number | 88-203,Nos. 88-202,s. 88-202 |
Citation | 784 P.2d 237 |
Parties | Delores M. THOMAS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). Delores M. THOMAS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Leonard Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, and S. Gregory Thomas (argued), Student Intern, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Maryrobin Burney (argued), Student Extern, for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
Appellant Delores Thomas was convicted after a jury trial of transferring a forged prescription for Percodan, a Schedule II controlled substance. Thomas has appealed the conviction, presenting the following issue:
"Did the court below err in refusing to instruct the jury upon request as to the dangers of eyewitness testimony and the possibility of error (1) where the sole issue for the jury under the defendant's theory of the case was the accuracy of that identification; (2) where the testimony of the sole witness to the criminal transaction suggested irregularities in the identification process; and (3) where there was expert testimony explaining the process of identification and the possibility of mistaken recall?"
We affirm.
On June 18, 1986, Rick Svoboda came to appellant's house seeking pain pills. She said she did not have any, so Svoboda suggested that she get some from her doctor. That afternoon appellant, using the alias Delores Burgess, visited Dr. Richard Whalen's office complaining of abdominal pain. She testified that she intended to get some pain pills and that she planned to share them with Rick Svoboda, who she described as a drug addict. As she did not have an appointment, she waited for the doctor in an examining room where she had access to Dr. Whalen's blank prescription pads. When Dr. Whalen did examine her, he prescribed Tagament and Bentyl for the abdominal pain, although he noted that the pain could be contrived. When appellant left Dr. Whalen's office, Rick Svoboda was waiting for her. He asked her if she had obtained any pain pills, and she said no. He called her a liar, and she showed him the prescriptions she had received. They argued, appellant tore up the prescriptions, and Svoboda left.
Later that same day, a woman walked into a Casper pharmacy and presented a prescription for Percodan, a narcotic drug, made out to a Dawn Gilbert. The prescription was written on a form from Dr. Whalen's office and bore the purported signature of Dr. Whalen. The pharmacist, Oscar Ray, filled the prescription. However, the next day he examined the prescription more closely and grew suspicious that it might be forged. He called Dr. Whalen, who said he had not written any such prescription and that he did not have a patient named Dawn Gilbert. Mr. Ray then contacted the police. Subsequently, the police assembled a photo lineup from Mr. Ray's description, and he identified a picture of appellant as the woman who presented the prescription. Dr. Whalen also identified her from the photo lineup as the "Delores Burgess" he examined. Both also identified appellant at trial.
Appellant testified at trial that she did not pass the forged prescription. She said that after she was arrested, Rick Svoboda told her that a woman named Carol Burnett had passed the forged prescription. She described Burnett as someone who probably has the same hair color and body frame as herself. She contends that the similarity in appearance between herself and Carol Burnett raises a question as to the accuracy of Oscar Ray's identification of her as the perpetrator.
Appellant also offered the testimony of a psychologist, George Blau, who testified as an expert witness on information processing, perception and recall. Blau's testimony dealt primarily with problems associated
with eyewitness perception and memory recall.
At the close of the evidence, appellant offered the following instruction, which was refused:
This proposed instruction is essentially the same as the "Model Special Instructions on Identification" adopted by the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (1972).
The Telfaire instruction contains two separate components: burden of proof of identity and credibility of eyewitness identification testimony. The trial court in this case gave separate and appropriate instructions to the jury on burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and witness credibility. Appellant contends, nevertheless, that the Telfaire instruction should also have been given in order to present her theory of the case.
The trial court's refusal to give the instruction can be affirmed on either of two theories. First, even if defendant asserts that it represents her theory of the case, a court may refuse an instruction which is argumentative or unduly emphasizes one aspect of the case. Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 154 (Wyo.1989); Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Wyo.1982). In Prime we considered language of an instruction which was virtually identical to part of the instruction requested here and concluded that it represented "a skillful effort to induce the trial court to argue the case for the defense through its instructions." 767 P.2d at 154.
The rhetorical questions "Are you convinced * * * ?" and "Are you satisfied * * * ?" may be appropriate in argument but not as part of the court's charge to the jury. Further, the instruction emphasizes the identification as one of "the most important issues" in the case and repeatedly stresses that identification is an element to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with those courts which hold that general instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility of witnesses are sufficient. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 652 P.2d 174, 179 (Colo.App.1981); People v. Hefner, 70 Ill.App.3d 693, 27 Ill.Dec. 96, 99, 388 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (1979).
Second, a defendant seeking a theory of the case instruction must satisfy two requirements. The defendant must offer an instruction which is sufficient to apprise the court of his theory of the case, and that theory must be supported by competent evidence. Best v. State, 736...
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