Thompkins v. State

Decision Date24 September 1986
Docket NumberNo. 72658,72658
Citation180 Ga.App. 473,349 S.E.2d 768
PartiesTHOMPKINS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Samuel A. Hilbun, Dublin, for appellant.

Beverly B. Hayes, Dist. Atty., William T. McBroom, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

SOGNIER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and he appeals.

1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, because there was no evidence that the killing in this case was the result of a sudden, violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation.

Appellant's girl friend, Dorothy Walker, had dated Arthur Little, the victim, for a period of about two months about a year before the incident involved here. She later started going with appellant, who was spending the night at Walker's house on the night of the killing. Late on the night of October 21, 1985 Little asked Frankie O'Neal for a ride, and directed O'Neal to Walker's house. Little told O'Neal to wait for him, then went in the house and talked to Kat Walker, Dorothy's sister, for a few minutes and returned to O'Neal's truck. As Little was getting in the truck appellant came out on the porch and asked what was going on; apparently a few words were exchanged and O'Neal and Little departed. Five or ten minutes later Little returned to the Walker house and was standing on the porch talking to Kat. Appellant and Dorothy were in bed, and when appellant heard someone talking at the door he put on his pants and shoes, took a gun from under the mattress and went out the back door. Appellant came around the house to the front porch, and told Little not to reach for his pocket. Kat saw that appellant had a gun and started back in the house. She heard five shots and saw Little crawl under the house; appellant reached under the house and fired three more times. Little died as a result of six gunshot wounds in his body. Appellant testified that Little said he was going to kill appellant and he shot Little in self-defense. Kat Walker testified that she did not hear Little threaten appellant, and did not see a gun in Little's hand. Appellant also testified that he did not see a gun in Little's hand, but thought he had a gun because he started to reach for his pocket.

OCGA § 16-5-2(a) provides, in pertinent part: "A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person; ..." In order to warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter, the evidence must not only show an act of violent passion, but also some serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable man. Swett v. State, 242 Ga. 228, 230, 248 S.E.2d 629 (1978). We find no evidence in this case to indicate that the killing was done in the heat of sudden passion, or was the result of serious provocation. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that the shooting was a deliberate act on the part of appellant, who got out of bed, dressed, got his gun, went outside and around the house, and shot Little. Further, appellant's defense in this case was that he acted in self-defense, not that he killed Little in the heat of passion as the result of serious provocation. Voluntary manslaughter denotes one acting out of anger or passion; self-defense denotes one acting with a motive to prevent injury. Murff v. State, 251 Ga. 478, 480, 306 S.E.2d 267 (1983). Thus, voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense was not raised by the evidence and a charge on that offense was not warranted. However, if in a trial for murder the evidence does not involve the law of voluntary manslaughter, but the trial judge instructs on voluntary manslaughter and the jury convicts of voluntary manslaughter, it is not cause for a new...

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4 cases
  • Rodriguez v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 21, 2005
    ...murder and felony murder), 16-5-2 (defining voluntary manslaughter), 16-5-21 (defining aggravated assault); Thompkins v. State, 180 Ga.App. 473, 474(1), 349 S.E.2d 768 (1986) (evidence demanding verdict of murder will support conviction voluntary manslaughter where the jury is instructed on......
  • Reese v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 8, 2004
    ...does not involve the law of voluntary manslaughter, so long as that evidence demands a verdict of murder. Thompkins v. State, 180 Ga.App. 473, 474(1), 349 S.E.2d 768 (1986); Varnum v. State, 125 Ga.App. 57, 62(1), 186 S.E.2d 485 (1971); see also Robinson v. State, 109 Ga. 506, 507, 34 S.E. ......
  • Gore v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 11, 2005
    ...267 Ga. 847, 847-848, 483 S.E.2d 588 (1997) (eyewitness testimony sufficient to affirm murder conviction); Thompkins v. State, 180 Ga.App. 473, 474(1), 349 S.E.2d 768 (1986) (where evidence demands murder verdict, jury instructed on voluntary manslaughter may find defendant guilty on the le......
  • Wright v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 9, 1987
    ...of voluntary manslaughter, it is not cause for a new trial if the evidence demanded a verdict of murder. Thompkins v. State, 180 Ga.App. 473, 474(1), 349 S.E.2d 768 (1986). Accordingly, we find no error. The evidence otherwise is more than sufficient to meet the standard of proof required b......

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