Thompson's Estate v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | MERCEDES-BEN,No. 1672,INC,1672 |
| Citation | 514 P.2d 1269 |
| Parties | ESTATE of George THOMPSON, Deceased, Appellant, v., Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
O. Nelson Parrish, of Parrish & Parrish, Fairbanks, for appellant.
Robert L. Eastaugh, of Delaney, Wiles, Moore, Hayes & Reitman, Anchorage, for appellee.
Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CONNOR, ERWIN, BOOCHEVER, and FITZGERALD, JJ.
On June 16, 1967, George Thompson was killed in a one-car accident while driving his Mercedes-Benz automobile. William H. Ackiss, a passenger in Thompson's automobile, was injured.
On December 27, 1967, William Ackiss and Donna Mae Ackiss, plaintiffs, filed a complaint containing the following counts: Count I for negligence against the State of Alaska; Count II against Mercedes-Benz, Inc., for negligence; Count III in strict liability against Mercedes-Benz, Inc.; Count IV for breach of warranty by Mercedes-Benz, Inc.; Count V against the Estate of Thompson for negligence; Count VI in strict liability against the Estate of Thompson. Attorney Robert A. Parrish represented the plaintiffs Ackiss.
On January 8, 1968, an appearance was entered by the firm of Merdes, Schaible, Staley & DeLisio on behalf of the estate and apparently Mercedes-Benz. On January 18, 1968, George M. Yeager entered his appearance on behalf of the estate. The representation of the parties began to finalize when Dallas L. Phillips was substituted for Edward A. Merdes as counsel for Mercedes-Benz on January 31, 1968. Mercedes-Benz answered on April 2, 1968, and on May 13, 1968, an answer was filed on behalf of the Estate of George Thompson.
Sometime in 1969, Ackiss and the Estate of George Thompson came to some form of settlement agreement. Subsequently, Mr. Robert A. Parrish was substituted as counsel for the Estate of George Thompson on August 27, 1969. On September 4, 1969, the Estate of George Thompson moved in the superior court for leave to file a cross-claim againts Mercedes-Benz. The cross-claim contained three counts: one for negligence, another for strict liability, and finally a count alleging breach of warranty. The cross-claim contained a survival action in the name of the decedent as well as a wrongful death action. Opposition to the motion was filed by Mercedes-Benz on September 11, 1969, on the grounds that AS 09.10.070, the general statute of limitations, had run since the accident occurred on June 16, 1967. The motion to file a cross-claim was denied in a memorandum opinion and order of Superior Court Judge Warren Taylor on November 12, 1969.
This court denied a petition for review filed by the estate and the other claims were all ultimately disposed of by settlement. After judgment was entered in this case, the estate appealed the decision of the trial court denying it permission to file a cross-claim.
The sole issue that needs to be decided on this appeal is whether the estate's cross-claim was barred by a statute of limitations, or if it related back under Alaska Rule of Civil Rpocedure 15(c) to the date the estate filed its answer. 1
Initially this court must decide if appellant should have been granted leave to amend its answer under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 2
Apparently, the trial court never considered this problem. Rule 15(a) provides leave to amend shall 'be freely given when justice so requires.' Generally, under the identical Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, leave to amend is liberally granted, 3 and in this instance the amendment was offered before trial. Still, the trial judge had discretion on whether to allow leave to amend and will have his ruling overturned only when there is an abuse of discretion. 4
Probably the most frequent reason for denying leave to amend is that it would be prejudicial to the opposing party. 5 The prejudice can result from the opposing party being put to an added expense, a more burdensome and lengthy trial, or if the issues being raised in the amendment are remote from the scope of the original case. 6 The trial judge here did not consider any factors when denying appellant's motion to amend other than the statute of limitations. This was not the correct manner in which to consider appellant's motion for leave to amend. The court
. . . should consider the request for leave to amend under subsection 'a' of the rule uninfluenced by whether, under Rule 15(c), the amendment would or would not relate back, and that once the amendment has been allowed, if the defendant pleaded limitation, the court would then act upon the plea in light of the provision of 15(c). . . . 7
We hold that under Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) the appellant should have been granted leave to amend since there was no showing that the amendment would have resulted in an injustice. Because the appellee did raise the statute of limitations argument, the next step for the trial judge would be to determine whether the cross-claim related back under Alaska Civil Rule 15(c).
Appellant argues that under Rule 15(c) the cross-claim relates back to when the original answer was filed and is not barred by either of the relevant statutes of limitations. 8 We agree and feel any other result would be in conflict with the liberal interpretation this court has given the civil rules in the past. 9
Appellee Mercedes-Benz initally argues that the purported cross-claim did not amend any original pleadings, and this is not an amendment for purposes of Civil Rule 15(a) or (c). Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
Appellee seems to contend that because Civil Rule 15 does not specifically state that an addition of a cross-claim to an answer is an amendment, Civil Rule 15(c) is inapplicable. If that were true, appellant's cross-claim could not relate back to the date the original answer was filed. We find that this position untenable. First, appellee has not shown this court how an added cross-claim could logically be characterized an anything other than an attempt to amend the answer. 10 Once the estate filed its answer there was no feasible way to introduce a cross-claim other than a Civil Rule 15 amendment. The estate is not required to file a separate action to raise the claims set forth in the cross-complaint. 11 Therefore, we conclude that when the estate attempted to add its cross-complaint to its original answer this was an attempt to amend its original pleadings and is governed by the requirements set forth in Civil Rule 15(c).
Appellees also argue that the cross-claim does not relate back under Civil Rule 15(c) because it states a new and different action. Rule 15(c) cautions that an amendment will only relate back if it 'arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading . . ..' While we agree with appellee that an amendment must arise from the same transaction as the original pleading, 12 we do not feel the facts in this particular case indicate that the appellant's proposed amendment arose from a different transaction.
In December of 1967, Mercedes-Benz was served with a complaint by the plaintiffs Ackiss. In the same complaint the estate was also named as a defendant in the aforementioned automobile accident. The estate's answer was filed on May 13, 1968, and did not contain a cross-claim. The proferred cross-claim concerned the same accident which was the subject of the original answer. The problem of whether a cross-claim can relate back to when the original answer was filed is one of first impression for this court, and is complicated by the fact that neither counsel nor this court could locate authority on the precise issue. However, guidance may be taken from authorities dealing with analogous questions and the policy behind the relation-back doctrine.
The relation-back rule has been very liberally applied. 13 One commentator has stated that the theory behind Civil Rule 15(c) is that, '(a) party who is notified of the litigation concerning a given transaction or occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitation are intended to afford. . . .' 14 Cross-claims will be allowed 'in the absence of a showing of injustice to someone or a delay of the trial' where there is no express rule of court imposing a limitation on the time that cross-claims must be filed. 15
A question analogous in many respects to that in the case at bar is whether an omitted compulsory counterclaim introduced under Civil Rule 13(f) 16 relates back to the date the original answer was filed. In Stoner v. Terranella 17 the Sixth Circuit held that since omitted counterclaims are specifically dealt with in Rule 13(f), the general amendment provisions of Rule 15(a) and (c) did not apply. The court stated:
We conclude that the remedies provided by the two rules are mutually exclusive in the sense that an amendment asserting a previously omitted counterclaim, such as was attempted in the instant case, is made pursuant to Rule 13(f) and not Rule 15(a). Consequently, since Rule 15(c) is applicable only to amendments made pursuant to Rule 15(a), amendments made pursuant to Rule 13(f) do not relate back to the original pleadings. 18
There is some disagreement on this analogous relation-back question and some criticism has been directed at the result in Stoner. Professors Wright and Miller made the following criticism of Stoner:
Under closer scrutiny, the Stoner decision appears very dubious. It is somewhat inconsistent to conclude that after the limitations period has run plaintiff may allege an additional claim for relief arising from the conduct, transaction, or occurrence involved in his original claim and that it will relate back under Rule 15(c), yet deny defendant an...
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Watts v. State
...claim of injuries to child). See also United States v. C. & G. Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 576 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Estate of Thompson v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 514 P.2d 1269 (Alaska 1973). In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion to dismiss the claims for wrongful de......