Thompson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.

• Decision Date: 18 July 1935
• Docket Number: 14112.
• Citation: 180 S.E. 880,177 S.C. 120
• Parties: THOMPSON v. ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

180 S.E. 880

177 S.C. 120

THOMPSON v. ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.

No. 14112.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 18, 1935

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Marlboro County; J. Henry Johnson, Judge.

Action by Joseph Herbert Thompson against the Ætna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Henry E. Davis, of Florence, for appellant.

Bennett & Carroll, of Bennettsville, for respondent.

FISHBURNE Justice.

The plaintiff, as one of the employees of J. L. Anderson, of Cheraw, S. C., brought this action on a group policy of insurance issued to Anderson by the defendant for the benefit of the employees in his veneer mill at Cheraw S.C. Under the terms of the policy each employee was insured to the amount of $1,000, to be paid either at his death or to the employee personally in the event he should become totally and permanently disabled before attaining the age of 60 years, and while insured under the policy. The insurance contract was originally issued on September 16, 1925, and was canceled on November 15, 1933.

In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that while in the employ of J. L. Anderson he became totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the terms of the policy prior to November 15, 1933, and sought to recover the sum of $1,000 actual damages therefor.

A second cause of action was set out in the complaint, based upon fraudulent breach of contract, but it is not necessary to consider this phase of the matter, for the reason that at the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony a verdict was directed in favor of the defendant on this cause of action.

The defendant denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and set up by way of an affirmative defense that the group policy upon which the action is based was issued by the defendant on the employees of J. L. Anderson on September 16, 1925, and canceled on November 15, 1933; that the plaintiff continued in the employ of Anderson, and worked long after the cancellation of the said group policy upon which his action is based, during all of which time he was not totally disabled; therefore he could not have become totally and permanently disabled during the continuance of the insurance as required by the terms of the disability clause. It is conceded by the appellant that the premium payment made by the plaintiff in November, 1933, under his testimony was applicable to the policy sued upon, and continued it in force at least through December 16, 1933.

The cause was heard at Bennettsville before his honor, Judge J. Henry Johnson, and a jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000 on his first cause of action.

At the close of plaintiff's testimony the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict in his favor, which was refused as to the cause of action for actual damages. After the announcement of the verdict, and before the jury was discharged, the defendant renewed its motion for a directed verdict on the first cause of action, which, being refused, the defendant then made a motion for a new trial, which was likewise refused.

That portion of the provision of the policy upon which suit is brought, pertinent to the issues presented here, reads as follows: "If any employee, before attaining the age of sixty years and while insured hereunder, becomes totally disabled and presumably will thereafter during life be unable to engage in any occupation or employment for wage or profit, or shall meet with the entire and irrecoverable loss of the sight of both eyes or of the use of both hands or both feet or of one hand and one foot, such employee shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled."

It appears from the testimony introduced on behalf of the plaintiff that he was a skilled, capable, and industrious workman, employed at Cheraw, in the veneer plant of J. L. Anderson, and had been so employed for a period of 12 years continuously, prior to January 1, 1934, and for the last six years of his employment he occupied the position of foreman in the lathe room. This was the only kind of work he was skilled and trained in doing. It constituted his sole and customary method of making a living for himself and his wife and two children, and he was not skilled in any other line of work.

It will be borne in mind that the policy of insurance under which the plaintiff sued was canceled on November 15, 1933 (although valid and effective until December 16, 1933), so that the real and vital question for the court to determine in this case is whether there was sufficient competent evidence to be submitted to the jury in support of the allegations that the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled while the policy in suit was in effect. We shall also pass upon other questions made by the exceptions.

In October, 1931, while engaged in working one of the lathe machines, a small piece of steel broke from some part of the machinery, and was projected into his left eye, in consequence of which he lost the eye. By reason of this injury he was unable to continue his work for about five weeks, at the end of which time he returned to the mill and worked there continuously until January 1, 1934, except for a period in March, 1932, when he suffered an attack of influenza which incapacitated him for a short while.

The testimony for the plaintiff shows that he relates the commencement of his permanent and total disability to the date of the injury to his eye; that is, in October, 1931. The evidence shows that following this injury the plaintiff developed a nervous condition, culminating in "spells" at the end of each work week, and which grew gradually and progressively worse throughout the years of 1932 and 1933. He became nervous and irritable, and was obsessed with the fear that he would do some physical injury to his wife and children. This fear became so intense during the period referred to that at his request such dangerous instrumentalities as axes, knives, and scissors were hidden when he was in the house.

The testimony of Mrs. Thompson, plaintiff's wife, shows that plaintiff complained of headache all the time, was nervous and irritable from the period commencing with the injury to the eye until finally the children could not come into the house because the noise they made distracted him, and that it was almost impossible for her to stay in the house with him as the end of each week approached; that his physical and mental deterioration became so acute that on January 1, 1934, she persuaded him to stop work. It is in testimony that prior to his voluntarily quitting work on January 1, 1934, he continuously made threats against his wife and his children, and would walk the floor and the streets at night.

Doctor Kenny, a local physician who treated him in January, 1934, testified to his mental hallucination with reference to nervous fears, his despondency; that he was "sick in the brain," and that he was suffering from an acute attack of psychoneurosis when the doctor saw him in January and February; that when he attended him he presented all the appearances of a crazy man, and was totally and wholly unfit for work in the capacity of a machinist foreman. Dr. Kenny attributed his mental condition and illness to a physical basis, existing prior to his examination. He described psychoneurosis as "where you have a lot of fears and horror and dread, and he can't get it out of his head." He further stated that the plaintiff discussed his symptoms with him fully, and also his mental condition, stating that he was afraid that he would kill his wife and his children. The doctor also testified that the plaintiff might have lucid intervals, and that he might improve and even do some work, but the witness refused to venture the assertion that the plaintiff would return to a normal condition.

The witness Wilson, who was a general machinist in the J. L. Anderson veneering plant, testified: That following the injury to his eye plaintiff was unable to perform his work as foreman in the plant in substantially his customary and usual manner; that after this injury the plaintiff would fail in his work toward the last of each week, and that noticing this condition he would assist him; that this inability on the part of the plaintiff to perform his work became much worse about the fall of 1933, and especially in October and November of that year.

The witness H. H. Griffin, a brother-in-law of the plaintiff, who lived at Bennettsville, testified with reference to the plaintiff, in part, as follows: "After he got his eye put out, I know that he never has been exactly the same, still he was not seriously ill then; but as time went on, I will say about the middle of last September (1933), or in September, I would go to Cheraw the week-end and get him and bring him here to stay with me. He seemed to be very nervous and shot all to pieces. I didn't go every weekend, but two or three times a month."

About the middle of January, 1934, the plaintiff, upon his own initiative, was admitted to the State Hospital in Columbia, where he remained, with one intermission, for a period of three months. While there he was especially under the care of Dr. Herger.

Dr Herger testified that the plaintiff was at that time suffering from psychoneurosis, psychothenic type; that the plaintiff had the most extreme form of this disease; and that in his opinion he was an insane and dangerous man. He stated further that the injury to or loss of the eye suffered by plaintiff might have acted as an exciting factor in bringing on his mental trouble; that no change had taken place in the condition of the plaintiff between the time he was first admitted to the hospital and when he was...