Thompson v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 08 September 1972
• Docket Number: No. 43548,43548
• Citation: 200 N.W.2d 921,294 Minn. 528
• Parties: Craig THOMPSON, a minor, by Wallace A. Thompson, his guardian ad litem, Appellant, v. Richard BARNES, individually, and as principal of Winnebago High School, etc., et al., Respondents, Minnesota State High School League, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 921

200 N.W.2d 921

294 Minn. 528

Craig THOMPSON, a minor, by Wallace A. Thompson, his guardian ad litem, Appellant, v. Richard BARNES, individually, and as principal of Winnebago High School, etc., et al., Respondents Minnesota State High School League, et al., Respondents.

No. 43548.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 8, 1972.

Wallace A. Thompson, Winnebago, for appellant

Korstad, Brophey & Easton Minneapolis, Seifert, Johnson, Hand & Berens, Fairmont, for Barnes.

LeVander, Zimpfer & Tierney, Minneapolis, for State High School League.

Heard and considered en banc.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Craig Thompson, a student at Winnebago High School, which is a member of defendant Minnesota State High School League, was suspended for 1 year from all interscholastic activities sponsored by defendant League because of his admitted violation of the broad language of the League's alcohol rule. ¹ Plaintiff brought an order to show cause why the enforcement of the rule should not be temporarily enjoined until the merits of his complaint seeking a permanent injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the alcohol rule were determined. The district court denied relief in the form of an order granting summary judgment for defendant League and denying plaintiff's motion for temporary injunction and for summary judgment in his favor.

Plaintiff has appealed from this order Because an order denying summary judgment is not appealable as of right, we are compelled, upon the wholly unsatisfactory record submitted, to treat plaintiff's appeal as one of right from an order denying a temporary injunction. Under the circumstances and upon the record before us, we cannot hold the trial court abused its discretion in denying temporary relief and accordingly affirm.

Craig Thompson had participated in interscholastic football, wrestling, and golf at Winnebago High School. On September 6, 1970, while a sophomore, he had been suspended for 18 weeks from all interscholastic events sponsored by the League for violating the League alcohol rule. The next year, on September 13, 1971, Craig, with a friend, removed a partially-filled bottle of whiskey from some grass behind Craig's home and carried it to his friend's home, where it was hidden in the garage. In some manner not made a part of the record, the boys' conduct was reported to the police. On the next day, a local police officer confronted Craig's friend concerning the whiskey. Admitting possession, he produced the bottle, which was taken to the office of the superintendent of Independent School District Number 225. Mr. Barnes, the Winnebago High School principal and athletic director, was summoned and Craig was called out of class. Upon questioning, Craig admitted his involvement with the whiskey. Craig's father was notified and arrived at the school while this questioning took place. Later that day, after Craig's father had left, Craig signed a written statement and was notified that he was suspended from participating in Leaguesponsored activities for one year--the penalty provided for a second violation of the alcohol rule. Craig was 16 years old and was a junior at the time of the incident. The suspension thus originally extended into the first weeks of his senior year.

On September 21, 1971, an appearance by Mr. Thompson andCraig before Mr. Barnes and the head football coach was granted at the request of Mr. Thompson. ² The suspension was then appealed to the directors of the League. ³ A hearing before the board of directors was held on October 1, 1971. Craig's parents appeared on his behalf and Mr. Thompson also acted as his legal counsel. Mr. Barnes also appeared and some affidavits and documents were submitted. On October 6, 1971, the board issued its findings and conclusions affirming Craig's suspension. ⁴ On October 11, 1971, Craig's parents unsuccessfully pleaded their son's cause before the Winnebago Board of Education.

Mr. Thompson, acting as guardian ad litem, then brought an action at the end of October 1971, seeking a temporary and permanent injunction to restrain enforcement of the alcohol rule against his son. Named as defendants were Mr. Barnes; Mr. Eitreim, superintendent of Independent School District Number 225, which was also named; and the Minnesota State High School League and its executive secretary, Mr. Freng. Also, upon Mr. Thompson's motion, these defendants were ordered to show cause why they should not be temporarily enjoined from enforcing the suspension and why Craig should not be temporarily restored to full participation in interscholastic events until the matter was fully heard and determined. On November 9, 1971, the temporary injunction sought in the order to show cause came before the district court. Upon affidavits and briefs, the defendants opposed the temporary injunction and moved the court for 'summary judgment.' Mr. Thompson was allowed to amend his complaint. ⁵ The matter of the order to show cause why plaintiff should not be granted a temporary injunction again came before the district court on December 13, 1971, at which time plaintiff was again permitted to amend his complaint and upon affidavits and briefs also made an oral motion for 'summary judgment.' On December 14, 1971, the district court made its order granting summary judgment against plaintiff and denying plaintiff's motions for a temporary injunction and for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the League was authorized to make the rules such as the alcohol rule by Minn.St. 129.12, ⁶ and that Craig was properly suspended under the rule.

Plaintiff appealed from this order. There is no appeal of right from an order granting summary judgment. See, 3 Hetland & Adamson, Minnesota Practice, pp. 276, 278. However, the district court's order was addressed to and achieved a denial of plaintiff's motion for temporary injunction, and an order denying injunctive relief is appealable as of right. ⁷

The lower court's ruling on a motion for a temporary injunction pursuant to Minn.St. 585.02 ⁸ is largely an exercise of judicial discretion and the sole issue on appeal to this court is whether there was a clear abuse of such discretion by the trial court disregarding either the facts or the applicable principles of equity. ⁹

Temporary injunctive relief should be granted when it is apparent that the rights of a party will be irreparably injured before a trial on the merits is reached or where it is shown that the relief prayed for in the main action will be ineffectual or impossible to grant. The conduct sought to the enjoined must threaten real, substantial, and irreparable injury to a party's rights and such injury should tend to make the ultimate judgment sought in his favor ineffectual. The trial court must balance the relative harm to the parties involved by the allowance or disallowance of such relief. Cramond v. AFL--CIO, 267 Minn. 229, 126 N.W.2d 252 (1964). ¹⁰ The party seeking such temporary relief has the burden of making, by verified pleadings and affidavits, a prima facie showing to require the granting of affirmative relief. Independent School Dist. No. 35, Marshall County v. Engelstad, 274 Minn. 366, 144 N.W.2d 245 (1966); Thermorama, Inc. v. Buckwold, 267 Minn. 551, 125 N.W.2d 844 (1964). Considering the contents of plaintiff's verified complaint and affidavits as they were presented to the district court, they at most establish that Craig was in previous school years a member of certain athletic teams at Winnebago High School and that the suspension allegedly placed him in public ridicule and jeopardized his standing and reputation in the community. There were no affidavits submitted establishing that Craig would probably have otherwise competed during the period of suspension or specifically in what way denial of participation in Leaguesponsored athletic events would cause irreparable injury to Craig pending trial on the merits. Nor was his standing in the community established so that any possible adverse effect could be evaluated by the trial judge as to whether such harm to his reputation amounted to substantial and irreparable injury. Also absent was any allegation or affidavit to the effect that the permanent injunction sought in the main action was insufficient to protect Craig's status in interscholastic activities or in the community. The lower court cannot enjoin temporarily on the mere assumption of a possible result, Independent School Dist. No. 35, Marshall County v. Engelstad, Supra, and viewing plaintiff's amended complaint and affidavits, we cannot rule that plaintiff met his burden. Therefore, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the relief sought, particularly in light of defendant's allegation of the potential harm that a temporary injunction would engender by placing a cloud over its efforts otherwise to enforce its eligibility rules pending a final decision on the merits in this case. ¹¹

Only one conclusion of law made by the trial court, that Minn.St. 129.12 authorized the League's alcohol rule, could be considered as reaching the complex issues raised either directly or inferentially by plaintiff's amended complaint. ¹² By their briefs and arguments presented to this court, the parties desire us to treat the order for summary judgment denying the temporary injunction as an adjudication of all issues conceivably raised by the pleadings. While the oral assurances of counsel insist that the issues of the League's authority and the reasonableness of the rule and other issues were presented and considered on the merits at the hearing upon the order to show cause, the application for temporary equitable relief is addressed to the judicial discretion of the lower court, and its order of denial could not on this record be considered as an adjudication on the merits. Ordinarily, neither a lower court nor this court is called upon in such a proceeding to adjudicate finally the issues raised in the...