Thompson v. Beacon Val. Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 09 October 1888
• Citation: 16 A. 554,56 Conn. 493
• Parties: THOMPSON v. BEACON VAL. RUBBER CO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

16 A. 554

56 Conn. 493

THOMPSON

v. BEACON VAL. RUBBER CO.¹

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

October 9, 1888.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; FENN, Judge.

Action by John C. Thompson against the Beacon Valley Rubber Company for malicious prosecution. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

C. S. Hamilton, for appellant. W. H. Williams, for appellees.

CARPENTER, J. In 1885 the plaintiff was doing business in the name of "It. Thompson," and purchased goods through the agency of one Squires, of the Beacon Valley Rubber Works. The defendant corporation was organized early in the year 1886. On April 14th of that year the defendant, through the same agent, Squires, consigned certain goods to the plaintiff for sale, who was then doing business in his own name. In June a small portion of the goods was sold, and the cash received therefor remitted to the defendant by Squires, less the price of one garment purchased in 1885, which he received, crediting the price thereof as cash. At that time the plaintiff claimed that the goods purchased in 1885 were worthless, and desired that the defendant would take them, and give credit therefor. When those goods were purchased there was an agreement with the Beacon Valley Rubber Works that they might be so returned, but that agreement did not come to the knowledge of the defendant. On September 3, 1886, the plaintiff boxed and shipped the goods to the defendant, charging the same to the defendant, and crediting the balance of goods consigned. The plaintiff put into one of the boxes containing the goods a letter explaining the transaction. The defendant refused to receive the goods, and did not receive the letter. On September 24th or 26th the plaintiff received an order from the defendant to return the goods remaining unsold of the consignment of April 14th. Between September 3d and 24th the plaintiff became financially embarrassed, and placed his property, including the balance of goods consigned, in the hands of a friend, with a view to making a compromise with his creditors. No compromise was effected with the defendant. The defendant then made an effort to collect the amount due for goods sold in 1885, which was represented by a note which came into the defendant's hands from the Beacon Valley Rubber Works, and also to recover the balance of the goods consigned. Among other things, a criminal prosecution was instituted against the plaintiff for embezzlement, on which the plaintiff was discharged. This suit is for malicious prosecution. The defendant had a verdict, and the plaintiff appealed.

On the trial the plaintiff offered to prove that Squires, when he sold the goods in 1885, had orally warranted them to be of the best quality and satisfactory to the purchaser in all respects, and agreed, if they were not satisfactory, that the defective goods might be sent back, and other goods sent in their place. To the admission of this evidence the defendant objected, on the ground that Squires at the time was not the agent of the defendant, that the defendant was not then in existence, and that it had not consented to receive the goods, and was in nowise bound to do so. The plaintiff insisted, notwithstanding, that the evidence was admissible as bearing upon the question of the plaintiff's good faith in sending to the defendant the goods purchased in 1885; as tending to show a want of criminal intent in what he subsequently did with the goods consigned to him by the defendant; and as bearing upon the question of the want of probable cause and the defendant's knowledge of it. The court properly sustained the objection, and excluded the evidence. The defendant was a stranger to that transaction, and we do not see how it could legitimately affect any question involved in this case. The goods eon-signed to the plaintiff by the defendant had no connection whatever with his former transaction with the partnership, and what he did in attempting to return the goods bought of the partnership to the defendant, and the refusal of the latter to receive them, could be no evidence against the defendant in this suit of his good faith in appropriating the goods consigned to him by the defendant.

The plaintiff persistently claimed that he had a right to introduce one of the garments which he purchased in 1885 as an exhibit, on a collateral issue as to the quality of the goods. The court properly denied his claim. The defendant had nothing to do with the goods sold to the plaintiff in 1885.

The plaintiff's second request to charge the jury was, in substance, that if they should find that the warrant was procured, and the plaintiff arrested thereunder wholly or partially for the purpose of compelling the payment of a debt, then the motive was wrongful, and the act malicious. The judge charged as requested, except that he omitted the words "wholly or partially." In this it is claimed that the court erred; the plaintiff insisting that if the motive was partially, in any degree, to collect a debt, it was unlawful, and therefore evidence of malice. The plaintiff's counsel unduly magnifies the importance of this matter. Want of probable cause and malice combined are essential. The jury were repeatedly told—no less than three times—that malice was to be inferred from the want of probable cause. If, therefore, want of probable cause was shown, malice was sufficiently proved. If there was probable cause, the jury was distinctly told that no amount of malice would entitle the plaintiff to a verdict. The first being established, the latter was immaterial. Now, there is nothing in the case to indicate that the verdict was based on the absence of malice; it could not have been, under the charge of the court. On the contrary, there was considerable evidence of probable cause; enough, it would seem, to warrant the jury in finding that it existed. We must therefore assume that the jury so found. If so, that alone would entitle the defendant to a verdict, irrespective of the question of malice. If want of probable cause had been proved, the plaintiff would not have been bound to rely alone upon the implication of malice, but might also have proved the motive, and thereby have shown express malice for the purpose of enhancing damages; but the matter was not claimed on that ground, and the case was not tried upon that theory. While, therefore, we are justified in disposing of this question as above, yet we do not hesitate to say that we think the court was right in its charge. In England and in some of our sister states prosecutions are...