Thompson v. Bracken County
| Decision Date | 26 October 1956 |
| Citation | 294 S.W.2d 943 |
| Parties | John E. THOMPSON et al., Appellants, v. BRACKEN COUNTY, Ky., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Joseph B. Hennessey, Augusta, for appellants.
Robert T. Jennett, Jr., Brooksville, for appellees.
At a 1952 election in Bracken County, it was voted that a special tax levy of 20cents on each $100 worth of property be levied under KRS 178.210. The tax was to have been levied each year 'for the purpose of improving and constructing, either or both, the roads and bridges of the county'.
For the years 1953-54, 1954-55, and 1955-56, a total of $65,165.93 was collected under the special levy. It was placed by the county treasurer in a separate fund designated as the 'Special Levy Road Fund'. This fund was kept separate from the 'General Road Fund', which was derived from the collection of 15cents of the 50cents general tax levy in the county. The 'General Road Fund' was used for the maintenance and repair of county roads.
During each of the three years, the fiscal court apportioned all of the road funds, both from the general and special levies, among the eight magisterial districts on a percentage basis according to the number of miles of county-maintained roads in each district. The maintenance of the county bridges appears to have been paid for by money derived from the special levy.
The proportionate part of the road fund money derived from both the general and special tax levies was paid by the county treasurer to the county road supervisor by issuance of warrants. The county road supervisor then expended the money, other than that part for his salary and car expense, as directed by each magistrate in his district. For the fiscal year 1954-55, road warrants totaling $47,711.40, including salary, $1,500, and car expense, $1,000, were paid to the county road supervisor. Except for the repayment of money borrowed and interest, $14,611.16, and for two warrants totaling $100.76, all road warrants were issued to the county road supervisor.
Out of the $65,165.93 collected from the special tax levy in three years, about $10,000 was expended for the purchase of rights of way for the construction of highways. There is about $10,000 remaining in the 'Special Levy Road Fund', and about $10,000 more was transferred and is now held in the 'General Road Fund', according to the county treasurer's records. The remainder of the special tax levy proceeds in the approximate sum of $35,165.93 was paid by the fiscal court to the county road supervisor under the procedure previously outlined.
This action was brought by four citizens and taxpayers of Bracken County against Bracken County, the individuals composing the Bracken County Fiscal Court, and the county treasurer to enjoin them permanently from further dissipation of the special tax levy proceeds for any purpose except the improving and constructing of the roads and bridges of Bracken County. The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts.
The lower court adjudged that the funds realized from the special tax levy were supplemental to the 'General Road Tax Fund' and 'may be used by the Fiscal Court for the construction, reconstruction and improvement of any and all of the public roads and bridges of Bracken County, but for no other purpose'. In the judgment, the permanent injunction requested by appellants was not granted. Their complaint was dismissed, and appellees recovered their cost.
The first question is whether the proceeds of a special tax levy collected under authority of KRS 178.210 to improve or construct roads and bridges may be used for any other purpose.
Appellants contend that the greater part of the proceeds of the special tax levy has been spent for maintenance and repair of county roads and bridges and that such a use is improper and illegal. Thus, our question is narrowed to one of whether the repair and maintenance of county roads and bridges may be included under the statute as being for the purpose of improvement and construction. The records does not disclose the exact nature of the road work accomplished by the expenditures.
The words 'improve', 'construct', 'maintain', and 'repair' have common usage. Simple words when considered in a statute are generally accorded their ordinary and accepted meaning. Louisville Title Co. v. Lucas, D.C., 27 F.2d 413; Old Lewis Hunter Distillery Co. v. Kentucky Tax Commission, 302 Ky. 68, 193 S.W.2d 464.
The word 'improve' is defined thus: 'to augment or enhance in value or good quality; to make more profitable, excellent, or desirable; to better; to raise the value of; to make useful additions or amendments; to bring nearer to perfection'. The word 'construct' is defined to mean: 'to build, form, or make'. Webster's International Dictionary, 2nd Edition.
The same authority defines the word 'maintain' as 'to hold or keep in any particular state or condition; to support, sustain, or uphold; to keep up, not to suffer to fail or decline'. 'Repair' is defined as 'to restore to a sound or good state after decay, injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction; to reinstate, remedy, heal, make right or mend'.
A distinction in the use of these words has been recognized in statutes concerning highways and roads. KRS 94.010(2)(a); KRS Chapter 177. 'Improvement' has been held to embrace construction or reconstruction work of a character distinguished from repair. City of Hazard v. Main Street Realty Co., Ky., 262 S.W.2d 87. 'Maintain' has been accorded the same meaning as 'repair'. Schneider v. Neubert, 226 Ill.App. 84. 'Maintenance' was held to mean 'not creation of something new'. Holman v. Santa Cruz County, 91 Cal.App.2d 502, 205 P.2d 767, 769. Ordinary gravel resurfacing of public highways was held to be in the nature of 'repair' and not 'improvement'. Cheney v. County Board of Supervisors of Buffalo County, 123 Neb. 624, 243 N.W. 881.
In short, 'improve' and 'construct' mean to make better the original status, while 'maintain' and 'repair' mean to preserve or remedy the...
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