Thompson v. City of St. Peters

• Decision Date: 24 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 4:15CV404 RLW,4:15CV404 RLW
• Citation: 220 F.Supp.3d 975
• Parties: Gina THOMPSON and Karen McCabe, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ST. PETERS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

220 F.Supp.3d 975

Gina THOMPSON and Karen McCabe, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF ST. PETERS, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:15CV404 RLW

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

Signed October 24, 2016

Nathan D. Sturycz, Edwardsville, IL, Joel Spencer Halvorsen, Sturycz Watts LLC, St. Louis, MO, Patrick A. Watts, Clayton, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Joann Tracy Sandifer, Omri E. Praiss, Husch Blackwell, LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RONNIE L. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of St. Peters, Missouri's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Gina Thompson and Karen McCabe ("Plaintiffs") filed a Class Action Complaint in this Court on March 4, 2015, against Defendants City of St. Peters, Missouri ("St. Peters), Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. ("Redflex"), and Does 1 through 24 alleging that the red light camera program is unconstitutional. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 4) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert nine counts: (I) Declaratory judgment; (II) Unjust Enrichment against Defendant St. Peters; (III) Violation of Article I § 19 of the Missouri Constitution against Defendant St. Peters; (IV) Violation of Article I § 10 of the Missouri Constitution against Defendant St. Peters; (V) Unjust Enrichment against Defendant Redflex; (VI) Abuse of Process against all Defendants; (VII) Damages for Violations of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.010, et seq. , against Defendant Redflex; (VIII) Money Had and Received against Defendants by Subclass 1; and (IX) Money Had and Received against Defendants by Subclass 2. (Compl., ECF No. 4)

On February 16, 2016, Defendant St. Peters filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims against the City. (ECF No. 57) Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion, asserting that genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to the allegations contained in the Complaint. (ECF No. 67)

This case stems from Ordinances allowing the automated enforcement of traffic regulations by using cameras at red lights to photograph traffic violations.¹ Plaintiff Thompson paid a $110.00 penalty after she received at least one Citation in the mail pursuant to St. Peter's Ordinance 335.095 around 2012 and/or 2013. (Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 4) Plaintiff McCabe paid a $110.00 penalty after receiving at least one Citation in the mail pursuant to St. Peter's Ordinance 335.097 in 2013 and/or 2014. (Compl. ¶ 14)

On June 8, 2006, the City of St. Peters adopted Ordinance No. 4536, which amended Section 335.095 of the City Code of the City of St. Peters, Missouri, entitled "Automated Enforcement of Traffic Control Signal Regulations." (Compl. ¶ 32; Def. St. Peters' Ex. A, 2006 Ordinance, ECF. No. 59–1) On November 7, 2013, the City adopted Ordinance No. 6014, which amended Section 335.097, entitled "Automated Photo Enforcement of Traffic Regulations." (Compl. ¶ 53; Def. St. Peters' Ex. B, 2013 Ordinance, ECF No. 59–2) Ordinance Nos. 4536 and 6014 (collectively "Ordinances") authorized the installation and operation of an automated red light enforcement system ("Camera System"). (Def. St. Peters' Exs. A & B, ECF Nos. 59–1, 59–2) These Camera Systems consisted of cameras and vehicle sensors working in conjunction with a traffic control signal to produce images and a video recording of a motor vehicle running a red light. (Def. St. Peters' SUMF ¶ 3, ECF No. 59) An officer employed by the St. Peters Police Department would examine the recorded images and determine whether the vehicle operator violated the City's Traffic Code. (Id. at ¶¶ 4–5) Upon filing an information, a summons would be served on the vehicle's owner. (Id. at ¶ 6)

Plaintiff Thompson received notices of violation and summonses for four separate violations of Section 335.095. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–30; Def. St. Peters' Exs. E–H, ECF Nos. 59–5 through 59–8) The citations included a court date, instructions how to access the photos and video footage online, and an option to pay the $110.00 fine in lieu of appearing in court. (Def. St. Peters' Ex. E, ECF No. 59–5) On all four occasions, Ms. Thompson elected to pay the fine. (Def. St. Peters' SUMF ¶¶ 12, 18, 24, 30)

Ordinance 6014 enacted new provisions related to the Camera System.² (Def. St. Peters' SUMF ¶ 33; Def. St. Peters' Ex. B, 2013 Ordinance, ECF No. 59–2) Plaintiff McCabe received a notice of violation and summons for an alleged violation of Section 335.097 that occurred on July 3, 2014. (Def. St. Peters' SUMF ¶ 34; Def. St. Peters' Ex. I, ECF No. 59–9) The citation included a court date, instructions on accessing the photos and video footage, and instructions for paying the $110.00 fine. (Def. St. Peters' Ex. I, ECF No. 59–9)

Ms. McCabe paid the fine. (Def. St. Peters' SUMF ¶ 39)

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 63 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1995).

The moving party has the initial burden to establish the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its favor. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co–op., Inc. , 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). Once this burden is discharged, if the record does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In fact, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party which would enable a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. Discussion

In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant St. Peters first argues that all of Plaintiffs' claims fail to the extent they are premised on a red light camera enforcement system other than that utilized by St. Peters. Defendant next asserts that Plaintiffs' claims for money damages in Counts II, VIII, and IX fail because they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the voluntary payment doctrine. St. Peters also avers that the claims for money damages for violation of the Missouri Constitution in Counts III and IV are not cognizable. Further, St. Peters contends that Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment in Count I fails because Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiffs are precluded from raising constitutional claims in Counts I, III, and IV on the grounds of waiver and estoppel. St. Peters further maintains that the red light camera sections did not violate any constitutional rights or state law. Finally, St. Peters asserts that Plaintiffs' claim for abuse of process in Count VI fails because Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that the City made use of process for some collateral purpose.

A. Sovereign Immunity

Defendant St. Peters argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' claims for money damages because the claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. "Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600, public entities enjoy sovereign immunity ... unless immunity is waived, abrogated, or modified by statute." Richardson v. City of St. Louis , 293 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). "A municipality has sovereign immunity from actions at common law tort in all but four cases." Bennartz v. City of Columbia , 300 S.W.3d 251, 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). These four exceptions include:

(1) where a plaintiff's injury arises from a public employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle in the course of his employment (section 537.600.1(1)); (2) where the injury is caused by the dangerous condition of the municipality's property (section 537.600.1(2)); (3) where the injury is caused by the municipality performing a proprietary function as opposed to a governmental function (State ex rel. Board of Trustees of the City of North Kansas City Memorial Hospital , 843 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo. banc 1993) ); and (4) to the extent the municipality has procured insurance, thereby waiving sovereign immunity up to but not beyond the policy limit and only for acts covered by the policy (section 537.610).

Id. at 259. "When bringing claims against a public entity, a plaintiff ‘bears the burden of pleading with specificity facts giving rise to an exception to the rule of sovereign immunity[.]’ " Wann v. St. Francois Cty., Missouri , No. 4:15CV895 CDP, 2016 WL 866089, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting Richardson, 293 S.W.3d at 136–37 ).

Here, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant St. Peters is not entitled to sovereign immunity because it entered into a contract for profit with Redflex and acted as if it were a private corporation. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that the third exception applies in that St. Peters was performing a proprietary and not a governmental function. "Governmental...