Thompson v. East Feliciana School System
| Decision Date | 28 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-00840-BAJ-RLB |
| Parties | LYTOSHIA S THOMPSON v. EAST FELICIANA SCHOOL SYSTEM, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants East Feliciana Parish School Board and Carlos Sani's Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31; Doc. 35). The Motions are opposed. (Doc. 43; Doc. 44). Defendants filed Replies. (Doc. 46; 47). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant East Feliciana Parish School Board's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant Carlos Sam's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot.
Plaintiff sues the East Feliciana Parish School Board (hereinafter “Board”) and Carlos J. Sam (hereinafter “Sam”), Superintendent of Schools, based on alleged sexual harassment, retaliatory discharge, denial of due process, and battery. (Doc. 1; Doc. 5; Doc. 31-1 ¶¶ 1-2, 5; Doc. 44-1, ¶¶ 1-2, 5).
Plaintiff was hired by Board on September 14, 2018. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 3; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 3). Plaintiffs job title was “Confidential Assistant to the Superintendent, ” Sam. (Id.). Sam was Plaintiffs supervisor. (Doc 31-1, ¶ 6; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 6).
During her employment, Plaintiff texted Sam multiple times in the evening hours regarding her personal life. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 8; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 8). Additionally, Plaintiff contacted Sam regarding an incident where Plaintiff was accused of calling another employee a “bitch.” (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 7; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 7). Sam instructed Plaintiff to contact Human Resources. (Id.). Plaintiff complied. (Id.).
On February 4, 2019, Plaintiff requested to attend an out-of-state training in Chicago, which cost $3, 300.00. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 9; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 9). Board denied approval of this training. (Id.). On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff requested to attend a Photoshop course at LSU. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 10; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 10). Board also denied approval of this training. (Id.).
On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff emailed Keisha Netterville, Executive Director of Human Resources, requesting a discussion regarding courses that she would like to attend. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 11; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 11). Plaintiff did not mention sexual harassment in this email.[1] (Id.).
On February 7, 2019, Sam instructed Plaintiff to report to SSA Consultants on February 8, 2019, at 8:00 A.M. for a professional development and training session. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 12; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 12). Sam instructed Plaintiff to be prompt and prepared to stay all day. (Id.). Plaintiff reported to SSA Consultants on February 8, 2019, but objected to part of the training session and left an hour after arriving. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 13; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 13). After leaving the training session, Plaintiff did not return to work. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 14; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 14). Plaintiff was suspended on February 11, 2019. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 15; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 15).
On February 12, 2019, Sam notified Plaintiff that he was contemplating undertaking disciplinary action against Plaintiff for failing to complete mandated training.[2] (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 16; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 16). Sam also informed Plaintiff that she had the opportunity to respond. (Id.). Plaintiff emailed a response to Sam, Netterville, and the Board president providing her position on the training and requesting a “status” on her employment. (Id.). Plaintiff did not mention sexual harassment in her email. (Id.).
On March 14, 2019, Sam placed Plaintiff on leave without pay and recommended her termination. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 17; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 17). The stated reason was insubordination for failure to attend a purported mandated professional development and training as directed by Sam. (Id.). Sam informed Plaintiff of this recommendation by letter. (Id.). The letter stated that Plaintiff could attend the April 2, 2019 Board meeting and elect to have a discussion regarding Sam's recommendation in either “open or executive session.” (Id.).
On March 26, 2019, Plaintiff emailed Sam requesting that he reconsider his decision to place her on leave without pay. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 18; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 18). If he could not or would not reconsider his recommendation, Plaintiff requested a closed session hearing. (Id.). Later that day, Sam replied to Plaintiffs email stating that he would inform the Board that Plaintiff wished to have the recommendation considered in private and invited Plaintiff to send any additional information for consideration. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 19; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 19).
Plaintiff had a termination hearing during the April 2, 2019 Board meeting in executive session in accordance with her request. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 20; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 20). Plaintiff spoke at the termination hearing. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 21; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 21). Plaintiff did not mention any allegations of sexual harassment during her termination hearing.[3] (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 24; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 24). Plaintiff was discharged on April 2, 2019 following the hearing. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 22; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 22). The stated reason for Plaintiffs discharge was failure to attend a purported mandated professional development and training session. (Doc. 31-1, ¶ 23; Doc. 44-1, ¶ 23).
A court may grant summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on motions for summary judgment, courts are required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Coleman v. Hous. Indep. School Hist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
To survive summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party must do more than allege an issue of material fact: “Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Auguster v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A party that fails to present competent evidence opposing a motion for summary judgment risks dismissal on this basis alone. E.g., Broussard v. Oryx Energy Co., 110 F.Supp.2d 532, 536 (E.D. Tex. 2000) ().
Defendants Board and Sam move for summary judgment, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 31; Doc. 35). Board argues that summary judgment is warranted regarding Counts I, II, and IV in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint-Plaintiffs claims against Board for sexual harassment, retaliatory discharge, and denial of due process. (Doc. 31; Doc. 5). Sam seeks summary judgment regarding Count III-Plaintiffs claim for “batteries" against Sam. The Court will address each Motion in turn, beginning with Board. (Doc. 35; Doc. 5).
First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Hooge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. CV 18-1112-SDD-RLB, 2020 WL 3067219, at *7 (M.D. La. June 9, 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized two types of sexual harassment claims: (1) “quid pro quo” claims, based on requests for sexual favors that result in adverse employment actions; and (2) hostile work environment claims, in which bothersome attentions or sexual remarks create a hostile work environment. Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)), Each type of sexual harassment claim requires a distinct analysis. See Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Court must first determine whether this is a “quid pro quo” or “hostile environment” case. Casiano, 213 F.3d at 283. Plaintiff did not allege either classification in her Complaint. (Doc. 5). Plaintiff argues in her Opposition, however, that Board is not entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, implying that Plaintiff believes this is a quid pro quo case.[4] (Doc. 46).
To determine whether this case is a quid pro quo or hostile environment case, the Court must ascertain whether Plaintiff suffered a “tangible employment action.” Casiano, 213 F.3d at 283 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62). Tangible employment actions "require[ ] an official act of the enterprise, a company act, ” such as “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62. If Plaintiff has suffered a tangible...
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