Thompson v. Eldorado Coffee Roasters Ltd.

Decision Date29 March 2017
Docket Number15–CV–6442 (WFK) (JO)
Citation246 F.Supp.3d 697
Parties Keith THOMPSON and Roha Rodriguez, Plaintiffs, v. ELDORADO COFFEE ROASTERS LTD., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

David Abrams, David Abrams, Attorney at Law, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Domenique Camacho Moran, Heather P. Harrison, Farrell Fritz, P.C., Uniondale, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION & ORDER

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, United States District Judge:

Keith Thompson ("Plaintiff") brings this action seeking unpaid overtime benefits under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA" or the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq ., and parallel provisions of New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), N.Y. Lab. § 650 et seq. , as well as recovery for failure to provide wage notifications under the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, N.Y. Lab. § 195. See generally Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 15. His employer, Eldorado Coffee Roasters Ltd. ("Defendant" or "Eldorado"), moves to dismiss Plaintiff's FLSA and NYLL claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing Plaintiff is exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements under the so-called "Motor Carrier Act exemption," 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) ("MCA exemption"). See generally Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Mot. Dismiss ("MTD"), ECF No. 19–1. As the facts pleaded are insufficient for this Court to determine whether the exemption applies, Defendant's motion is DENIED.1

BACKGROUND2

Eldorado is a beverage product company that, inter alia , imports and roasts coffee beans. SAC ¶¶ 7, 16–17; see also MTD at 1–2. Eldorado imports its beans from around the world, roasts them at its facilities in Pennsylvania and New York, and then delivers them to customers, including in New York. SAC ¶¶ 16–17; see also MTD at 1–2. Eldorado operates in interstate commerce and, at all relevant times, had gross annual sales of at least $500,000.00, making it subject to the FLSA. SAC ¶¶ 16–19. Plaintiff has been a delivery truck driver for Eldorado for approximately six years. Id. ¶ 8. Until approximately 2014, Plaintiff regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, often 50 or more, but was not paid overtime wages. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated the instant action on November 10, 2015. Compl., ECF No. 1. He amended his Complaint on December 3, 2015, see Am. Compl., ECF No. 5,3 and again on March 13, 2016, see SAC. Defendant answered the Amended Complaint on December 23, 2015, see Answer, ECF No. 8, and amended its Answer on February 26, 2016, see Am. Answer, ECF No. 14. Defendant denied all of the allegations in the Amended Complaint and asserted eight affirmative defenses, including that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the MCA exemption. See Am. Answer ¶ 21. Defendant filed its fully-briefed motion to dismiss on June 27, 2016, see MTD; Pl.'s Mem. Opp. to MTD ("Opp."), ECF No. 19–2; Def.'s Reply Memo. ("Reply"), ECF No. 19–3, and this Court held oral argument on January 18, 2017. The parties were invited to submit supplemental briefing on the MCA exemption, and Plaintiff did so. See Pl.'s Supp. Letter, ECF No. 37.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "the duty of a court ‘is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.’ " DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C. , 622 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Cooper v. Parsky , 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) ). The Court may dismiss a complaint that "rais[es] an affirmative defense ‘if the defense appears on the face of the complaint.’ " Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP , 322 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield , 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) ); see also 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1357 (3d ed. 2016) ("[T]he complaint also is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when its allegations indicate the existence of an affirmative defense that will bar the award of any remedy, but for this to occur, the applicability of the defense has to be clearly indicated and must appear on the face of the pleading to be used as the basis for the motion").

ANALYSIS

I. The Motor Carrier Act Exemption to the FLSA

Defendant's motion to dismiss hinges on whether the MCA exemption applies to Plaintiff, which would exempt him from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.4 Under the MCA exemption, certain motor carrier operations are exempt from the FLSA and are instead subject to regulation by the Secretary of Transportation. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). Covered operations include "motor private carrier[s]," which are enterprises that do not primarily provide transportation services but rather transport goods they own for sale or similar.5 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15) ; see also id. § 31502(b)(2) ("The Secretary of Transportation may prescribe requirements for ... maximum hours of service of employees of ... a motor private carrier."). An employee falls within the MCA exemption if his "activities ... directly affect[ ] the safety of operation of motor vehicles ... in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act." 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a). Truck drivers may thus be covered by the MCA exemption. See Fox v. Commonwealth Worldwide Chauffeured Transp. of N.Y. , LLC, 865 F.Supp.2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Garaufis, J.) ("There are four broad categories of workers whose duties are said to directly affect the safety of vehicle operation: drivers, mechanics, loaders, and helpers of the first three.").

The MCA exemption may apply even if a truck driver does not cross state boundaries so long as "a substantial part of [his] ... activities relate [ ] to goods ... mov[ing] in the channels of interstate commerce." Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co ., 317 U.S. 564, 572, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943) ; see also 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) ("Transportation within a single State is in interstate commerce within the meaning of the [FLSA] ... where it forms a part of a ‘practical continuity of movement’ across State lines from the point of origin to the point of destination."). As a result, delivery route drivers who do not cross state lines may be covered by the MCA exemption if "the ‘essential character’ of [a] shipment is interstate in nature." Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line, Inc. , 820 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Foxworthy v. Hiland Dairy Co ., 997 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1993) ); see also, e.g., Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distribs., Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 224–25 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding "the interstate commerce requirement" to be satisfied where intrastate route driver picked up empty bottles and cans intended for shipment out of state).

Where a shipment has come to rest in a warehouse before being transported intrastate, the Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he entry of the goods into the warehouse interrupts but does not necessarily terminate their interstate journey." Walling , 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. 332. Rather, the goods remain in interstate commerce "if the halt in the movement of the goods is [only] a convenient intermediate step in the process of getting them to their final destinations." Id. Courts have subsequently interpreted the Court's guidance on this issue to mean:

If the shipper's fixed and persisting transportation intent at the time of interstate shipment was to deliver an item to a specified customer who had ordered the item, regardless of whether it was stored temporarily intrastate, the [MCA] exemption applies. On the other hand, the [MCA] exemption does not apply where items are delivered from out of state to an intrastate location, such as a warehouse, for future delivery to customers yet to be identified. In other words, the exemption is inapplicable where the final destination of any shipment is not decided until after the goods had come to rest in the warehouse.

Cruz v. AAA Carting & Rubbish Removal, Inc., 116 F.Supp.3d 232, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Karas, J.) (quoting Masson v. Ecolab, Inc., 04–CV–4488, 2005 WL 2000133, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) ). Consequently, courts look to whether " ‘the intended final destination’ " of the shipment "was envisaged at the time the transportation commenced." Bilyou, 300 F.3d at 223–24 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Project Hope v. M/V IBN SINA, 250 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) ); see also Klitzke v. Steiner Corp., 110 F.3d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining MCA exemption applied to intrastate travel of goods intended for specific customers at the time they were warehoused).

The Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") has provided some guidance on this issue, ruling that "there is [no] fixed and persisting intent" to send goods to a particular destination beyond "the ... storage point at the time of shipment," when:

(i) At the time of shipment there is no specific order being filled for a specific quantity of a given product to be moved through to a specific destination beyond the terminal storage, and
(ii) the terminal storage is a distribution point or local marketing facility from which specific amounts of the product are sold or allocated, and
(iii) transportation in the furtherance of this distribution within the single State is specifically arranged only after sale or allocation from storage.

29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(2) (citing Ex parte No. MC–48 (71 M.C.C. 17, 29)). The Department of Labor ("DOL") later adopted this test in its...

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