Thompson v. Ellenbecker, Civ. No. 94-4166.
| Decision Date | 18 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 94-4166. |
| Parties | Maynard THOMPSON, Louis Flammond, Sr., and Pedro Red Hawk, Plaintiffs, v. James ELLENBECKER, in his capacity as Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Social Services, and his successors, executives and assigns, Terry Walter, in his capacity as Program Administrator, South Dakota Office of Child Support Enforcement, and his successors, executives and assigns, and Mike Mehlhaff, in his capacity as the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Commerce, his successors, executives and assigns, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
B.J. Jones, Dakota Plains Legal Services, Mission, SD, for Plaintiffs.
David L. Braun, Charles McGuigan, Assistant Attorneys General, Pierre, SD, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking a declaration that SDCL §§ 32-12-116 and 25-7A-56, which restrict the issuance or renewal of drivers and professional licenses to those persons owing more than $1,000 in child support arrears, violate various provisions of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the said statutes.
Each plaintiff has child support arrearages of more than $1,000 and their prior South Dakota driver's licenses have expired. The plaintiffs have each received temporary driving permits pending the resolution of this action.
Both plaintiffs and defendants have made Motions For Summary Judgment in this action. The motions were heard on April 17, 1995 and taken under advisement.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4), and 1367(a).
Although plaintiffs seek to have two statutes declared unconstitutional, this Court held in an order dated August 17, 1995, that plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge SDCL § 25-7A-56 because none of the plaintiffs have the type of professional or business license subject to restriction under this statute.
As plaintiffs do have drivers' licenses they have standing to challenge SDCL § 32-12-116, which provides:
Plaintiffs allege the above statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide procedural or substantive due process or equal protection of the laws.
Maynard Thompson. Mr. Thompson is employed with a temporary employment service in Sioux Falls, and his wages are currently being garnished by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) for $150 per month which is being applied $100 to his current child support obligations and $50 to his child support arrearages. OCSE has determined this amount is satisfactory. However, Mr. Thompson has refused to sign the stipulation required by OCSE and his driver's license has not been renewed.
Louis Flammond, Sr. Mr. Flammond was in a car accident in 1987 which left him a quadriplegic. His minor son is now receiving Social Security and VA benefits so he has no current child support obligations, but he had arrearages of $6,450 at the commencement of this action. OCSE is receiving $150 per month from Mr. Flammond's Social Security benefits on the arrearages and this is a satisfactory amount to OCSE. Mr. Flammond has refused to sign the stipulation required by OCSE and his driver's license has not been renewed.
Pedro Red Hawk. Mr. Red Hawk is disabled and is receiving Social Security disability benefits. OCSE has garnished his Social Security benefits and is receiving $150 per month which is a satisfactory payment to OCSE. Mr. Red Hawk has not contacted OCSE or signed the required stipulation.
Plaintiffs assert that SDCL § 32-12-116 and the administrative rules adopted violate their procedural and substantive due process rights and deny them equal protection.
The issues to be decided are:
(1) Does the State of South Dakota's use of the drivers license law to collect delinquent child support obligations violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights?
(2) Does the State of South Dakota's requirement that applicants for issuance or renewal of a drivers' license sign the stipulation set out at Appendix A to this opinion as a condition to the issuance or renewal of a drivers license violate plaintiffs' procedural due process rights?
(3) Does the State of South Dakota's use of the drivers license law to collect delinquent child support obligations violate plaintiffs' equal protection rights?
The statute at issue is presumed constitutional as it does not involve suspect classifications or fundamental rights. MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 332 (8th Cir.1991). Therefore, plaintiffs carry the burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional.
The Eighth Circuit explained "a plaintiff asserting a Substantive Due Process claim must establish that the government action complained of is `truly irrational' that is `something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.'" Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir.1993).
Plaintiffs assert SDCL § 32-12-116 fails to provide substantive due process because it is arbitrary and irrational to restrict an individual's drivers license for conduct unrelated to that individual's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.
Defendants argue a rational basis exists between nonpayment of child support and restriction on the obligor's license to drive. When an obligor is more than $1,000 in arrears for child support, the state is able to ascertain an obligor's current address when he or she seeks to renew his or her drivers license. Additionally, restrictions on one's ability to drive inhibits one's ability to move from job-to-job, state-to-state or location-to-location. Without a valid drivers license it is more difficult to move or change jobs with the specific intent of avoiding payment of child support.
The Court finds that SDCL § 32-12-116 is not arbitrary or irrational. Rational reasons, as espoused above, support restrictions on child support obligors' drivers licenses for non-payment of child support. Therefore, this statute does not deny substantive due process to the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs complain that neither SDCL § 32-12-116 nor the regulations adopted provide any procedure for determining "satisfactory arrangements" for payment of arrearages and thereby deprives them of procedural due process. As each of the plaintiffs are already paying through other judicial process an amount which defendants agree is satisfactory, I conclude that the only due process claim available to them is whether the state can require them to sign the stipulation as a condition to obtaining a drivers license.
Plaintiffs' drivers licenses remain restricted because they...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Amunrud v. Board of Appeals
...appeal denied, 103 Ohio St.3d 1428, 814 N.E.2d 491 (2004) (same; no substantive due process violation); Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F.Supp. 1037 (S.D.1995) (no substantive due process violation because rational reasons support restriction on child support obligors' driver's licenses for no......
-
TRI COUNTY LANDFILL v. Brule County, No. 21143
...to two prior South Dakota district court decisions which have also utilized the "truly irrational" standard. See Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F.Supp. 1037, 1040 (D.S.D.1995) (holding that where a child support obligor brought an action for violation of his due process rights based upon a So......
-
Samuel v. Hogan
...that the CSRA reflects invidious discrimination on the part of its framers") (internal citations omitted); Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (D.S.D. 1995) (holding that a law did not violate the Equal Protection clause when it restricted obligors owing more than $1,000 in chi......
-
State v. Buchmann, A12–1518.
...of these statutes has been challenged on either a due process or equal protection basis. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F.Supp. 1037, 1040–41 (D.S.D.1995); Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wash.2d 208, 143 P.3d 571, 574 (2006); State v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725, 727–29 (Alaska 1998). Chil......