Thompson v. Fairchild

• Decision Date: 22 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 10432,10432
• Citation: 93 Idaho 584,468 P.2d 316
• Parties: Elizabeth A. THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ward FAIRCHILD and Marie Fairchild, husband and wife, and Farmers National Bank, a corporation, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 316

468 P.2d 316

93 Idaho 584

Elizabeth A. THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ward FAIRCHILD and Marie Fairchild, husband and wife, and Farmers National Bank, a corporation, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 10432.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April 22, 1970.

May, May & Bennett, Twin Falls, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lloyd J. Walker, Twin Falls, Behm & Anderson, Buhl, for defendants-respondents.

DONALDSON, Justice.

On July 6, 1966, pursuant to a written contract, 160 acres of land was sold by Ward and Marie Fairchild (defendants-respondents) to Elizabeth A. Thompson (plaintiff-appellant). Prior to July, 1966 (the date of the written contract), Elizabeth A. Thompson and her husband, Robert, were living on the property in question under an oral agreement entered into in July, 1961. According to the terms of the oral agreement a payment of $850.00 per year was to be made by the Thompsons to the Fairchilds. In addition, the Thompsons were responsible for taxes.

The written sales contract of July 6, 1966, provided for a total purchase price of $12,000.00. The Fairchilds (sellers and defendants-respondents herein) acknowledged that $4,227.53 of the $12,000.00 had been already paid to them because of (1) previous payments made by the Thompsons to the Fairchilds under the oral agreement heretofore referred to and (2) services which were rendered by the Thompsons to the Fairchilds. The balance of the purchase price, viz., $7,772.47 was to be paid in equal annual payments of $1,000.00 per year, the first payment due November 1, 1966, and subsequent payments to be made on November 1, of each year until the entire contract had been paid in full. The written contract further provided that the Thompsons (the buyers who had been in possession of the property since 1961) were to remain in possession so long as they performed according to the terms of the written agreement. A default clause was included in the contract. ¹ Mrs. Thompson defaulted on the $1,000.00 payment due on .november 1, 1967, and the Fairchilds had their attorney prepare a '30 Day Notice' which was sent on January 23, 1968, to the premises as provided in the contract. The Fairchilds subsequently took possession of the property.

Elizabeth A. Thompson instituted suit against the Fairchilds in district court for damage allegedly done to the land by them. The Fairchilds counterclaimed contending that they were entitled to possession of the premises since Elizabeth A. Thompson of the defaulted on the contract.

The trial court sitting without a jury found in favor of the Fairchilds (defendants-respondents) and granted them immediate possession of the property in question and dismissed Elizabeth A. Thompson's (plaintiff-appellant) claim against them since,

'* * * there is ample proof to justify the finding that she (Elizabeth A. Thompson) had received sufficient notice of rescission in some manner * * * and that she was actually aware of Fairchild's decision to rescind the contract because of her failure to make the payments required.' ²

Elizabeth A. Thompson has appealed to this Court submitting ten assignments of error in support thereof. These can be reduced primarily to the contention that the trial court erred in its finding 'that appellant had actual notice of default under terms of the contract' or in finding that she had notice of any kind whatsoever.

The questions presented by this appeal are simply stated: (1) Did Elizabeth A. are simply stated: (1) Did Elizabeth A. if notice were not given according to the method prescribed by the written instrument, was Elizabeth A. Thompson prejudiced by the failure of the respondents to give notice in the prescribed manner?

Forfeitures are regarded with disfavor and strict compliance with forfeiture provisions is traditionally required. Stockman's Supply Co. v. Jenne, 72 Idaho 57, 237 P.2d 613 (1951); Marks v. Strohm, 65 Idaho 623, 150 P.2d 134 (1944). However where literal compliance with forfeiture provisions amounts to a meaningless gesture, such compliance is not necessary. Wickahoney Sheep Co. v. Sewell, 273 F.2d 767 (9the Cir. 1959). Relying on earlier Idaho case law (the parties in the Wickahoney case were governed by the substantive law of the State of Idaho since federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332) which holds that notice in the prescribed manner is not required where a party has actual notice and has not suffered prejudice, ³ the Federal Court held it was not necessary to follow the prescribed and circuitous procedure outlined in the contract where 'there is no question of the adequacy of the notice itself.'

In the case at bar the record reveals ample proof that Elizabeth A. Thompson was aware of her default. ⁴ Therefore whether or not the formal requirements regarding the giving of notice as prescribed by the written instrument were complied with is immaterial where it is clear that notice was in fact received. The record further demonstrates that appellant was in no way prejudiced because she knew on the 29th of January, 1968, of the notice of default. This was a mere six days after the formal notice was mailed and no offer of payment was made by plaintiff-appellant until April 1, 1968, some 60 days after she had actual notice.

It has long been the settled rule of of this Court that where the findings of the trial court are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence, such findings will not be distrubed on appeal. Riley v. Larson, 91 Idaho 831, 432 P.2d 775 (1967); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Brown, 90 Idaho 403, 412 P.2d 586 (1966); I.R.C.P. 52(a); ⁵ Jones v. Big Lost River Irrigation District, 93 Idaho 227, 459 P.2d 1009 (1969). The trial judge is the arbiter of conflicting evidence; his determination of the weight, credibility, inferences and implications thereof is not to be supplanted by this Court's impressions or conclusions from the written record. Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Brown, supra.

Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the money retained by the respondents ($5,477.53) ⁶ did not constitute a penalty and could be retained as liquidated damages or for rental for the time appellant was in possession. The determinative factor in distinguishing between 'liquidated damages' and 'penalty' is whether or not the amount named in the contract is reasonably proportioned to the probable loss. McCormick, Damages, § 149; Williamson v. Smith, 74 Idaho 79, 256 P.2d 784 (1953); Scogings v. Love, 79 Idaho 179, 312 P.2d 570 (1957). The district court held that the sum of $5,477.53 which was paid under the oral and written contracts over a seven year period represented a return of approximately 6 1/2% simple interest for the use of an asset having an agreed value of $12,000.00. We find no error in the holding of the district...