Thompson v. Fresno County
| Decision Date | 29 May 1963 |
| Citation | 59 Cal.2d 686,31 Cal.Rptr. 44 |
| Parties | , 381 P.2d 924 Millie THOMPSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF FRESNO, Defendant and Respondent. S. F. 21259. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Walkup & Downing, Bruce Walkup, San Francisco, and William B. Boone, Santa Rosa, for plaintiff and appellant.
Harold A. Parichan, Fresno, for defendant and respondent.
This is an appeal by Millie Thompson from an order denying her petition for leave to file a claim for personal injuries against the County of Fresno. The question presented involves a consideration of the provisions of sections 715 and 716 of the Government Code as applied to the facts alleged in the petition.
Section 715 provides in part that a claim against a local public entity relating to a cause of action for physical injury to the person shall be presented not later than the one hundredth day after the accrual of the cause of action. Section 716 provides that the superior court shall grant leave to present a claim after the expiration of the time specified in section 715 if the entity against which the claim is made will not be unduly prejudiced thereby and if the claimant was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of such time and by reason of such disability failed to present a claim during such time.
Plaintiff contends that the allegations of her petition, which are summarized below, establish that because of her physical incapacity she was entitled to relief under section 716 and that the trial court should have so held even though under one theory of the case a claim may have been timely filed under section 715.
It is first alleged as follows: Plaintiff, on July 28, 1960, underwent surgery in Fresno County Hospital with respect to a cervical disc. The operation was performed by agents of the county in such a negligent manner that plaintiff suffered injury to the spinal cord resulting in quadriplegia, i. e., paralysis of all extremities. She was returned to surgery on the same day, and an exploratory operation was performed in the region of the prior operation. The condition of quadriplegia was not remedied by the second operation, and plaintiff remained paralyzed in all four extremities. She was a patient of the hospital until September 28, 1960, when she was taken to the home of her sister. From July 28, 1960, to and including June 14, 1961, plaintiff was totally physically incapacitated, unable to move from her bed, write, sign her name, reach a telephone, visit an attorney, or personally take any steps to determine the true cause of the paralysis. Because of her physical disability she was unable to file a claim within 100 days after July 28, 1960.
Secondly, it is alleged: At the time of the second operation plaintiff was advised by agents of the county that her paralysis was caused by a stroke which she suffered at the time of or immediately following the first operation. This advice was known by the agents of the county to be false. Plaintiff, who was ignorant of medical matters, accepted the explanation of her condition as correct and relied upon it. On or about April 7, 1961, plaintiff's sister became suspicious that the explanation was not true, and, after consultation with independent medical sources, it was determined that plaintiff's condition was not due to a stroke but to negligence in the performance of the operation. Plaintiff was first so advised on June 14, 1961, and she caused a verified claim to be presented within 100 days following that date.
Plaintiff further alleges that she was in doubt whether the filing of a claim later than 100 days after July 28, 1960, the date of the surgery, would be valid without leave of the court granted pursuant to section 716 and that to fully protect her rights she believed she should obtain such an order.
Affidavits filed with the petition confirmed plaintiff's total physical incapacity and inability to attend to her business and legal concerns. The county did not file an affidavit or present evidence in opposition and did not contend that it would be prejudiced by the granting of the petition.
At the time of its ruling the court made the following statement in writing: ...
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