Thompson v. Globe Newspaper Co.
| Decision Date | 19 May 1932 |
| Parties | FRED H. THOMPSON v. THE GLOBE NEWSPAPER COMPANY. SAME v. BOSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
December 14, 1931.
Present: RUGG, C.
Libel, Truth Privilege, Malice. Arrest. District Court. Clerk of Court. Practice, Criminal, Warrant. Evidence, Competency, Relevancy and materiality. Corporation, Officers and agents. Agency Scope of employment. Practice, Civil, Exceptions.
The authority given by G.L.c. 218, Section 33, to clerks of district courts to issue warrants extends to the issuance of warrants under G.L.c. 276, Section 16, relative to rendition.
An action of tort for libel against a corporation publishing a newspaper concerned an article printed in the defendant's newspaper containing statements that the plaintiff, after being charged in a warrant issued in
New Hampshire with having procured the larceny in that State of certain pages of a magazine about to be issued, was arrested in this Commonwealth upon a warrant issued from a district court charging him with being a fugitive from justice; and a subsequent article relating to the plaintiff's extradition to New Hampshire having been stayed upon the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court of the United
States. The defendant's answer set up truth and privilege.
It appeared that a complaint was made in the District Court, that a warrant was issued, the return of which recited that the plaintiff had been arrested, that the plaintiff appeared in the District Court, and that he later resisted extradition and sought a writ of habeas corpus in the District
Court of the United States. Held, that (1) It was proper to exclude evidence offered by the plaintiff to show what occurred in the District Court at the time when the warrant was issued and that the judge of that court was not present at that time even though it be assumed that the clerk had no authority to issue the warrant, the validity of the proceedings in the District Court could not be called in question collaterally;
(2) It was proper to rule that the proceedings in the District Court were judicial proceedings within the meaning of the rule of law making privileged fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings when made without express malice;
(3) The complaint and the warrant issued from the District Court properly were admitted in evidence: they were competent on the issue of truth or to show that the defendant had published a fair and accurate report of the proceedings;
(4) Certified copies of the extradition papers were competent to show the accuracy of the second article published in the defendant's newspaper;
(5) Whether or not there was a crime under the law of New Hampshire charged against the plaintiff in the extradition papers was immaterial;
(6) The defendant had not indorsed the truth of the charge upon which the plaintiff was arrested, and was not obliged to show that the charge was true in order to establish the defence of truth of the statements made in its articles;
(7) It was pertinent to show that articles in the defendant's newspaper other than those relied upon in the declaration, which were admitted solely on the issue of malice on the defendant's part, were privileged as reports of judicial proceedings;
(8) Rulings requested by the plaintiff on the issue of malice, to the effect that the defendant had no right to publish the account of the plaintiff's arrest unless it had reason to believe him guilty of the crime charged, properly were refused;
(9) It was proper to refuse the following ruling requested by the plaintiff: "If the jury find that the . . . [defendant] made no retraction of the charges or failed to give notice or adequate notice that a court in New Hampshire had acquitted the plaintiff after a trial on these charges, that may be considered as furnishing evidence of the true character and meaning of the article complained of";
(10) It was proper to exclude, on the issue of malice, an article published by the defendant concerning proceedings in equity between the publisher of the magazine and the publisher of another newspaper, the plaintiff's employer, which did not contain the plaintiff's name, and to exclude testimony by the plaintiff that he had been recognized as a person referred to in such article, even though such references were defamatory, there being nothing to show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was the subject of the reference;
(11) Malice on the part of the defendant could not be proved by showing malice on the part of employees of the defendant who were not responsible for the publication of the articles complained of by the plaintiff;
(12) The fact that the defendant made no investigation of the truth of the charges against the plaintiff was immaterial on the issue of malice on the defendant's part;
(13) It was immaterial on the issue of malice that other newspapers in the defendant's locality did not publish the article complained of by the plaintiff;
(14) The publication by the plaintiff's employer in its newspaper of the contents of the pages which were alleged to have been stolen from the magazine properly was admitted in evidence to show the truth of a statement, in the defendant's article of which the plaintiff complained, that such publication was made on a date before the date set for publication of the pages in the magazine.
THREE ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs dated May 18, 1928. The actions were tried together in the Superior Court before Walsh, J. Material evidence and portions of the judge's charge are stated in the opinion. The following rulings, among others requested by the plaintiff, were refused by the judge:
The jury found for the defendant in the first and third actions. In the second action there was a verdict for the plaintiff on the first count of the declaration and for the defendant on the other counts. The verdict for the plaintiff subsequently was set aside by the judge as against the evidence and the weight of the evidence applicable to that count. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.
E.A. Whitman, for the plaintiff.
F. Rackemann, (H.
M.Davis & R.W. Dunbar with him,) for Boston Transcript Company.
S.C. Rand, (J. Barker, Jr., with him,) for Boston Publishing Company. F.T. Leahy, for The Globe Newspaper Company.
PIERCE, J. These are three actions for libel tried together by order of the court on motion of the plaintiff. The action against The Globe Newspaper Company was in two counts for the publication in the Boston Globe of false and malicious libels on May 18 and June 22, 1927; that against the Boston Publishing Company was in four counts for libels published in the Boston Traveler on May 18 and 19, 1927, in the Boston Herald on May 19 and June 23, 1927; that against the Boston Transcript Company was in one count alleging the publication in the Boston Transcript of a libel on May 18, 1927. The answer in each case was a general denial, truth and privilege. The jury found for the defendants Globe and Transcript companies, and for the Boston Publishing Company on counts 2, 3 and 4 with a verdict for the plaintiff on count 1, which was subsequently set aside by the judge as against the evidence and the weight of the evidence applicable to count 1. The cases are before this court on the plaintiff's exceptions.
The evidence shows that in the spring of 1927 a controversy, covering both religion and politics, was being carried on between Charles C. Marshall and Governor Smith of New York. In the April issue of the Atlantic Monthly an open letter from Marshall to Smith was published and it was understood that Smith was to answer this letter in a subsequent issue. The plaintiff, who was at that time employed by the Boston Post as a writer of stories of important events to be published exclusively in that newspaper, sought, without success, information from the treasurer of the Atlantic Monthly respecting this reply.
He was then sent by direction of his editor to Concord, New Hampshire, where is located the Rumford Printing Company which prints the Atlantic Monthly, to see if he could find out where he could get hold of the contents of the Smith letter because people in Concord had obtained them. On the way he visited one Sheriff O'Dowd, in Manchester, who gave him the name of a man named Sullivan, in Concord. The plaintiff explained to Sullivan...
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