Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1991
• Citation: 578 N.Y.S.2d 106,78 N.Y.2d 553,585 N.E. 2d 355
• Parties: , 585 N.E.2d 355 David THOMPSON, Appellant, v. GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 106

578 N.Y.S.2d 106

78 N.Y.2d 553, 585 N.E.2d 355

David THOMPSON, Appellant, v. GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 25, 1991.

Joseph Miklos and Meryl R. Neuren, for appellant.

Wilfred R. Caron, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

The issue on this appeal in a summary judgment setting is whether plaintiff Thompson, a general employee of Applied Transportation Service (ATS), was properly determined to be a special employee of Grumman Aerospace Corp. (Grumman) as a matter of law. If so, Thompson's instant common-law action against Grumman is barred because of the exclusive workers' compensation benefits Thompson received from ATS. The uncontroverted record supports Grumman's assertion that from the time Thompson was assigned to work exclusively at its plant until his accident one year later, Grumman exerted comprehensive control over every facet of his work. The Appellate Division correctly determined that Thompson was a special employee of Grumman. We therefore affirm the order granting summary judgment to defendant Grumman on its affirmative defense of workers' compensation.

Thompson, an experienced sheet metal mechanic, was recruited and hired by ATS in January 1986 to work at defendant Grumman pursuant to a "Purchase Order" agreement between ATS and Grumman. Under that agreement, ATS recruited and provided trained, experienced candidates for employment at Grumman's Bethpage Operations Center to meet the job descriptions and specifications furnished in advance by Grumman. ATS submitted resumes of qualified applicants to Grumman representatives for consideration; Grumman had the right to interview the candidates and to make the "final selection". Grumman fixed the hourly wages and benefits; ATS provided Thompson's paycheck, carried workers' compensation, liability and unemployment insurance, and withheld Social Security. ATS billed Grumman for labor at a base rate multiplied by a factor which included all ATS costs for "labor, overhead and profit". Only Grumman could terminate Thompson's assignment to its facility. ATS was precluded from substituting, reassigning or removing personnel selected by and assigned to work at Grumman. Grumman also had the right to hire, "on a direct basis" and without ATS's consent, ATS employees assigned to work at Grumman, subject to limitations not pertinent here.

It is uncontroverted that Thompson performed work exclusively for Grumman at its Bethpage facility from the time he was recruited and hired by ATS for Grumman until his injury approximately one year later. He reported daily to a Grumman supervisor, Dan Schmidt, who assigned, supervised, instructed, oversaw, monitored and directed his work duties on a daily basis. Thompson acknowledged Schmidt as his "supervisor". While the ATS Director of Personnel delivered Thompson's paycheck each week and "commented" on his job performance, there were no ATS supervisory personnel assigned to or present at the Grumman jobsite.

After he was injured, Thompson filed for and received workers' compensation benefits based on his employment with ATS. He then commenced this negligence action against Grumman. Grumman asserted as an affirmative defense in its answer and, after discovery, in its motion for summary judgment, that Thompson was its special employee and that his acceptance of workers' compensation benefits barred this action. Plaintiff cross-moved to dismiss that workers' compensation affirmative defense.

Supreme Court denied Grumman's motion and granted Thompson's cross motion, finding as a matter of law that Thompson was an employee of ATS only and was not a special employee of Grumman. That decision was based on language in the ATS-Grumman contract which provided that "[a]ll persons employed by [ATS] and assigned to work under any Purchase Order shall at all times be employees of [ATS] and not of Grumman."

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, concluding as a matter of law that Thompson was in the special employ of Grumman when he was injured (166 A.D.2d 578, 560 N.Y.S.2d 864). The court reasoned that while the issue of special employment status is generally one of fact, the indicia of special employment in this case--including Grumman's comprehensive and exclusive daily control of Thompson's work--established his special employee status. This Court granted leave to appeal to Thompson.

Thompson claims that the ATS-Grumman contract makes him an employee of ATS only. Alternatively, he urges that, at the very least, he raised a question of fact as to his special employment status with Grumman.

We have consistently found as a general proposition that a general employee of one employer may also be in the special employ of another, notwithstanding the general employer's responsibility for payment of wages and for maintaining workers' compensation and other employee benefits (Stone v. Bigley Bros., 309 N.Y. 132, 127 N.E.2d 913; Irwin v. Klein, 271 N.Y. 477, 3 N.E.2d 601; Murray v. Union Ry. Co., 229 N.Y. 110, 112-113, 127 N.E. 907; Matter of Schweitzer v. Thompson & Norris Co., 229 N.Y. 97, 99, 127 N.E. 904; see also, Cameli v. Pace Univ., 131 A.D.2d 419, 420, 516 N.Y.S.2d 228). A special employee is described as one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another (Brooks v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 71 A.D.2d 405, 407, 422 N.Y.S.2d 695). General employment is presumed to continue, but this presumption is overcome upon clear demonstration of surrender of control by the general employer and assumption of control by the special employer (Stone v. Bigley Bros., supra, 309 N.Y. at 140-143, 127 N.E.2d 913 [and cases cited therein]; Sweet v. Board of Educ., 290 N.Y. 73, 76-77, 48 N.E.2d 266; Irwin v. Klein, supra, 271 N.Y. at 484-485, 3 N.E.2d 601; Ramsey v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 269 N.Y. 219, 224, 199 N.E. 65).

We recognize that a person's categorization as a special employee is usually a question of fact (Stone v. Bigley Bros., supra; Irwin v. Klein, supra, 271 N.Y. at 486-487, 3 N.E.2d 601; Wawrzonek v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 276 N.Y. 412, 419, 12 N.E.2d 525; Ramsey v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., supra; Braxton v. Mendelson, 233 N.Y. 122, 135 N.E. 198). These cases usually involve arrangements under which a general employer performed work and provided services for another business and, in the course of doing so, an employee and equipment of the general employer were necessarily used and temporarily assigned to work for that business. These lent employee cases, not surprisingly, rest on their particular facts. They do not create a per se rule that a question of fact always exists in these cases. They do not require that the question of special employment inevitably go to a jury. That is true here where, combined with other indicia of special employment, the uncontroverted record documents an employer's comprehensive and exclusive daily control over and direction of the special employee's work duties for almost a full year with the corresponding complete absence of any supervision or control of his work duties by the originating general employer.

Indeed, though recognized as an exception to the general approach and analysis, we have held that the determination of special employment status may be made as a matter of law where the particular, undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact (Sweet v. Board of Educ., 290 N.Y., at 76, 48 N.E.2d 266, supra; Irwin v. Klein, 271 N.Y., at 487, 3 N.E.2d 601, supra; Ramsey v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 269 N.Y., at 223-224, 199 N.E. 65, supra; Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127, 129, 135 N.E. 199; Murray v. Union Ry. Co., 229 N.Y., at 112, 127 N.E. 907, supra; see also, Delisa v. Arthur F. Schmidt, Inc., 285 N.Y. 314, 320, 34 N.E.2d 336; Fallone v. Misericordia Hosp., 23 A.D.2d 222, 227, 259 N.Y.S.2d 947, affd. without opn. 17 N.Y.2d 648, 269 N.Y.S.2d 431, 216 N.E.2d 594; Richiusa v. Kahn Lbr. & Millwork Co., 148 A.D.2d 690, 692, 539 N.Y.S.2d 438; Cameli v. Pace Univ., 131 A.D.2d, at 420, 516 N.Y.S.2d 228, supra; Doboshinski v. Fuji Bank, 78 A.D.2d 537, 538, 432 N.Y.S.2d 99; Brooks v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 71 A.D.2d, at 407, 422 N.Y.S.2d 695, supra ). Thus, we have never held that the issue of special employment must always be submitted to a fact finder where the undisputed facts establish that the general employer was performing no work for the special employer and did not retain control over the special employee. This, when combined with other factors, allows a determination of special employment status as a matter of law (compare, Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 362 N.Y.S.2d 131, 320 N.E.2d 853).

Many factors are weighed in deciding whether a special employment relationship exists, and generally no one is decisive (Braxton v. Mendelson, 233 N.Y. 122, 124, 135 N.E....