Thompson v. Hendrickson USA, LLC, 3:20-cv-00482
| Decision Date | 05 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:20-cv-00482,3:20-cv-00482 |
| Parties | PRISCILLA THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. HENDRICKSON USA, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.1 (Doc. No. 13, "Motion"). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. No. 19). Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. No. 20). The matter is ripe for review.
For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff, an African American woman, was hired by Defendant in September 2010 as an Assembly Worker. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 8). Defendant's Paint and Assembly Department contains several different jobs a worker can perform, but workers often consistently perform only one job within the department at a time. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10). For several years prior to 2015, Plaintiff worked only one station on the assembly line. (Id. at ¶ 11). In July 2015, Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury in the form of a rotator cuff tear. (Id. at ¶ 13). Plaintiff required surgery, follow-up treatment, physical therapy, and work conditioning as a result of her injury. (Id. at ¶ 14).
Plaintiff received notes from her doctor reducing her work restrictions as she healed, but each time she reached out to Defendant, it denied her request to return to work. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18). Defendant refused to allow Plaintiff to return to work in a light duty role, and Defendant did notengage in an interactive process to determine whether the accommodation of a light duty role could be granted. (Id. at ¶ 16).
In June 2017, Plaintiff's doctor notified Defendant that Plaintiff's restrictions would be permanent. (Id. at ¶ 21). That month, Plaintiff had a meeting with Defendant's Human Resources Manager and offered to do several jobs in the Paint and Assembly Department that she believed she could fully perform, including among others the brake installation position. (Id. at ¶ 22). Defendant maintained that Plaintiff must be able to perform all jobs in the Paint and Assembly Department in order to return to work. (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff was terminated the day after her meeting with the Human Resources Manager. (Id. at ¶ 28).
At the time of her termination, there were several other employees who were not required to rotate positions and were not able to perform all positions in the department. (Id. at ¶ 29). Plaintiff believes that at least one white employee was allowed to return to work with light duty restrictions in the Paint and Assembly Department. (Id. at ¶ 25). Plaintiff believes that white employees without a disability were allowed to stay in one position and not rotate throughout the department. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27).
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on December 17, 2017, alleging discrimination and retaliation based on disability. (Id. at ¶ 30). She subsequently amended her charge to allege discrimination and retaliation based on racial discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 31). In connection with her EEOC charge, a federal investigator performed a site visit at the facility, where the investigator observed that several employees did not ever rotate positions and had not been cross-trained to rotate to other positions. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33, 34).
On December 12, 2019, the EEOC issued a determination letter finding that there is reasonable cause to believe that Respondent failed to provide a reasonable accommodation as toPlaintiff's disability. (Id. at ¶ 35). The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue based on both disability discrimination and race discrimination, and Plaintiff commenced her action in this Court on June 9, 2020, within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC's Notice of Right to Sue. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 36).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff brings the following respective Counts: I) Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act ("ADAAA")3 in the form of disability discrimination and retaliation, II) race discrimination under Title VII, and III) race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of monetary damages. It is relevant to the discussion below to note that although it is generally customary to include only a single "claim" in each count of a complaint, Plaintiff's Counts I and III each can be viewed as including two counts, one for discrimination and one for retaliation.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, as it has done above. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that isplausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Id.; Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010), cited in Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). Moreover, factual allegations that are merely consistent with the defendant's liability do not satisfy the claimant's burden, as mere consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief even if it supports the possibility of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it may be appropriate to "begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. This can be crucial, as no such allegations count toward the plaintiff's goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such allegations include "bare assertions," formulaic recitation of the elements, and "conclusory" or "bald" allegations. Id. at 681. The question is whether the remaining allegations—factual allegations, i.e., allegations of factual matter—plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not, the pleading fails to meet the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and thus must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683.
As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the motion is converted to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 645, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Blanch v. Trans Union, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 789, 791-92 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).
Importantly, the familiar burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), holding modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), is inapplicable on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.5
A plaintiff need not allege facts specifically indicating that the plaintiff could carry the burden she might ultimately bear under McDonnell Douglas. This is because McDonnell Douglas "is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). A plaintiff is not required to plead what would qualify as a prima facie case forpurposes of McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (); Clough v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 13-2885-STA-tmp, 2014 WL 1330309, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2014) (). The Court recently explained this in some detail in resolving a motion to dismiss a plaintiff's THRA claims:
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