Thompson v. Mcdonald

• Decision Date: 27 November 1889
• Citation: 10 S.E. 448,84 Ga. 5
• Parties: Thompson v. McDonald.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

10 S.E. 448

(84 Ga. 5)

Thompson

v.McDonald.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 27, 1889.

Action—Splitting Causes—Partnership.

1. An account resulting from a single contract cannot be split into two causes of action, the whole being mature when the first action was brought.

2. A contract with a partnership raises no cause of action in favor of one of the partners severally against the other contracting party, though the partnership was dissolved before full performance, and though, by arrangement between the partners, performance was completed, after dissolution, by that partner who has brought the suit.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Jackson county; Hutchins, Judge. Payton Thompson, for plaintiff in error.

Bleckley, C. J. 1. According to the evidence for both parties, the lumber sued for by McDonald was included in the contract made by McDonald in behalf of Hall & McDonald with Mrs. Thompson, the plaintiff in error. It was so charged on the books kept by Hall & McDonald, and was includ-ed in the action which they brought against her, and in which they recovered, after striking from their bill of particulars these items of lumber. They thus had a recovery against her for a part of the lumber included in their general account, which account was the result of one and the same contract, made between them and her through her husband as her agent. At the time they brought the action in which they recovered, the items now sued for, as well as the rest of the general account, were due. At least, nothing to the contrary appears. Having voluntarily withdrawn these items from the account, they could not bring a second suit for them, the rule being that all breaches of a contract, up to the time of bringing action on the same, must be included in the one action. Railroad Co. v. Garrard, 54 Ga. 327; Evans v. Collier, 79 Ga. 319, 4 S. E. Rep. 266.

2. Another conclusive reason why there could be no recovery in the subsequent suit is that that suit was based upon an alleged contract, express or implied, with McDonald alone, whereas, as we have stated, it was proved by both parties that the lumber was furnished under the contract made with Hall & McDonald. No debt, therefore, from Mrs. Thompson to McDonald ever existed. It does appear that this lumber was furnished after Hall and McDonad dissolved partnership. But the dissolution of the partnership did not affect the contract which they had made with Mrs. Thompson. Nor did the partners themselves, as it...