Thompson v. Parker
| Decision Date | 10 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11CV-31-R |
| Parties | WILLIAM EUGENE THOMPSON PETITIONER v. PHILLIP W. PARKER RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
[CAPITAL CASE]
This matter is before the Court on the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by William Eugene Thompson, by counsel. While serving a life sentence for murder in the minimum-security Western Kentucky Farm Center, Thompson killed Charles Fred Cash, a Kentucky Department of Corrections officer. Thompson pleaded guilty to the murder. At a sentencing trial, the jury sentenced Thompson to death.
The Court has exhaustively reviewed the parties' briefing, the record below, and the relevant case law. After doing so, the Court concludes that Thompson is not entitled to habeas relief on any of the claims of error raised. The Court also finds that a certificate of appealability should issue with respect to claim five but should be denied as to Thompson's other claims.
The Kentucky Supreme Court set out the following facts underlying Thompson's sentence. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22 (Ky. 2004).
At the time of this crime, Appellant was serving a life sentence for murder. He was transferred to the Western Kentucky Farm Center, a minimum security prison facility that includes an inmate-operated dairy farm. During the early morning hours of May 9, 1986, Appellant and his supervisor, Fred Cash, reported to work at the dairy barn. According to Appellant, he became enraged outside a calf barn while he and Mr. Cash were attempting to start some equipment. Appellant admits striking Mr. Cashonce to the head with a hammer. Little is known about exactly what transpired thereafter, as Appellant claims to have "blacked out." However, the evidence reveals that Mr. Cash's skull was crushed by numerous blows to the head with a hammer and his body was dragged into a calf's stall. According to Appellant, upon realizing what he had done, he removed Mr. Cash's pocketknife, keys and wallet, and left the Farm Center in the prison dairy truck. Appellant fled to the nearby town of Princeton, where he purchased a ticket and boarded a bus bound for Madisonville. The authorities apprehended Appellant in Madisonville.
Id. at 31.1 This Court presumes the state court's findings of fact to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Thompson originally was tried before a jury in Lyon Circuit Court in October of 1986 and was found guilty of murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree escape. He was sentenced to death, twenty years, and ten years, respectively. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1993). Upon remand, Thompson pleaded guilty to all three charges. Thompson waived jury sentencing on the robbery and escape charges and was sentenced to two consecutive prison terms totaling twenty years. A second penalty-phase trial was held in Graves Circuit Court on February 2 - 11, 1998, to determine sentencing on the murder charge. The prosecution called ten witnesses, and the defense called four witnesses, including Thompson himself. At the conclusion, Thompson was again sentenced to death for the murder of Fred Cash. The jury found the existence of the following two aggravating factors: Thompson's prior conviction of murder and the victim was a corrections officer engaged in the performance of his duties at thetime of his murder. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d at 45. The trial court formally sentenced Thompson to death on March 12, 1998.
Thompson again appealed his sentence, raising a number of issues including his competency to enter a guilty plea. The Kentucky Supreme Court remanded the case for a retrospective competency hearing and abated determination of the remaining issues on appeal. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 407 (Ky. 2001). After a hearing, the trial court determined that Thompson had been competent to plead guilty. Thompson filed a subsequent appeal raising twenty-nine claims of error. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Thompson's conviction and sentence in a unanimous opinion rendered on August 26, 2004. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.2d at 84. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 27, 2005. Thompson v. Kentucky, 545 U.S. 1142 (2005).
Thompson filed a motion to vacate and set aside his sentence under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 on May 18, 2006. The Lyon Circuit Court denied the motion on May 15, 2009, finding an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. Thompson appealed the denial to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed on October 21, 2010. Thompson v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-SC-557-MR, 2010 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 99, at *11 (Ky. Oct. 21, 2010).
Thompson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western of District of Kentucky on March 1, 2011. He filed an amended petition on July 12, 2011. In his amended petition, he raises the following seven claims for relief: 1) the jury considered extrajudicial evidence; 2) defense counsel was ineffective in not making sure that the jury knew Thompson was already serving out a life sentence; 3) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument; 4) the trial court unfairly limited questioning in voir dire; 5) the juryinstructions were improper on mitigation; 6) Kentucky's proportionality review process is flawed; and 7) cumulative error.
The standard under the AEDPA, on which the petitioner bears the burden of proof, is "'difficult to meet' [and a] 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). The Supreme Court recently explained that the AEDPA's requirements reflect "the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)); see also Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 676 (6th Cir. 2011) () (citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). The Supreme Court cautioned that the AEDPA requires federal habeas courts to review state court decisions with "deference and latitude," and that "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are independent tests and must be analyzed separately. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 2003). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. William v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405.A state court's ruling violates the "unreasonable application" clause "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. at 407. An unreasonable application can also occur where "the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. Unreasonableness is an objective standard, and the fact that another court has applied the law in the same manner is not dispositive. Id. at 409-10. "Unreasonable"...
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