Thompson v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 30 September 1874
• Citation: 73 Ill. 11,1874 WL 8912
• Parties: CHARLES THOMPSON et al.v.JOSEPH S. REYNOLDS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

73 Ill. 11

1874 WL 8912 (Ill.)

CHARLES THOMPSON et al.

v.JOSEPH S. REYNOLDS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1874.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. MERRIAM & ALEXANDER, for the appellants.

Mr. JOHN C. RICHBERG, for the appellee. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

Some time in the latter part of the year 1868, appellee and his partner were consulted by appellants as to whether they should execute a release, without consideration, of certain property mentioned in the deed. The partner advised that they had no interest, and could do so without prejudice to their rights; but, subsequently, another quitclaim deed was, in like manner, presented for a large amount of property. Appellee was then applied to for further advice, when he, with appellant Charles Thompson, consulted with one James Dunne, also an attorney, who occupied the same office with appellee. They investigated the matter, and arrived at the conclusion that appellants had an interest in the property.

An agreement was soon after entered into between appellants and appellee, by which appellee was to institute all necessary proceedings to ascertain and fix the rights of appellants; that he should pay all necessary expenses, and receive one-half of whatever should be realized. Appellants agreed that they would do no act to interfere with the proceedings. It is claimed that, with the consent of the parties, appellee agreed with Dunne he should assist in prosecuting the claims, for which he was to receive one-half of appellee's moiety, being one-fourth of what should be recovered.

Soon after, proceedings were commenced in the circuit, the Superior and the county courts by these attorneys. During the continuance of these proceedings, it is claimed that about $10,000 was realized by appellants executing releases, by way of compromise, with several defendants to the various suits, and it is claimed that these proceeds were divided according to the terms of the agreement.

About the month of May, 1871, appellants, it is claimed, without the consent of appellee or of Dunne, terminated the several proceedings and conveyed the lands in litigation, in consideration of $7500, actually paid to them, and to recover one-half of that sum this action was brought. A trial by the court and a jury was had, resulting in a verdict of $1500 in favor of plaintiff, on which a judgment was rendered and this appeal prosecuted.

A number of errors are assigned on the record, but in the view we take of the case, we shall only consider whether the judgment is against the law. The court was asked to instruct the jury that the agreement entered into was champertous and void, but the court below refused to give the instruction. Blackstone defines champerty (vol. 4, p. 135,) as “a species of maintenance, and punished in the same manner, being a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant compum partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them, if they prevail at law, whereupon the champerter is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense.” The same author informs us that the punishment, if a common person, for champerty, was by fine and imprisonment--and this was a misdemeanor, punishable at the common law. See Hawk. Pleas of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 463. It was also prohibited by various ancient statutes, commencing as early as the Statute of Westminster 1, ch. 25, all of which enact heavy penalties for their violation.

It thus appears, that champerty was an offense at the common law, and our General Assembly having adopted the common law of England as the rule of decision, so far as applicable to our condition, until modified or repealed this must be regarded as in force in this State, as affecting all such contracts, and as being opposed to sound public policy. It is certainly applicable to our condition so far as it relates to attorney and client, and contracts with intermeddlers and speculators in apparently defective titles to property. If allowed to be practiced by attorneys, it would give them an immense advantage over a client. The superior knowledge of the attorney of the rights of the client, would give him the means of oppression and acquiring great and dishonest advantages over the ignorant and unsuspecting owner of property. By giving false advice, the attorney, owing to the confidence his client reposes in him, and to his superior knowledge, would have the client completely at his mercy, and would thus be enabled to acquire the client's property in the most dishonorable manner. To allow champerty would be to...