Thompson v. Richmond & Danville R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 March 1886
• Citation: 24 S.C. 366
• Parties: THOMPSON v. RICHMOND & DANVILLE R. R. COMPANY.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

24 S.C. 366

THOMPSON v. RICHMOND & DANVILLE R. R. COMPANY.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 13, 1886

1. In action against a railroad company under section 1511 of General Statutes to recover damages for personal property destroyed by fire beyond defendant's right of way testimony is inadmissible to prove that defendant had paid for cotton burned at the same time, which had been received by the company for carriage.

2. Under section 1511 of General Statutes, a railroad company is liable for property destroyed by fire, beyond its right of way, communicated by its locomotive engines or originating within the limits of its right of way in consequence of any act of an authorized agent, and this liability attaches without regard to the question of the company's negligence, or of proximate or remote cause.

Before WALLACE, J., Spartanburg, June, 1885.

This was an action by Jeff Thompson against the defendant company to recover damages for furniture and other personal property burned at Duncan's, in Spartanburg County, on the line of the Atlanta and Charlotte Airline Railway Company, then operated by the defendant. The action was commenced August 15, 1883. The opinion states the case.

Messrs. Duncan & Sanders , for appellant.

Mr. Stanyarne Wilson , contra.

OPINION

MR JUSTICE MCIVER.

On November 24, 1882, the plaintiff had certain personal property destroyed by fire, in a house occupied by him as the tenant of one Greer, which was about one hundred and fifty yards from the railroad of the defendant, and outside the limits of its right of way; and this action was brought to recover damages for the destruction of said personal property under the allegation that the fire originated from the escape of sparks from defendant's engines.

It seems that some cotton on the platform of defendant's depot was also burned on the same day, and, against the objection of defendant, witnesses were allowed to testify that the defendant company had paid for said cotton-his honor, the Circuit Judge, ruling that " it may in one sense be that it is an admission of their liability. It may not be by word, but by acts." It appeared in evidence that this cotton had been delivered at the depot for shipment, and taken charge of by the defendant's agent, though no bill of lading had been given, it being the custom at that depot for shippers to call in the evening and get bills of lading for all cotton put in charge of defendant's agent during the day. At the close of the testimony as to the cotton defendant's counsel moved " that so far as the paying for this cotton could be construed to be an admission of defendant's liability, it be stricken out," to which his honor replied: " That is for the jury. I will charge the jury on the law with regard to it; " but so far as appears from the charge as set out in the record, this matter was not alluded to.

The Circuit Judge after reading to the jury section 1511 of the General Statutes (which will hereinafter be set out in full), in substance instructed the jury that if the plaintiff's property was destroyed by fire communicated by sparks from the locomotive engines of the defendant, or by fire originating within the limits of defendant's right of way, in consequence of the act of any of its authorized agents or employees, the defendant would be liable, the terms of the law above referred to having eliminated all inquiry into the question of negligence and into the question of proximate or remote cause.

The plaintiff having obtained judgment the defendant appealed on various grounds, which raise questions as to the admissibility of the testimony objected to, as affording any evidence of defendant's admission of liability to the plaintiff, and as to the proper construction of the above mentioned section of the general statutes, which will be considered without referring to the various grounds of appeal seriatim .

First, as to the question of evidence. We think the testimony objected to was incompetent, and its admission, with the accompanying remarks of the judge, that: " It may, in one sense, be that it is an admission of their liability. It may not be by words, but by acts," was well calculated to prejudice the cause of the defendant, especially when he further said: " Here is a fire, in consequence of which this plaintiff claims that he has been injured. Now, we cannot conceive that every little fact and detail of the burning can be proved, but we must exercise our judgment and be allowed to infer from one fact another. It is asked whether, as a consequence of this fire cotton having been destroyed, the company did pay for it? Now, what if they did pay for it? The inference is that it is an admission of liability ."

It seems to us clear that the last sentence of these remarks, which we have italicised, only with the view to direct special attention to it, was well calculated to prejudice the defendant; in fact, virtually decided the case against the company. For, as we have seen, the judge withdrew from the jury any question as to the negligence of the defendant, and any question as to whether the fire originating on defendant's right of way was the proximate or remote cause of the destruction of plaintiff's property, so that, practically, the only question for the jury to determine was whether the fire was the consequence of the act of any authorized agent or employee of the defendant; and if the fact that defendant had paid for the cotton was evidence of defendant's admission of its liability to the plaintiff, it must necessarily have been an admission that the fire was the consequence of the act of some one of defendant's agents or employees.

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