Thompson v. Ryan
Decision Date | 31 July 2015 |
Docket Number | No. CV-12-00766-TUC-DCB (BGM),CV-12-00766-TUC-DCB (BGM) |
Parties | Lyndall Dwaine Thompson, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Lyndall Dwaine Thompson's pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) ("Petition") (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Answer") (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed his Traverse (Doc. 13). The Petition is ripe for adjudication.
Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,1 this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1).
The Arizona Superior Court, Pima County stated the facts2 as follows:
Answer (Doc. 11), In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 8/3/2010 (Exh. "E") at 1-3.
On July 10, 2007, a grand jury indicted the Petitioner on one count of first degree murder for the shooting death of his brother Clark Duval. Id., Exh. "E" at 1; see also Answer (Doc. 11), Ct. App. Mem. Decision 9/24/2009 (Exh. "C") at ¶ 1. On April 11, 2008, a jury found Petitioner not-guilty of first degree murder, but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, a class two felony. Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. "C" at ¶ 1, Exh. "E" at 1. On July 14, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of sixteen years imprisonment. Id., Exh. "C" at ¶ 1, Exh. "E" at 1.
On March 2, 2009, counsel for Petitioner filed an Anders4 brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals.5 Answer (Doc. 11), Appellant's Opening Br. 3/2/2009 (Exh. "G").Subsequently, Petitioner filed two pro se supplemental appellate briefs. Answer (Doc. 11), Appellant's Pro Se Suppl. Br. 7/17/2009 (Exh. "I") & Appellant's Pro Se Suppl. Br. 7/8/2009 (Exh. "M"). Petitioner initially alleged six (6) claims for relief, including that (1) "because of the 'irreconcilable conflict and friction' between him and his attorney of record, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to replace trial counsel[;]" (2) "because he was prevented from participating in an effective and amicable manner with his trial counsel, he was deprived of the opportunity and right to put forth mitigating factors into the record of testimony and complete and full disclosure[;]" (3) because of the conflict between Petitioner and counsel "request after request for interview and investigation concerning family, friends, associates and witnesses went entirely unheeded or considered[,]" preventing Petitioner for establishing mitigating factors and "conditions of historical background and motives of conduct[;]" (4) prosecutorial misconduct by the State "because it engaged in presenting facts and various misstatements about Appellant during the trial and sentencing that were prejudicial[;]" (5) "all officers of the honorable court did not participate in or take action to insure or represent a profound attitude offairness[;]" and (6) based on the conflict between Petitioner and counsel "he was not given proper nor full and complete full disclosure of evidence[.]" Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. "M" at 2-3. The majority of Petitioner's first supplemental brief focused on the trial court's alleged failure to replace his attorney despite the "irreconcilable conflict" between them. See id., Exh. "M." Petitioner's second supplemental brief alleged that (1) "the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing attorney [sic] and Public Defender's Office [sic] to withdraw wholly and completely and the court's failure to acknowledge a gross conflict of interest and denial, summarily, of the Appellant's due process[;]" (2) Petitioner was "denied his right to pre-trial and hearing that would put forth mitigating factors and circumstances reflecting his nature and associations surrounding all trial issues and alleged events . . . [including] knowledge of a right to preliminary hearings, to include mitigation hearings and hearing of discovery[;]" and (3) the "denial of due process did not allow [Petitioner] to present mitigating testimony for the record nor for the jury's review." Id., Exh. "I" at 3-4. The majority of Petitioner's second supplemental brief focused on the alleged denial of a preliminary hearing. See id., Exh. "I."
On September 24, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions. See Answer (Doc. 11), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 9/24/2009 (Exh. "C"). As an initial matter the appellate court "note[d] that most of the arguments Thompson has attempted to assert in his first supplemental brief appear to have been copied from the pleadings of other defendants." Id., Exh. "C" at 3. The court went on to state that "[a]s such, they are generally unclear and unsupported by the record on appeal." Id. "To theextent Thompson intended to challenge Skitzki's conduct at trial, his arguments constitute claims of ineffective assistance of c...
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