Thompson v. State, 18572
| Decision Date | 14 November 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 18572,18572 |
| Citation | 248 S.C. 475,151 S.E.2d 221 |
| Parties | Joe THOMPSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of South Carolina et al., Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Joseph D. Sapp, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Edward B. Latimer, Columbia, for respondents.
This is an appeal from an order of The Honorable John Grimball, Resident Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, discharging a writ of habeas corpus.
The appellant is an inmate of the South Carolina Penitentiary, serving a life sentence imposed upon him by The Honorable Steve C. Griffith, Presiding Judge, at the 1964 September term of the Court of General Sessions for Fairfield County, after the appellant plead guilty to an indictment that charged him with murder. The appellant not only signed a plea of guilty to murder with a recommendation to the mercy of the court but a jury returned a like verdict. The appellant was represented by retained counsel at the time of his trial and in connection with his guilty plea.
The appellant, on March 3, 1965, filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, alleging that his imprisonment was contrary to law on the following grounds:
1. That one juror who found him guilty was a second cousin of the deceased.
2. That he was advised by his attorney to plead guilty to murder and receive a sentence of four or five years.
3. That he was arrested and questioned by police without being in the presence of his attorney to aid him, even though demand was made.
4. That he was not promptly arraigned.
5. That three 'false witnesses' testified against him.
6. That the court refused to let him 'talk' at the trial.
7. That he was advised at his trial that if he plead innocent he would be sentenced to death.
8. That he was not advised by either his counsel or the court of the charge against him and was not given a copy of the indictment.
9. That one witness perjured himself by testifying in conflict with his previous testimony given at the inquest and that appellant's attorney refused to cross-examine such witness.
10. That he was deprived of certain rights under Title 18, Section 242, of the 1962 Code of Laws. (Apparently this reference was to Title 18, Section 242, U.S.C.A.)
Upon this petition the circuit judge issued the writ of habeas corpus; and the respondents having made return thereto alleging that the appellant had been convicted and sentenced in accordance with due process of law, the matter was heard in the Circuit Court on July 15, 1965, and October 29, 1965. The appellant was present and represented by court appointed counsel, other than counsel who represented him when he plead guilty and was sentenced. By his order of December 6, 1965, the circuit judge found that the grounds upon which the appellant alleged his imprisonment to be contrary to law were without merit and he discharged the writ of habeas corpus and remanded the appellant to custody. This appeal followed. The appellant, by his exceptions, raises two questions: (1) Is there a duty on a trial judge in South Carolina to question one accused of a criminal act in order to determine whether or not the accused understands the consequences of his plea of guilty before the court accepts such plea, and (2) Was the petitioner accorded due process of law at the time he entered his plea of guilty?
It appears from the record in this case that the appellant was indicted for the crime of murder by the Fairfield County Court of General Sessions at the 1964 June term thereof. This case came on for trial before The Honorable Steve C. Griffith, Presiding Judge, and a jury, on September 10, 1964, the appellant being represented by retained counsel. Upon the arraignment of the appellant he entered a plea of not guilty. The State completed the presentation of its case against appellant on September 10, 1964. At the close of such testimony the appellant made a motion, which was refused, to reduce the charge against him from that of murder to manslaughter. After the State had completed its case against the appellant, the court adjourned until September 11, 1964. During this period, the retained counsel entered into negotiations with the Solicitor concerning a possible guilty plea. The appellant conferred with his retained attorney and other counsel who had been brought in for consultation on this matter. Upon the convening of court on September 11, 1964, the appellant, through his counsel, asked to be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the offense of murder with recommendation to the mercy of the court. The plea as agreed to by the State and by the court was signed by the appellant and the jury that had been impaneled to try the case was directed to and did return a verdict in accordance with said agreement and plea. The trial judge, pursuant to Section 16--52 and Section 17--553.4 of the Code, sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for the period of his whole lifetime.
At the hearing before Judge Grimball the appellant testified that he was present and heard all of the testimony given in behalf of the State. The next morning the appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder with a recommendation to mercy assigning as his reason therefor that his attorneys 'told me if I didn't plead guilty I would get the electric chair'. He admits that prior to the entry of his plea of guilty and as he went to the desk to sign such that Judge Griffith asked him 'do you know what you are doing?', and he answered 'Yes'. When asked why he gave this answer he stated that his counsel had told him to give this response. He further testified that he did not know what sentence he was going to get. The record shows that the appellant was in court with his attorney as the trial judge instructed the jury foreman to sign a consent verdict finding him guilty of murder with a recommendation to mercy. He was also present when the judge stated that the sentence was a mandatory life sentence. He made no objection to what was being done. He admitted that his attorneys advised him to plead guilty to murder with a recommendation to mercy because it was their opinion if he did not do so he would get the electric chair. He denied that he knew that the death penalty was the punishment if he was found guilty of murder without a recommendation to mercy and also denied that his counsel told him that if he entered a plea of guilty to murder with a recommendation to mercy he would get a life sentence. However, on cross-examination, he did admit that his attorneys told him that if the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of murder he would be sentenced to die in the electric chair.
The record shows that when the appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder with a recommendation to the mercy of the court Judge Griffith instructed the jury to return such a verdict. Thereafter, he announced a life sentence in conformity with the verdict. The appellant denied that this took place and that he only knew he had a life sentence when he was entered as a prisoner in the penitentiary. This testimony contradicts the transcript of record in this case.
The attorney for the appellant appeared as a witness. He testified that after the State had completed its case against the appellant that he was convinced that the only two decisions the jury could render would be murder or murder with a recommendation to mercy. The attorney told the appellant that if the Solicitor would allow him to do so he strongly recommended that he enter a plea of guilty to murder with a recommendation to mercy. He further testified that he called into consultation another attorney who had defended the appellant at a previous term of the court for another crime. After these attorneys had considered the testimony against the appellant in this case it was their joint recommendation and advice that he enter a plea of guilty to murder with a recommendation to mercy. This attorney testified that he explained the charges contained in the indictment to the appellant and explained the possible sentences that he could receive if convicted. He then testified that the decision 'to enter that guilty plea was Joe Thompson's and Joe Thompson's alone' and such plea was voluntarily entered.
The appellant does not allege the incompetency of his counsel nor does he charge him...
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