Thompson v. State

• Decision Date: 15 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2D13–5874.,2D13–5874.
• Parties: Scotty THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

170 So.3d 856

Scotty THOMPSON, Appellant

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D13–5874.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 15, 2015.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Sharon Morgan Vollrath, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Scotty Thompson appeals his convictions and sentences for manufacture of methamphetamine; possession of a listed chemical; actual or constructive possession of a structure used for trafficking, sale, or manufacture of controlled substances; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Thompson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The record shows that in response to a burglary, officers traced a phone found at the victim's residence to a codefendant at the address of Thompson's sister. Officers testified that Thompson's sister invited them into the house. Thompson's sister, however, testified that the police asked if Thompson was there and she said, “yes” while gesturing toward Thompson who was sitting on the couch. She maintained that she did not invite them in, instead testifying that she was pushed out of the way by the police officers. Thompson offered testimony stating

[w]ell, I noticed that somebody knocked on the door and my sister answered the door, and I heard them ask for me and she said, ‘Yeah’ and she pointed at me. Like I was on the couch. And then they walked right by her and asked me to get up and asked me if I could talk to them.

Officers spoke with Thompson and asked for permission to search his bedroom. Thompson refused, stating that he did not want his bedroom searched because there were needles with methamphetamine in the bedroom. Based on this and other statements, the officers obtained a search warrant. They discovered stolen items as well as illegal drugs in the residence. Thompson was charged with burglary while armed; two counts of grand theft; manufacture of methamphetamine; possession of a listed chemical; actual or constructive possession of a structure used for trafficking, sale, or manufacture of controlled substances; possession of methamphetamine; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of cannabis.

The defense moved to suppress evidence resulting from the search on the grounds that the officers did not have Thompson's sister's consent to enter the home and that the officers had omitted this information in bad faith in the application for a warrant. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Thompson's sister's testimony was not credible. The court also found no merit in the allegations concerning the application for a search warrant.

A jury trial was held. Defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the contraband was found in a room where Thompson was a joint occupant. Thompson argued that the State failed to prove he had the ability to exert dominion and control over the items. He also pointed out that there was no presumptive testing or chemical analysis on the contraband. The motion was denied. Ultimately, the jury found Thompson guilty of manufacture of methamphetamine; possession of a listed chemical; actual or constructive possession of a structure used for trafficking, sale, or manufacture of controlled substances; and possession of drug paraphernalia and acquitted him on the remaining counts. He was sentenced to seven years in prison.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A ruling on a motion to suppress reaches review clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences in a manner consistent with the trial court's ruling. Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001). However, the application of the law to the facts, in particular whether a suspect is “in custody,” is a legal question subject to de novo review. Id.

Thompson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the law enforcement officers did not have consent to enter the home. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits warrantless searches; however, a warrantless search may be validated if the State proves “the search falls into an established constitutional exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent.” Alamo v. State, 891 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Whether consent is voluntarily given is a question of fact determined considering the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Consent can be given by the suspect himself or by a third party. See Cooper v. State, 706 So.2d 369, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Further, “police may accept an invitation to make a warrantless entry into premises only under circumstances that would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that the person making the invitation is authorized to do so.” Id. at 372 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) ). Although there was conflicting evidence as to whether Thompson's sister had invited the officers into the residence, sufficient evidence exists to support a finding that the officers reasonably perceived Thompson's sister's response (in the form of a gesture) as an invitation to enter the residence and she in fact had the authority to invite them inside.

Furthermore, Thompson argues that his incriminating statement should have been suppressed because he made it pursuant to an interrogation; however, evidence was presented showing he volunteered the information. Incriminating statements are admissible where they are made voluntarily and spontaneously and are not the product of interrogation. Hayward v. State, 24 So.3d 17, 36 (Fla.2009), as revised on denial of reh'g (Dec. 10, 2009) (quoting Rosher v. State, 319 So.2d 150, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) ). The determination of whether the evidence should have been suppressed depends on the type of encounter that occurred between law enforcement and the defendant. A consensual encounter involves minimal police contact. As the Florida Supreme Court described in Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), “[d]uring a consensual encounter a citizen may either voluntarily...