Thompson v. State, M-85-85

Decision Date19 November 1986
Docket NumberNo. M-85-85,M-85-85
Citation728 P.2d 859
PartiesMary V. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

The appellant, Mary V. Thompson, was convicted in a non-jury trial for the crime of Public Intoxication in the District Court of Cleveland County in Case No. CRM-84-1681. The judge found her guilty and set punishment at a fine of one hundred dollars ($100.00).

Briefly stated the facts are that on July 19, 1984, at approximately 1:30 a.m., a police officer in Noble, Oklahoma, observed appellant exit her automobile and stagger toward a nearby grocery store. The officer approached appellant, who walked with an extremely staggered gait, and smelled a strong odor of alcohol. He also observed that appellant had slurred speech, and that her eyes were dilated and bloodshot. Appellant was unable to produce any identification, but she told the officer her name and date of birth. When the officer asked her where she was going she responded by giving an address that is non-existent in Noble, Oklahoma, and the officer informed appellant that she was in Noble, but she believed she was in Norman, Oklahoma. Appellant admitted that she had drunk some beers and taken heavy medication; however, she had taken medication approximately twenty-four (24) hours before that time. After the officer read appellant her rights and explained the implied consent request test, appellant stated that she understood her rights and consented to the test. At that point, the officer conducted a plain view search of appellant's vehicle and observed the keys in the ignition. He then started the car to establish its mobility.

The officer arrested the appellant for actual physical control of a motor vehicle, and transported her to the Cleveland County Detention Center where she was given a breath analysis test, registering seven hundredths (.07).

The appellant first contends that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to dismiss the information. The appellant alleges that the information issued is defective on its face because the affidavit is in the words of the district attorney, J. Tully McCoy, yet it was signed by Chief of Police Joe Hyde and an assistant district attorney.

The purpose of the statute requiring the district attorney to subscribe an information is to give an official character to all prosecution and to insure that the prosecution is being conducted in good faith and not the work of private persons. Coffer v. State, 508 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okl.Cr.1973).

In Ellington v. State, 516 P.2d 287 (Okl.Cr.1973), as in the instant case, the defendant argued that the information was defective on its face for the reason that it was not personally verified by the district attorney, and further argued that 22 O.S.1971, § 303 mandated that the district attorney personally verify each information filed in his district. This Court rejected that argument and held that:

In the information in the case at bench, the district attorney's name is inserted in the verification followed by the signature of the district attorney's duly appointed assistant acting in his official capacity. This is a sufficient compliance with 22 O.S.1971, § 303. The verification is not defective. See, State v. Jackson, 57 Okl.Cr. 277, 48 P.2d 861 (1935).

In the instant case, the information was properly verified by a duly appointed assistant acting in his official capacity; therefore, we find that the verification is in compliance with ...

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1 cases
  • Gille v. State, M-85-524
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • September 11, 1987
    ...information filed with the court was, in fact, signed by the assistant district attorney who prosecuted this case. See Thompson v. State, 728 P.2d 859, 861 (Okl.Cr.1986). See also 22 O.S.1981, § Next, the test for sufficiency of the information is two-pronged: (1) whether the appellant was ......

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