Thompson v. State

• Decision Date: 10 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC02-800.,SC02-800.
• Parties: Paul THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

887 So.2d 1260

Paul THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC02-800.

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 10, 2004.

Howard Babb, Public Defender, James R. Baxley and Jason D. Winn, Assistant Public Defender's, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Tavares, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela J. Koller and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General's, Dayton Beach, FL, for Respondent.

QUINCE, J.

We have for review Thompson v. State, 808 So.2d 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), based on apparent conflict with the decision in Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

The question presented here is the application of the punishment enhancement provisions of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), where the defendant's prior driving while license suspended (DWLS) convictions occurred under an earlier version of the statute that did not require proof of knowledge as an element of the offense. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision in Huss and quash the decision in Thompson.

Facts and Procedural History

Paul Thompson pled guilty to a felony charge of knowingly driving with a license that had been suspended or revoked (felony DWLS) under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). In a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, Thompson argued that because his two predicate DWLS convictions used to charge him with felony DWLS had occurred prior to October 1, 1997,¹ he could only be charged with a misdemeanor. Thompson cited the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Huss v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), as authority for his argument. Thompson also argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear his case because, under Huss, his two predicate convictions were improperly used to enhance his charge to felony DWLS. Without these predicate convictions, Thompson asserted, his crime would only be a misdemeanor under the amended statute. The trial court denied Thompson's 3.850 motion, concluding that Huss constituted a change in decisional law that should not be retroactively applied.

On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal also rejected Thompson's argument regarding the retroactive application of Huss. Thompson, 808 So.2d at 285

. The Fifth District agreed with the trial court that Huss represents a change in the law, not merely a recognition of the "state of the law," as Thompson asserted. Id. The Fifth District also concluded that the Huss ruling was not retroactive. Id. Finally, the Fifth District rejected Thompson's assertion that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment and characterized the argument as "`clearly lack [ing] merit.'" Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 809 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)).

Analysis

Prior to October 1, 1997, section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1995), provided in relevant part:

(1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:

....

(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

The Legislature amended the statute by adding language that the driving must be done "knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation,"² thus adding a knowledge element to the crime. See § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The amended statute also provides that a person who drives while his or her license is canceled, suspended, or revoked but does not have knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation as provided in subsection (2) is merely guilty of a moving violation. See § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998).³

The factual circumstances of Huss are almost identical to the instant case. See Huss, 771 So.2d at 591

.⁴ William Raymond Huss was convicted of felony DWLS under the amended statute. As in Thompson, the predicate convictions which the State relied on to enhance Huss's offense to felony status occurred prior to the October 1, 1997, effective date of the amended statute. 771 So.2d at 592. The First District held that because Huss's prior convictions had occurred before the statutory amendment that added the knowledge element, the convictions could not be used under the amended statute for the purposes of enhancement to felony DWLS. The First District explained that "the law under which [the defendant] received his prior convictions is no longer in effect, and for purposes of enhancement under the new statute for multiple convictions, the statute by its plain wording applies only to a `conviction' for the offense prescribed by the present statute." Id. at 593.

In a recent decision, the First District also certified conflict with the decision in Thompson on this very issue. See Stutts v. State, 821 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). In Stutts, the First District decided that the defendant's prior DWLS convictions in Alabama could not be the basis for an enhanced felony DWLS offense under the amended section 322.34(2) because the Alabama statute contained no knowledge element. Id. at 450. The First District explained that its prior decision in Huss did not change the law, but merely "stated the `plain meaning' of the new provision" that was created by the legislative amendment. Id. at 451.

The underlying conflict between these cases is whether Huss represents a change in the decisional law of this state that should be accorded retroactive application. In Thompson, the Fifth District concluded that "Huss represents a change in the law, but the ruling is not retroactive." 808 So.2d at 284. In contrast, the First District characterized its decision in Huss as being based on the plain language of the applicable statute which "did not constitute a change in the decisional law of this state." Stutts, 821 So.2d at 451. As the First District explained in Huss, "the law under which [Huss] received his prior convictions is no longer in effect, and for purposes of enhancement under the new statute for multiple convictions, the statute by its plain wording applies only to a `conviction' for the offense prescribed by the present statute." 771 So.2d at 593. The First District also pointed out that the Legislature could have, but did not, provide for enhancement under the amended statute based on violations of the pre-amendment version of the statute. Id.

An examination of this Court's decision in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980), and the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001), is instructive in answering the question concerning the impact of the Huss decision. In Witt, this Court was asked to apply a number of alleged changes in decisional law to a defendant's conviction for first-degree murder and his resulting death sentence during his appeal of the denial of postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. This Court had to balance two important goals of the criminal justice system — "ensuring finality of decisions" and "ensuring fairness and uniformity in individual cases" — to determine when a subsequent change in a rule of law should be applied retroactively in the context of postconviction relief. 387 So.2d at 925. We concluded that an alleged change of law will not be considered in a rule 3.850 proceeding unless the change: (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court; (b) is constitutional in nature; and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. Id. at 931.

This Court has applied the Witt analysis to a number of cases, with differing outcomes. Compare State v. Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.1998)

(determining that Court's decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995), which invalidated the statutory penalties for attempted second- and third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, met all three prongs of Witt and should be applied retroactively) with Delgado v. State, 776 So.2d 233, 241, 241 n. 7 (Fla.2000) (concluding that Court's interpretation of the burglary statute did not meet the second or third prongs of the Witt test and could not be applied retroactively).

Huss does not meet the first prong of the Witt test as it was not a decision of either this Court or the United States Supreme Court. Thus, the Fifth District correctly concluded that the Huss ruling was not retroactive under the Witt analysis. Thompson, 808 So.2d at 285. Moreover, the question of retroactivity under Witt is not applicable to this case because we are examining a change in the statutory law of this state not a change in decisional law emanating from this Court or the United States Supreme Court.

However, the question of retroactivity should not have ended the Fifth District's analysis of Thompson's postconviction claim. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003), "[t]he question here is not just one of retroactivity." Id. at 840, 123 S.Ct. 2020 (remanding for this Court to resolve separate due process question of whether defendant's possession of pocketknife satisfied the elements of Florida's first-degree burglary statute). Thompson's claim must also be evaluated in light of the due process principles set forth in Fiore.

Fiore involved a Pennsylvania criminal statute that prohibited the operation of a hazardous waste facility without a permit. 531 U.S. at 226, 121 S.Ct. 712. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the statute for the first time after William Fiore's conviction became final. This subsequent interpretation made it clear that Fiore's conduct was not within the statute's scope. Id. After Fiore was...