Thompson v. State
| Decision Date | 25 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-17-00043-CR,06-17-00043-CR |
| Parties | MICHAEL LYNN THOMPSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 71st District Court Harrison County, Texas
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Julius Cox called the police after he saw that a truck, driven by Michael Lynn Thompson, had backed into his mailbox and driven away. Eric Nieves, a trooper with the Texas Department of Public Safety, was dispatched to investigate the call, and he spoke with Cox. Nieves quickly found the truck, with Thompson behind the wheel, parked in a nearby driveway. Seeing several signs that Thompson was intoxicated, Nieves arrested him on suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and drove him to Good Shepherd Medical Center where his blood was drawn. A laboratory analysis revealed Thompson's blood to contain 0.274 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, more than three times the legal limit. Thompson was charged with DWI, third or more. A Harrison County jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b) (West Supp. 2016).
On appeal, Thompson contends that (1) the trial judge lacked the authority to preside over the trial, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his warrantless arrest, and (3) the trial court erred by restricting his voir dire of the jury panel.
We affirm the trial court's judgment because (1) the County Court at Law of Harrison County had authority to try Thompson's case, (2) the officer had probable cause to arrest Thompson without a warrant, and (3) the trial court was within its discretion to deny additional time for voir dire.
In his first point of error, Thompson contends that because the record is silent as to how the judge of the County Court at Law of Harrison County came to preside over this trial in the 71st Judicial District Court, the trial judge lacked "the power to preside over the jury trial."
Thompson's indictment was presented to the 71st Judicial District Court of Harrison County; pretrial matters, such as Thompson's motion to suppress and the State's motion for a continuance, were heard by the Honorable Brad Morin, judge of the 71st Judicial District Court. However, the case proceeded to jury trial before the judge of the County Court at Law of Harrison County, the Honorable Joe Black, apparently sitting for the 71st Judicial District Court. The charge of the court, the verdict form, and the punishment instructions are all signed by Judge Black. The judgment of conviction emanated from the 71st Judicial District Court of Harrison County, but was also signed by Judge Black.
To the extent Thompson takes issue with the authority of the judge of the County Court at Law of Harrison County to sit for the 71st Judicial District Court, we find no error. The County Court at Law of Harrison County has concurrent jurisdiction with the 71st Judicial District Court in felony cases other than capital murder cases. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1042(a)(2) (West Supp. 2016). In matters of concurrent jurisdiction, the judge of the county court at law may be assigned a felony case, other than a capital murder case, by the 71st Judicial District Court. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1042(b) (West Supp. 2016). In any event, Thompson failed to object tothe exchange of benches in this case, so any complaint regarding the lack of an assignment authorizing the exchange has not been preserved for our review.1
In his second point of error, Thompson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his arrest because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.2
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that turn on credibility and demeanor, while reviewing de novo other application-of-law-to-fact issues. See Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Appellate courts should also afford nearly total deference to trial court rulings on application-of-law-to-fact questions (also known as mixed questions of law and fact) if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellate courts review mixed questions of law and fact not falling within this category on a de novo basis. Id. We must affirm the decision if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
A warrantless arrest is "unreasonable per se unless the arrest fits into one of a 'few specifically defined and well delineated exceptions.'" Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993)). A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant only if probable cause exists with respect to that person and the arrest falls within one of the exceptions set out in Article 14.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Lunde v. State, 736 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). An officer has probable cause to make a warrantless arrest "if, at the moment the arrest is made, the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the person arrested had committed or was committing an offense." Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "Probable cause deals with probabilities; it requires more than mere suspicion but far less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or even that needed to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence." Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. "[I]t is clear that 'only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
Nieves was the only witness to testify during the suppression hearing. Nieves was dispatched to investigate a call that a possibly intoxicated driver had backed a truck into a mailbox. The caller, Cox, described the suspect's vehicle as a maroon and silver truck with a Texas license plate with a possible plate number of GMZ 2411. The caller identified Thompson as the possible driver. When Nieves arrived at the Cox residence, he spoke with Cox and their interaction was recorded by Nieves' dash camera. The dash camera recording was admitted into evidence andplayed for the court. The recording captures the complainant telling Nieves that he saw the truck, driven by Thompson, hit his mailbox and drive away. As Nieves was about to leave, he saw a truck matching the description drive by, and he tried to catch up to it in order to continue his investigation.
When Nieves caught up to the truck, it was running, but parked in a driveway with Thompson sitting behind the wheel. The truck had a Texas license plate, number GMZ 2459. He believed the truck was the same one involved in damaging the mailbox. Nieves told Thompson, "[W]e got a call that you hit the mailbox over there at [Cox's] house." Thompson responded, "[Y]es," but Nieves also told him that he "heard that [Thompson] had been drinking." Thompson denied having drunk anything, but Nieves noticed that Thompson "seemed very confused," he had a "little bit" of trouble with his balance, his speech was slurred, "he had red glassy watery eyes," and "his breath and/or person" smelled strongly of alcohol.
Nieves administered a divided attention field sobriety test (the finger count), but Thompson failed it. Nieves tried to administer the Horizontal-Gaze Nystagmus Test, but he could not complete it because Thompson kept turning his head and would not follow Nieves' finger with only his eyes. Nieves did not have Thompson perform the walk-and-turn test or the one-leg stand test because Thompson "was not wearing shoes and the way he was acting and speaking [Nieves] didn't feel comfortable putting him in a position where he could fall and hurt himself." When questioned by Nieves, some of Thompson's responses were "down right incoherent." Based on the foregoing, Nieves believed that Thompson had been driving while intoxicated, and he placed Thompson under arrest.
Here, based on the facts and circumstances within Nieves' knowledge, a reasonably prudent person would believe that Thompson had committed or was committing the offense of driving while intoxicated. See Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878. Cox told Nieves that Thompson was driving the truck that hit his mailbox, and Thompson's truck matched the description given by Cox. While Nieves was still at the Cox residence, the truck drove by the house. Nieves testified that when he pulled up behind the parked truck, it was still running and Thompson was behind the wheel. Therefore, it was reasonable to infer that Thompson had been driving the truck. When Nieves approached and spoke with Thompson, he exhibited several signs of intoxication and either failed or could not complete the field sobriety tests Nieves administered to him. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Thompson's motion to suppress, and we overrule this point of error.
In his final point of error, Thompson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the duration of his voir dire examination of the jury panel.
A trial court has broad...
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