Thompson v. State

• Decision Date: 20 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. A98A1743.,A98A1743.
• Parties: THOMPSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

506 S.E.2d 201

234 Ga. App. 74

THOMPSON v. The STATE.

No. A98A1743.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 20, 1998.

Joyce M. Griggs, Savannah, for appellant.

Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Ronald M. Adams, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Judge.

Earl Fenton Thompson appeals his convictions by a jury of carrying a concealed weapon, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Thompson contends that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion in limine; (2) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment; and (3) refusing to give a requested jury charge. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Thompson's convictions.

1. In his first enumeration of error, Thompson asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine in which he sought to exclude the introduction of statements he made at the time of his arrest. In our review of the trial court's order denying Thompson's motion to suppress, we construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the trial court's ruling. Mao v. State, 222 Ga.App. 482, 483, 474 S.E.2d 679 (1996). It is the trial court's duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and its findings of credibility and fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

During the hearing on Thompson's motion in limine, Officer Mike Embry with the Savannah Police Department testified that Andrea Beasley drove her car into the police precinct yard while several officers were present during a shift change. Beasley exited the car, identified herself to Officer Embry, and told him that her boyfriend beat her up, threatened her, and had a gun. Officer Embry went to the vehicle and confronted Thompson who was sitting in the passenger seat. Officer Embry testified that Thompson was loud, belligerent, and vulgar, and that he denied that there was a gun in the car. However, another officer found a gun under the front passenger seat. At that point, Thompson started talking in a rambling manner—first denying the gun was his, then admitting it was his, but saying that the police could not prove it. Thompson was put in a police cruiser where he continued to talk, saying to Beasley; "I can't believe you told them about—that I had the gun, had the gun on me."

Based on this testimony, Thompson's statements can be put in two groups: (a) those statements made in Beasley's car in response to the officer's initial inquiry, and (b) those statements made once he was put into the police cruiser. Thompson contends that none of his statements should have been admitted at trial because he had not been given his Miranda warnings.

(a) The trial judge determined that the first statements made by Thompson either were made in response to the officer's initial inquiry while investigating the situation or were made prior to Thompson being placed in custody.

We have specifically held that "Miranda warnings are not required when a person responds to an officer's initial inquiry at an on-the-scene investigation which has not become accusatory." Williamson v. State, 171 Ga.App. 904, 905, 321 S.E.2d 762 (1984). We agree with the trial court that the first of Thompson's statements were made in response to the officer's initial inquiry and were admissible.

"The issue presented, as to whether [Thompson] was in custody for Miranda purposes, is a mixed question of law and fact. We will not reverse the trial court's fact findings which underpin its legal conclusion made at a suppression hearing, unless they are clearly erroneous. Whatley v. State, 196 Ga.App. 73, 78(5), 395 S.E.2d 582 [(1990)]. A person is not in a state of custody merely because he is a prime suspect at the time he is interrogated by the police or their agent. See Vaughn v. State, 261 Ga. 686, 687(2), 410 S.E.2d 108 [(1992)]. Even if the police have probable cause to arrest at the time of the interview and secretly intend to charge the suspect at some future time, such facts are immaterial to a determination of whether the suspect was in custody at the time of the interview, except when and to what extent the police communicate their future intent to arrest during the course of the interview. State v. Brannan, 222 Ga.App. 372, 376(2)(c), 474 S.E.2d 267 [(1996)].... A suspect must be in a custodial situation for Miranda to apply; a suspect is not entitled to Miranda warnings, as a matter of right, unless he has been taken into custody or has been deprived of freedom of action in another significant way. Hardeman v. State, 252 Ga. 286, 288(1), 313 S.E.2d 95 [(1984)]; Carroll v. State, 208 Ga.App. 316, 317(2), 430 S.E.2d 649 [(1993)].... The real issue for adjudication is whether the individual was formally arrested or restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Hodges v. State, 265 Ga. 870, 872(2), 463 S.E.2d 16 [(1995)]. In resolving this issue, the relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in [a] suspect's position would perceive his situation (Hodges, supra, citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, [3151], 82 L.Ed.2d 317[(1984)]); that is, whether a reasonable person in [Thompson's] position would have understood the situation to constitute restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest. Manchester v. State, 226 Ga.App. 653, 655(1), 487 S.E.2d 449 [(1997)]." (Punctuation omitted.) Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga.App. 604, 605-606, 497 S.E.2d 236 (1997).

Applying these standards to the evidence before us, we conclude the trial court's finding that Thompson's initial statements were voluntarily made under noncustodial circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Compare Hodges, supra; Vaughn, supra; Manchester, supra.

(b) The trial court determined that the remainder of Thompson's statements were voluntary and not the result of police interrogation.

"Not all in-custody statements are subject to Miranda. A volunteered statement, which is not the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent, would not be suppressible on this ground. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).... The definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.... Zubiadul v. State, 193 Ga.App. 235, 237, 387 S.E.2d 431 (1989)." (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 224 Ga.App. 568, 569, 481 S.E.2d 268 (1997). In the present case, the trial court's finding that Thompson's statements were not made as a result of custodial interrogation is not clearly erroneous.

2. In...