Thoms v. Dingley

• Decision Date: 23 June 1879
• Citation: 70 Me. 100
• Parties: BENJAMIN N. THOMS & another v. JAMES B. DINGLEY & another.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

70 Me. 100

BENJAMIN N. THOMS & another v. JAMES B. DINGLEY & another.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 23, 1879

ON EXCEPTIONS.

ASSUMPSIT on contract of warranty of six sets of carriage springs sold by defendants to plaintiffs, January 30, 1872, at the price of $43, and used by plaintiffs in the construction of six carriages.

Plaintiffs claimed special damages in one count of the writ.

Plea general issue.

At the trial, plaintiffs introduced testimony tending to show that in January, 1872, they were, and for a long time before had been, in the business of manufacturing carriages in Bangor and that their business was known to the defendants; that in the early part of said month they ordered to be made and sent to them by the defendants, manufacturers of carriage springs in Gardiner, six sets of carriage springs of certain dimensions, to be made of the best of steel; that said springs were ordered by plaintiffs for use in the construction of carriages, and that defendants knew that said springs were ordered and intended by plaintiffs for such use that springs of the dimensions ordered were sent by defendants to plaintiffs, and were warranted by defendants to be of the best of steel; that said springs were used by plaintiffs, as of the best of steel, in the construction of new aud valuable carriages, which plaintiffs sold to various parties, warranting the same to be good and serviceable; that the steel in said springs was not of the best, but of a very poor quality, and unfit for a carriage spring; that, in consequence of the defective quality of their steel, the springs in five of the six carriages so constructed broke very soon after their sale, and that plaintiffs were subjected to an expense of sixty dollars for work, necessary in taking out, repairing and replacing said broken springs at different times, and claimed to recover the same.

Upon the question of damages, the presiding judge gave the jury the following instructions:

" The measure of damages is the difference between the springs as they were and as they should have been. I know of no other rule. If the price was the fair one, the usual price, why then the limit of damages could not exceed the price, because they could not be more than worthless. If they were to be repaired, and the repairs made them as good as new, then the cost of repair in that particular case, not exceeding the price at which they could have been purchased would be the damage, if, being repaired, they were as good as new. If they were worthless, five of them, the measure of damages would be the value of them, the price paid, with interest from the date of the writ up to the present time."

Verdict for plaintiffs for nineteen dollars; and the plaintiffs alleged exceptions.

J. Varney, for the plaintiffs.

L. Clay, for the defendants, contended that the instruction upon the question of damages was correct, and cited Moulton v. Scruton, 39 Me. 287. Story Con. 344, § 552. Sedg. Dam. (5 ed.) 655-658. Stiles v. White, 11 Met. 356. Wright v. Roach, 57 Me. 600.

Neglect to give particular instructions not requested is not ground for exception. Gardner v. Gooch, 48 Me. 487. Darby v. Hayford, 56 Me. 246. Willey v. Belfast, 61 Me. 569.

PETERS J.

The defendants, manufacturers and vendors of carriage springs, sold to the plaintiffs, carriage builders, six carriage springs, knowing that the plaintiffs were to use them in the construction of carriages, and warranted them as made of the best of steel. They turned out to be of poor material, and unfit for the purpose for which they were intended and used. In this action on the warranty, the plaintiffs claim to recover, having declared therefor specially, the expenses to them of taking out of the carriages into which they were placed some of the defective springs and fitting new ones in place of them.

The common doctrine applicable to all cases is, that the damages shall be the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of. They are general damages when the necessary and natural consequence. If they are the natural but not the necessary consequence of the act complained of, then they are special damages, and must be specially set forth in the declaration. Furlong v. Polleys, 30 Me. 491, and cases there cited. This is an ancient and very general doctrine. The difficulty is to determine when cases fall within and when without the definition. That must often be settled by other rules of a more definite character. There must be rules within the rule. In the growth and advancement of the law, rules have been adopted to meet the necessity.

Ordinarily, the measure of damages applying to warranty of personal property is the difference between the actual value of the articles sold and what they would have been worth if as warranted. Wright v. Roach, 57 Me. 600. But this is not an invariable standard. It is not always adequate to produce just results. There are cases where more extended damages are recoverable for special or consequential or exceptional losses.

The rule that embraces cases of special damages is the one formulated in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 353. Alderson, B., there said: " Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect to such breach of contract, should be either such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, that is, according to the usual course of things from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and were thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from the breach of the contract under those special circumstances so known and communicated." More could profitably be quoted from the case, if space permitted.

The principles laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale have been applied in many cases, and in the main been approved by many courts. In ...