Thoraldsen v. Hatch

• Decision Date: 25 July 1902
• Citation: 87 Minn. 168,91 N.W. 467
• Parties: THORALDSEN v. HATCH et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

87 Minn. 168

91 N.W. 467

THORALDSEN

v.HATCH et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 25, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Otter Tail county; L. L. Baxter, Judge.

Action by Iver Thoraldsen against A. C. Hatch and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where a deed is deposited with a person other than the grantee upon an agreement to deliver it upon the performance of certain conditions it is an escrow, and it is not necessary that the terms authorizing its delivery be expressed in writing, but may be declared orally at the time of the deposit.

2. When a deed is deposited in escrow to be delivered upon the happening of a certain event or the performance of a specified condition, the depositor is not at liberty to withdraw the deed or forbid its delivery without the consent of the other party.

3. When there is a deposit of a deed to be delivered upon certain conditions, the escrow is not defeated by the death of the grantor, but delivery may be enforced thereafter.

4. Conditions in the deposit of a deed in escrow for the sole benefit of one of the parties thereto may be waived by him, and a delivery enforced, notwithstanding such conditions. Chas. C. Houpt and Edward Engerud, for appellant.

E. E. Corliss and Parsons & Brown, for respondents.

LOVELY, J.

Action to determine adverse claim to real property. Plaintiff alleged possession to a tract of land in Otter Tail county, asserting an adverse claim by defendants, and demanded that they be debarred therefrom. The answer alleges that the defendant Evarts is the owner in fee of the premises, that the remaining defendants are his tenants, and demands that the title to the property be decreed in him free from the asserted claim of plaintiff. The case was tried to the court, who made findings of fact, and held as a conclusion of law adversely to plaintiff's title, and in favor of defendants. Judgment was entered, from which plaintiff appeals.

The evidence is not returned, and the appeal is here solely upon the pleadings and findings of the trial court, from which it appears that Amos Ralph, on the 25th day of August, 1896, was the owner of the land in question. On that date he bargained with one Sorenson for an exchange of this land for another tract owned by the latter, located in the state of Washington. Ralph executed a deed to Sorenson of the Otter Tail land. Sorenson made a deed of the Washington land to Ralph. Both deeds were deposited with the bank at Battle Lake upon a verbal agreement between the parties that the deeds were to be delivered to the grantees named therein, respectively, upon the payment by Sorenson to the bank for Ralph of $125, conditioned also that Ralph was to satisfy two mortgages on his land, one for $2,000 in round numbers, and the other of $26.50. The mortgage for $2,000 was paid by Ralph. Ralph died intestate on the 27th day of September, 1899, both deeds still remaining in the hands of the bank, and the mortgage of $26.50 being unpaid. On the 25th of February, 1900, after the death of Ralph, Sorenson caused $125 to be paid to the bank, and demanded the delivery to him of the deed of the Otter Tail land. The defendant Evarts had succeeded by purchase to the rights of Sorenson, and, through mesne conveyances from the heir of Ralph, plaintiff claims to own the land in controversy, and insists that he is lawfully entitled thereto upon the following grounds: (1) That the delivery of the deeds to the bank at Battle Lake was upon an oral agreement, and therefore void under the statute of frauds, because its terms were not expressed in writing; (2) that either party or his successor in interest had a right to withdraw the deed before delivery; (3) that the death of Ralph before the delivery of his deed terminated the rights of the respective parties.

1. The condition in the agreement for the transfer of the land and the deposit of the two deeds must be treated as an escrow. To make a deed an escrow, it must be delivered to a stranger, to be held until the condition is performed, then to be delivered to the grantee. Raymond v. Smith, 5 Conn. 559. In a very early and authoritative definition of an ‘escrow’ it is declared to be ‘where one doth make a deed and deliver it unto a stranger until such condition be performed, and then delivered to him to whom such deed is made to take effect as his deed, and so a man may deliver a deed and such...