Thorne v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 19 April 2016
• Docket Number: Record No. 0701–15–1.
• Citation: 66 Va.App. 248,784 S.E.2d 304
• Parties: Shawanda S. THORNE v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

66 Va.App. 248

784 S.E.2d 304

Shawanda S. THORNE

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 0701–15–1.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Norfolk.

April 19, 2016.

Leslee A. Nicholas, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Victoria Johnson, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: DECKER, ATLEE, J., and FRANK, Senior Judge.

DECKER

, Judge.

Shawanda S. Thorne appeals her conviction for obstruction of justice without force, in violation of Code § 18.2–460(A)

. She alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction because her refusal to sufficiently roll down the window of her vehicle as instructed by the police officer in order for him to test the tint did not constitute obstruction of justice. She suggests that her refusal to comply was not opposition or resistance by a direct action as required by the applicable section of the Code.¹ Contrary to the appellant's contention, this Court holds that the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND²

On October 7, 2012, Officer D.Q. Taylor of the City of Chesapeake Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a four-door sedan with dark tinted windows that was being driven by the appellant. Officer Taylor approached the driver's side of the car, and the appellant opened the window about three to four inches in order to provide her identifying information. She "became very upset" and told the officer that he had no reason to stop her. Taylor explained that she needed to roll down the window farther so that he could test the tint to determine if the windows were "within legal standards." He also explained that he needed her to roll the window down farther for "officer safety reasons" so that he could see into the back seat. Taylor believed that passengers were in the back seat but could not be sure because he could not see into the rear portion of the passenger compartment. The appellant "kept yelling that the window tint was legal and Officer Taylor had no reason to stop her." She persisted in her refusal to roll down the window and yelled repeatedly, "I know my rights! You don't know my rights!"

Officer Taylor requested at least five times that the appellant roll her window "f[a]rther down for the testing." He also asked her to get out of the car. She did not comply with any of the requests. Taylor told her that the window needed to be rolled down a minimum of four to six inches in order for him to test the tinting. He further explained that if she did not roll down the window, he would charge her with obstruction of justice. She yelled, "I know my rights! Do what you gotta do!" Once a backup police unit arrived, the appellant finally rolled down the back passenger-side window sufficiently for the tint testing to be performed. This was about nine minutes after Officer Taylor's first request. Taylor tested the tint and determined that it exceeded the legal limit. He issued the appellant a summons for obstruction of justice.

The appellant presented evidence at trial. She testified that at the time of the traffic stop it was cold and rainy. She also said that she had four children in the back seat of the car. According to the appellant, she explained that she did not want to roll the window down farther than necessary to provide her information because of the weather. She also said that she told Taylor that she could not get out of the car because of a leg injury. The appellant acknowledged that the officer told her he would charge her with obstruction of justice and that she was upset. However, she "denied making all of the statements attributed to her by Officer Taylor." She also denied that the reason she would not roll down the window farther was because the children were not properly restrained. The appellant's fiancé, who was the front seat passenger, also testified and corroborated her account. He acknowledged that Officer Taylor told the appellant that she would be issued a summons for obstruction of justice if she did not get out of the car.

After the appellant rested her case, counsel made closing arguments. The appellant argued that "her actions [of] not rolling down the window did not constitute obstruction and that the officer indeed was able to perform his test on the window which resulted in a summons for that charge." The trial court found the appellant guilty of obstruction of justice without force.³

II. ANALYSIS

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by finding the evidence sufficient to convict her of obstruction of justice. According to the appellant, no evidence proved her opposition or resistance to the officer by a direct act as required under the statute. She maintains that her actions or inactions did not keep him from performing his duty and that she merely delayed lowering her window for several minutes due to the weather. Finally, she suggests that her behavior did not rise to the level of obstruction because she provided the officer with adequate reasons why she would not roll her window down enough for him to test it for improper tinting, the basis for the traffic stop.

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under well-settled legal principles. On appeal, we consider the evidence "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth," granting to it all reasonable inferences that flow from the evidence. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 639, 645, 643 S.E.2d 166, 169 (2007)

. Examining "the record through this evidentiary prism requires [the Court] to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth.’ " Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 558, 562, 680 S.E.2d 361, 363 (2009) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980) ). To the extent that our sufficiency analysis requires us to interpret a statute, this is a question of law that we review de novo. Powell v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 20, 26, 766 S.E.2d 736, 739 (2015).

Where factual findings are at issue in the context of an appeal, great deference is given to the trier of fact, in this case the trial court. E.g., Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518, 506 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1998)

. Determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight afforded their testimony are matters left to the fact finder, who has the ability to hear and see them as they testify. Id. In fulfilling these duties, the fact finder may reject an accused's explanation and infer that she is "lying to conceal [her] guilt." Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 511, 521 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1999). Additionally, the fact finder is responsible for determining "what inferences are to be drawn from proved facts," provided that the inferences reasonably flow from those facts. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567–68 (1976) ). "[W]hen ‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences,’ [the appellate] court ... ‘must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’ " Harper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 517, 523, 642 S.E.2d 779, 782 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2793, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). "If the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, the reviewing court [will not] substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the [fact finder]." Jordan v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 153, 156–57, 747 S.E.2d 799, 800 (2013)

.

Finally, the evidence supporting a conviction must "exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" that flows from the evidence. Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468, 536 S.E.2d 437, 441–42 (2000)

; see Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 479, 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925). Under longstanding appellate principles, whether an "alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact" that will be reversed on appeal only if plainly wrong. Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 528, 535, 567 S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 1, 12, 492 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997) ). "Merely because [a] defendant's theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his [or her] innocence has not been excluded. What weight should be given evidence [remains] a matter for the [fact finder] to decide." Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462, 467, 138 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1964) ; see Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 505, 510, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). The appellate court asks only whether a reasonable finder of fact could have rejected the defense theories and found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785.

Code § 18.2–460(A)

provides: "If any person without just cause knowingly obstructs ... any law-enforcement officer ... in the performance of his duties ... or fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so by such ... law-enforcement officer ..., he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor." Obstruction requires "actual hindrance or obstruction of the officer." Polk v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.App. 590, 594, 358 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1987). It involves "prevent[ing] the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action." Id. (quoting Jones, 141 Va. at 478–79, 126 S.E. at 77 ). The offender must "obstruct the officer himself[,] not merely ... oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed." Jones, 141 Va. at 479, 126 S.E. at 77(quoting 2 Hascal R. Brill, Cyclopedia of Criminal Law § 1156 ((1923)), quoted with approval in Jordan, 273 Va. at 648, 643 S.E.2d at 171

); see also 2 Brill, supra, §§ 1154–56, at...