Thornhill v. Ingram

• Decision Date: 01 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–IA–00959–SCT.,2014–IA–00959–SCT.
• Citation: 178 So.3d 721
• Parties: Kay THORNHILL, C.F.N.P. v. Christopher W. INGRAM, Individually, and As Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Jennifer Lynn Ingram, Deceased.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

178 So.3d 721

Kay THORNHILL, C.F.N.P.

v.Christopher W. INGRAM, Individually, and As Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Jennifer Lynn Ingram, Deceased.

No. 2014–IA–00959–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 1, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 2015.

Dorrance Aultman, S. Beth Windham, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellant.

Norman W. Pauli, Jr., Hattiesburg, James A. Cook, Jr., attorneys for appellees.

Before DICKINSON, P.J., PIERCE and COLEMAN, JJ.

DICKINSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. A wrongful-death beneficiary failed to prosecute this medical-malpractice case for four years, so, on the defendant's motion, the circuit judge dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff refiled, and the defendant twice moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed. Both motions were denied, and we granted interlocutory appeal. Because the statute of limitations is not tolled when cases are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the second complaint was untimely. Accordingly, we reverse and render.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 2002, Christopher Ingram sued Forrest County General Hospital, Dr. Edgar Grissom, and Kay Thornhill on behalf of Jennifer Ingram's wrongful-death beneficiaries.¹ Ingram claimed that their failure to accurately diagnosis Jennifer and provide her necessary medical treatment caused her 2001 death. But, eight years later, the defendants moved the circuit judge to dismiss Ingram's case for failure to prosecute. The circuit judge dismissed the case "without prejudice."

¶ 3. Ingram refiled December 29, 2010. Thornhill moved for summary judgment and claimed that the statute of limitations had run. She argued that, under this Court's decision in Knight v. Knight, the statute had not been tolled during the first proceeding.² The circuit judge denied the motion, finding that, while the Knight holding addressed dismissals on the clerk's motion under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), it did not address dismissals on a party's motion under Rule 41(b).

¶ 4. A year and a half later, Thornhill moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, reasserting her statute-of-limitations argument. The renewed motion directed the circuit judge to this Court's opinion in Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Richardson, which had handed down after the judge denied the first motion.³ The circuit judge treated the motion as one for relief from a judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and found no grounds for relief.

¶ 5. Thornhill then petitioned this Court for interlocutory appeal, which we granted. She now argues that the circuit judge erred by treating the motion as one under Rule 60(b) and that the statute of limitations barred Ingram's second suit. We agree.

ANALYSIS

I. The circuit judge erred by treating Thornhill's second motion as a motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b).

¶ 6. Thornhill styled her second dispositive motion as a "Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment." The motion specifically requested relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The motion made no reference to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60, and the motion never requested relief from the circuit judge's prior order.

¶ 7. But because he previously had denied a similar motion, the circuit judge treated the second motion as one for relief from a judgment under Mississippi Rule Civil Procedure 60(b). Thornhill now argues that this was error, and that the motion should have been treated as one to dismiss or for summary judgment. We agree.

¶ 8. Rule 60(b) states that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding...."⁴ This Court has said that motions under Rule 60"proceed on the assumption that the trial court has entered a valid and enforceable judgment which has become final."⁵ That is, a Rule 60 motion seeks relief from a final judgment.⁶

¶ 9. In Holland v. Peoples Bank & Trust Company, a circuit judge denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.⁷ After that judge recused and this Court appointed a special judge, the defendants asked the new judge to reconsider the order denying summary judgment.⁸ The new judge then granted summary judgment.⁹ The plaintiff appealed and argued that the second judge could not reconsider the motion for summary judgment because no ground for relief existed under Rule 60(b).¹⁰

¶ 10. We explained that " ‘[a]n order denying summary judgment is neither final nor binding upon the court or successor courts.’ "¹¹ On that basis, we concluded that the plaintiff's "reliance on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) is misplaced in that the rule applies only where the judgment or order is final. In accordance with Mauck, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment."¹²

¶ 11. So a circuit judge's decision to deny summary judgment cannot be reviewed through Rule 60(b) because the denial does not constitute a final judgment. Accordingly, we find that the circuit judge erred by treating Thornhill's second dispositive motion as one under Rule 60(b). And the only authority Ingram cites to the contrary is this Court's decision in Richardson, which dealt with a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an order dismissing the plaintiff's case for failure to prosecute, not an order denying summary judgment.¹³

II. The circuit judge erred by denying Thornhill's motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment.

¶ 12. Thornhill moved to dismiss Ingram's claims, arguing that the statute of limitations ran before Ingram filed his second complaint. The parties agree that Ingram's medical-malpractice claims are subject to the limitations period in Mississippi Code Section 15–1–36, which states:

no claim in tort may be brought against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, institution for the aged or infirm, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered, and, except as described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, in no event more than seven (7) years after the alleged act, omission or neglect occurred....¹⁴

The parties also agree that, unless the statute of limitations was tolled, it lapsed, because the second complaint was filed in 2010—nine years after the alleged negligent conduct occurred.

¶ 13. Thornhill argues that in Knight, we held that any time a case is dismissed for lack of prosecution, the statute of limitations is not tolled during the first proceeding. Ingram argues that Knight 's holding pertained only to dismissals for failure to prosecute on the clerk's motion under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), and not those initiated by a party under Rule 41(b). We find that the exception to tolling articulated in Knight applies to all cases dismissed for lack of prosecution.

¶ 14. The " ‘[a]pplication of a statute of limitation is a question of law to which a de novo standard also applies.’ "¹⁵ The general rule in Mississippi is " ‘that, unless process is not timely served, the statute of limitations is tolled upon the filing of the complaint, and does not begin to run again until litigation has ended.’ "¹⁶ Before Knight, this rule applied even when a case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.¹⁷

¶ 15. In Knight, a circuit judge dismissed claims for assault and battery without prejudice after nearly ten years of inactivity.¹⁸ The dismissal was initiated on motion of the circuit clerk.¹⁹ The plaintiffs refiled their complaints, but the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed.²⁰ The circuit judge agreed.²¹

¶ 16. The plaintiffs appealed, and this Court considered whether "a complaint should not toll the statute of limitations when a complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute."²² We recognized then that, previously,

[t]his Court and the Court of Appeals ha[d] ... both recognized that filing a complaint tolls the statute of limitations and permits a plaintiff to refile his or her case if this case is dismissed without prejudice and time remains on the statute of limitations.²³

¶ 17. But we then adopted a new rule, stating that

when an action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute, the statute of limitations does not toll, and the parties are left in the same position as if they had never filed the action.²⁴

¶ 18. We provided several reasons for our holding, including that "[a]llowing the statute to toll in such a situation presents an opportunity for abuse of process, potentially allowing cases to be dismissed and refiled for a period of years or even decades."²⁵

¶ 19. We also made it clear that plaintiffs who fail to prosecute their cases have only themselves to blame, noting cases from other jurisdictions which adopted a similar rule for that reason, including the New Mexico Supreme Court, which said:

A party who has slept on his rights should not be permitted to harass the opposing party with a pending action for an unreasonable time.... the courts should not distinguish between a plaintiff who takes no action before the limitations period expires and a plaintiff who files a complaint before the period expires but who thereafter takes no action ....²⁶

¶ 20. In Knight, however, we did place some limitation on our holding, stating:

This holding, however, does not mean that all cases dismissed without prejudice after the statute of limitations has expired cannot be refiled. Some will be revived by the savings statute, equitable tolling, or otherwise. Our narrow holding here is merely that dismissal without prejudice for want of prosecution does not toll the statute of limitations.²⁷

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