Thornton v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 15 December 1919 |
| Docket Number | 33097 |
| Citation | 175 N.W. 71,187 Iowa 1158 |
| Parties | ARTHUR M. THORNTON, Appellee, v. MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Marshall District Court.--B. F. CUMMINGS, Judge.
ACTION for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for personal injuries. The plaintiff was an engine fireman and sustained a compound fracture of the arm. The defense was, in substance, a general denial. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for $ 6,250, which was reduced by the trial court to $ 4,000. The defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
C. H E. Boardman, M. M. Joyce, and R. B. Alberson, for appellant.
S. A Anderson, F. E. Northup, and J. E. Holmes, for appellee.
The specification of negligence was that the blow-off cock of the engine, upon which the plaintiff was working, was defective as to its valve, and as to its discharge pipe appurtenant thereto, in that the valve stuck, and failed to close automatically, and in that the discharge pipe was not securely fastened by an appropriate clamp, so that the pressure of the escaping steam from the blow-off cock forced it out of position, and threw a part thereof against the plaintiff's arm.
On the morning in question, the engine started at Mason City for its run to Monmouth, Illinois. The plaintiff boarded it, as fireman, at 9:15, at Marshalltown, his run being from Marshalltown to Monmouth. At Gilman, the third station from Marshalltown, the engineer experienced trouble with the blow-off cock, in that the valve thereof wholly failed to close, with the result that the steam and water of the boiler were rapidly escaping.
The blow-off cock was a device for enabling the engineer to blow out the dirty sediment which settled in the mudring of the boiler. The mud-ring was the lowest point in the boiler, and was intended to catch the settlings. In the bottom thereof was an opening, which was covered with a steel valve. This valve was held in its seat by the pressure of the steam. A lever was so connected with it that the engineer could lift the valve by the application of force. When it was thus lifted, the steam and water, under great pressure, passed through it, carrying away the dirt. This blowing off was a momentary process, lasting but a second or two. The lever being released, the valve should settle back into its place at once. Appurtenant to this blow-off cock, and on the outside of the boiler, was a discharge pipe, about 2 inches in diameter, and about 18 inches in length. Through this pipe, steam and water were discharged, under a pressure of 180 pounds. For the purpose of deflecting such discharge, and thereby protecting the roadbed, the lower end of such discharge pipe was turned horizontally, at right angles to the perpendicular part. In order to hold such pipe securely in its position under the great pressure of steam, it was necessary that it be securely clamped.
On the occasion in question, the valve, having been opened by the lever of the engineer, failed to close. The engineer manipulated his lever, without success. The plaintiff got down from the engine, taking with him a longhandled pick, with which he attempted to tap the valve. The supposition was that some substance had got under the valve and prevented it from settling into its seat. While the plaintiff was making his attempt, the pressure of the steam upon the discharge pipe drove it out of its position, and dislodged a part of it, and threw it with great violence against the plaintiff. This is the general outline of the facts of the accident. The contention for plaintiff is that the blow-off cock was in a defective condition. Such alleged defective condition was twofold:
(1) That the valve was defective, in that it did not close.
(2) That the discharge pipe was not securely fastened to its place, so that it failed to withstand the pressure to which the blow-off process necessarily subjected it.
The defendant denied the negligence, denied the alleged defects, denied that the defects, if any, were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and specially pleaded that the plaintiff's own negligent acts were the sole cause of his injury.
I. The first error assigned as a ground of reversal is that the verdict was contrary to the instructions, and without support in the evidence. In support of this assignment, the defendant contends, not only that no defective condition was shown as to the appliances, and that the defects, if any, were not the proximate cause of the injury, but that it affirmatively appears that the plaintiff's own negligent acts were the sole cause of the injury. The plaintiff testified that the engineer said to him, when he started with his pick, "You can't get it," or, "Don't go near it." The engineer testified for the defendant that he did not know that the plaintiff had left the cab. It is urged by defendant that the blow of the pick by the plaintiff was the cause of the displacement of the discharge pipe, and that such displacement would not have occurred if the plaintiff had withheld the blow. It is also urged that he put himself wrongfully in the place of danger, in violation of the orders of the engineer. These contentions are based upon inferences which are drawn from the evidence. The evidence is by no means conclusive thereon. There was sufficient basis in the evidence for a finding by the jury that these appliances were in a defective condition. Even the witnesses for the defendant who testified to an inspection immediately following the disaster disclosed that they found the blow-off cock and the clamp loose. We shall presently set out the Federal statute, which has an important bearing upon this point. Not only does the evidence fail to show conclusively that the accident was the sole result of the wrongful act of the plaintiff, but the jury could properly have found therefrom that his conduct was not wrongful at all. The failure of the valve to close created a grave emergency. The steam and water were rapidly escaping, and it was a question of only a brief time when the lowering of the water in the boiler would expose its crown sheet. Danger of explosion was imminent, unless something was done quickly. Unless the valve could be restored to its function, it would be necessary at once to extinguish the fire under the boiler. We see little ground, therefore, for holding, as a matter of law, that the activities of the fireman, under such circumstances, were wrongful or negligent.
II. Complaint is directed to Instruction 9, given by the trial court. This was as follows:
"You are further instructed that, under the law, the defendant was bound to furnish to the plaintiff a locomotive boiler, at the time in question, which was safe to be used, both as to the boiler and as to its appurtenances, and to keep and maintain the same in such condition at all times so as not to expose the plaintiff to any hazard or risk."
It is urged that this instruction ignored the question of negligence, and was contradictory to the other instructions given. It is true that the Federal Employers' Liability Act makes negligence the basis of the employer's liability. The trial court so instructed the jury. It is true, also, that such act and the Federal Safety Appliance Act enjoin certain specific duties upon the employer, a breach of which is declared to be unlawful and punishable. Such breach, therefore, constitutes negligence.
One of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts is generally known as the Locomotive Boiler Act. It was enacted February 17, 1911, as Chapter 103 of the Laws of 1911, and now appears as Sections 8630 to 8639 of the United States Compiled Statutes of 1916. It was later amended by an act passed on March 4, 1915, as Chapter 169, which now appears as Section 8639-a of such United States Compiled Statutes. In this act appears the following provision:
The Employers' Liability Act, as enacted April 22, 1908, and later amended, now appears as Sections 8657 to 8665 of the United...
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