Thornton v. Saul
| Decision Date | 06 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 4:20-cv-00073-TER |
| Parties | BARBARA ANN THORNTON, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security; Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This is an action brought pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a "final decision" of the Commissioner of Social Security, denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB). The only issues before the Court are whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards have been applied. This action is proceeding before the undersigned by consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. R. 73.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on January 3, 2017, alleging inability to work since July 30, 2016. (Tr. 15). Her claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing. A hearing was held on September 7, 2018, at which time, a vocational expert (VE) and Plaintiff testified. (Tr. 15). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision on January 10, 2019, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 15-25). Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision, which the Appeals Council denied on November 7, 2019, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. Plaintiff filed this action on January 7, 2020. (ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff was born on November 4, 1975, and was forty-one years old at the alleged onset date. (Tr. 62). Plaintiff alleges disability originally due to back problem and spinal cord lesions. (Tr. 63). Only relevant records will be summarized under pertinent issue headings.
In the decision of January 10, 2019, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law (Tr. 15-25):
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2020.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 30, 2016, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Spine Disorder, Neuropathy, Obesity, and Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) with some non-exertional limitations. The claimant is capable of lifting and/or carrying 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently. She is capable of standing and/or walking at least 2 hours in an 8-hour workday and sitting about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She can never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds, and occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She must avoid concentrated exposure to workplace hazards.
6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a Dispatcher. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 30, 2016, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in the Listing 1.04A analysis. Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly assess the opinions of Dr. Wilson. Defendant argues the ALJ supported findings with substantial evidence.
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). Section 423(d)(1)(A) defines disability as: the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for at least 12 consecutive months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, regulations promulgated under the Act have reduced the statutory definition of disability to a series of five sequential questions. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983) (). An examiner must consider the following: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"); (2) whether he has a severe impairment; (3) whether that impairment meets or equals an impairment included in the Listings;1 (4) whether such impairment prevents claimant from performing PRW;2 and (5)whether the impairment prevents him from doing SGA. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. These considerations are sometimes referred to as the "five steps" of the Commissioner's disability analysis. If a decision regarding disability may be made at any step, no further inquiry is necessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) ().
A claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Act if he can return to PRW as it is customarily performed in the economy or as the claimant actually performed the work. See 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, § 404.1520(a), (b); Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 82-62 (1982). The claimant bears the burden of establishing his inability to work within the meaning of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5).
Once an individual has made a prima facie showing of disability by establishing the inability to return to PRW, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to come forward with evidence that claimant can perform alternative work and that such work exists in the regional economy. To satisfy that burden, the Commissioner may obtain testimony from a VE demonstrating the existence of jobs available in the national economy that claimant can perform despite the existence of impairments that prevent the return to PRW. Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002). If theCommissioner satisfies that burden, the claimant must then establish that he is unable to perform other work. Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); see generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987) ().
The Act permits a claimant to obtain judicial review of "any final decision of the Commissioner [ ] made after a hearing to which he was a party." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of that federal court review is narrowly-tailored to determine whether the findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standard in evaluating the claimant's case. See id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Walls, 296 F.3d at 290 (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)).
The court's function is not to "try these cases de novo or resolve mere conflicts in the evidence." Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1157-58 (4th Cir. 1971); see Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir.1988) (citing Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the court must uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390, 401; Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005). Thus, the court must carefully scrutinize the entire record to assure there is a sound foundation for the Commissioner's findings and that her conclusion is rational. See Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58; see also Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the Commissioner, that decision must be affirmed "even should the court disagree with such decision." Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).
The "Listings," found at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1, "is a catalog of various disabilities, which are defined by 'specific medical signs, symptoms, or laboratory test results.' " Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530, (1990)). A claimant's impairment meets a Listing if "it satisfies all of the criteria of that listing, including any relevant criteria in the introduction, and meets the duration requirement." 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(c)(3)(eff. 6/7/11 to 3/26/17). The only time requirement is that "the evidence must show that your impairment(s) has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months." Id. at (c)(4)(emphasis added). "When a claimant satisfies a listing by meeting all its specified medical criteria, he presumably qualifies for benefits. See Bennett, 917 F.2d at 160. "If the individual's impairment(s) has the specific medical findings of a listed set of medical findings or findings that are equal in severity and duration to a set of listed findings, the individual is considered to be unable to engage in any gainful activity and, thus, can be found disabled on medical grounds alone." SSR 83-19, 1983 WL 31248, *1.
The impairment medically equals a Listing "if it is at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment." Id. § 416.926(a). If a claimant has a listed impairment, but: 1) does "not exhibit...
To continue reading
Request your trial