Thornton v. State
| Decision Date | 18 April 1899 |
| Parties | THORNTON v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. On the trial of a defendant for the murder of his wife, his declaration to another that "he had tried to care for his wife, but that she had forced him to do what he had done," are not admissible in evidence in his behalf though made in a half minute after the commission of the crime; it appearing that this statement was made to one in the house of defendant, where he had gone after he had left the scene of the killing, and the circumstances not indicating that the statement was free from suspicion of afterthought.
2. The fact that the solicitor general, in his concluding argument to the jury, read from a transcript made by the stenographer from his notes of the evidence, and commented thereon, is not ground for a new trial, when it does not appear from the motion what were the contents of the transcript, nor that anything was read or said by the solicitor different from what was actually testified to on the trial.
3. When the character of the deceased for violence had been put in issue before the jury, it was proper for the court to instruct the jury that general character of the deceased in this particular could not be proved by specific acts of violence.
4. It is not error for the court to charge the jury that "when the guilt of the accused is made to appear by proof to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury are authorized to convict, regardless of the good character of the accused"; the court having also charged in the same connection that "the jury has the right to consider the good character of the accused," not merely where his guilt is doubtful, under the other testimony in the case, but where such testimony of good character may of itself generate such doubts."
5. Under the facts in this case, there was no error in charging the jury to the effect that a felonious attack upon another with brickbats and rocks, by virtue of which the party assailed is knocked into a ditch, or by virtue of which she falls into a ditch in an effort to escape from the blows of the assailant, would be murder, if such attack was the primary cause of the death of the party assailed, although the death may have resulted from the fall.
6. Under the evidence in this case, there was no reasonable theory upon which the defendant could have based his contention that, if he was guilty of any crime at all, it was involuntary manslaughter. Even if such theory could have been predicated upon the statement of the defendant, there was no error in omitting to charge the jury what would be the form of their verdict in the event they found the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, no request to charge on this subject having been made by defendant's counsel.
7. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of guilty.
Error from superior court, Sumter county; Z. A. Littlejohn, Judge.
Will Thornton was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.
H. B Simmons, J. N. Scarborough, and Allen Fort, for plaintiff in error.
F. A. Hooper, Sol. Gen., and J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Will Thornton was found guilty under an indictment in Sumter superior court charging him with the offense of the murder of his wife. The testimony develops the following case, made out by the state's witnesses: In the month of July, 1898, the attention of witnesses was first attracted to a difficulty between the defendant and his wife by hearing screams and cries for help in their house. He was at the time engaged in violently beating her. She started to run from the house, and, as she got to the door, a severe wound was observed on her head. The defendant then struck her with a rock and knocked her to the ground. She arose, still endeavoring to escape from him, and finally a man came to her rescue; and while she had hold of him, and he was trying to protect her, the defendant threw another rock or brickbat, and knocked his wife away from her would-be protector to the ground. She arose, again made an effort to escape, and had reached the top of the steps that led down to the street, several feet below, when another rock or brickbat was hurled against her head by her husband, knocking her into a ditch or ravine, where she remained still, as if dead. The defendant then went to the edge of the bluff, looked down upon the body of his wife, threw another missile at her, and afterwards left the scene and returned to his house. During the time of the assault, cries of "Help!" and "Murder!" and repeated pleas for her life, were made by the wife. The wounds upon her head were severe and extensive, but the probability is, from the testimony, that her death was really caused by the fall, which seems to have broken her neck. The defendant introduced several witnesses, none of whom contradicted the above facts. He showed by them his good and peaceable character, and also the violent and quarrelsome disposition of his wife. In his statement he related facts concerning the violent conduct of his wife, and her aggravating demeanor towards him, for a long time previous to the homicide. He claimed that he was not mad with his wife at the time she was killed; that he was not throwing at her when she fell in the ravine, but at the man who was interfering with them; and that the movement of this person caused the fall of his wife. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial, and excepts to the judgment of the court overruling the motion.
1. The defendant's counsel offered to prove by a witness upon the stand that, after the defendant had returned from the scene of the killing to his house, he stated to this witness who was then in the house, that "he had tried to care for his wife, but that she had forced him to do what he had done"; and he further offered to show that this statement was made in about a half a minute after the killing. On objection of state's counsel to this testimony, it was excluded from the jury. It is insisted by counsel for plaintiff in error that the declaration was so nearly connected with the criminal act charged as to constitute a part of the res gestæ. Section 998 of the Penal Code provides that "declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, are admissible in evidence as part of the res gestæ." While time is an important element to consider in determining what sayings constitute part of the res gestæ of any transaction, yet it is by no means the only thing to be considered. As McCay, J., said in the case of Hall v. State, 48 Ga. 609: "The res gestæ of a transaction is what is done during the progress of it, or so nearly upon the actual occurrence as fairly to be treated as contemporaneous with it. No precise point of time can be fixed, a priori, when the res gestæ ends. Each case turns on its own circumstances. Indeed, the inquiry is rather into events, than into the precise time which has elapsed. Is the proof offered of a matter fairly a part of the same transaction? Is it an event happening naturally and spontaneously as a part of the occurrence under investigation? Measured by this rule, which is manifestly a fair and...
To continue reading
Request your trial