Thornton v. State
| Decision Date | 18 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-KA-01262-COA.,2001-KA-01262-COA. |
| Citation | 841 So.2d 170 |
| Parties | Harvey Clifton THORNTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Jim Davis, Moss Point, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General, by Scott Stuart, attorney for appellee.
Before THOMAS, P.J., IRVING and MYERS, JJ.
IRVING, J., for the court.
¶ 1. Harvey Clifton Thornton (Thornton) was convicted by a jury, sitting for the Circuit Court of Harrison County, for the manslaughter of his brother, Shelton Gerald Thornton. The trial judge sentenced him to serve a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Thornton has appealed, asserting the following issues: (1) whether the admission of the tape of Addie Thornton's statement to law enforcement was error, and (2) whether the court erred by rereading the Sharplin instruction to the jury, highlighting the elements of the instruction, and granting the State's additional instruction.
¶ 2. This Court finds no error in the admission into evidence of the statement given by Thornton's mother, but even if it were, it was harmless error beyond doubt. Further, this Court finds no error in the lower court's giving of the second instruction on voluntary intoxication or its rereading of the Sharplin instruction under the circumstances of this case. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
¶ 3. On March 11, 2000, Thornton, along with his other siblings, Shelton and Daniel, accompanied his elderly mother, Addie Thornton, from the hospital to her home after their father had suffered a stroke. Earlier in the day, Thornton and Mrs. Thornton went to the hospital to see Thornton's father. Thornton had been drinking rum that morning and brought rum with him in a quart jug to the hospital. That afternoon, the two left the hospital, stopped at a grocery store, and bought chicken and beer. Thornton also bought a gallon of rum and a large bottle of wine for his mother and his brothers, Shelton and Daniel.
¶ 4. After Thornton and his mother arrived back at the Thornton home, Thornton was still drinking rum. Thornton had also been taking different medications throughout the day. Thornton and Shelton had smoked marijuana. Mrs. Thornton and Daniel had some wine.
¶ 5. After cutting grass outside the Thornton home, Shelton came into the house. He sat on a couch next to Daniel who was watching television. Thornton later came inside and asked Shelton why Shelton had had sexual intercourse with Thornton's wife. Shelton responded that he had sexual intercourse with her before, during and after she and Thornton were married. This was stated in somewhat of a laughing manner.1
¶ 6. Thornton immediately proceeded to the laundry room to retrieve his gun, which was already loaded. When Thornton appeared with the gun, his mother got up and grabbed it. According to her recorded statement, she was able to wrestle it away from him on two occasions. However, Thornton got the gun a third time. His mother grabbed it again and knocked it up. Thornton snatched the gun out of her hand, told Shelton that Thornton was going to kill his a-s, and fired the fatal shot. Daniel attempted to stop Shelton's bleeding, and Thornton called 911. The Long Beach police arrested Thornton at the scene.
¶ 7. Thornton was indicted for murder by a grand jury for his brother's death. Following two days of trial, the jury found Thornton guilty of manslaughter, and he was sentenced to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Thornton's post-trial motions were denied, and this appeal ensued.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶ 8. The appellate court's standard of review of a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence is the abuse of discretion standard. Herring v. Poirrier, 797 So.2d 797, 804 (¶ 18) (Miss.2000). The trial judge is empowered with the discretion to consider and to decide what evidence is admissible, and unless this judicial discretion is so abused as to be prejudicial to the accused, then, the ruling of the lower court must be affirmed. Francis v. State, 791 So.2d 904, 907 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct. App.2001) (citing Graves v. State, 492 So.2d 562, 565 (Miss.1986); Shearer v. State, 423 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss.1982)).
¶ 9. On the day that Shelton was killed, Mrs. Thornton gave a recorded statement to Lieutenant Mike Byrd of the Long Beach Police Department concerning the shooting incident. On March 21, 2000, ten days after the shooting, Mrs. Thornton gave a recorded statement to Detective Susan Taylor of the Long Beach Police Department. Detective Taylor testified for the prosecution, while Lieutenant Byrd was called as a witness by the defense.
¶ 10. Due to Mrs. Thornton's mental condition at the time of trial (she had been diagnosed with dementia and major depression), the trial judge ruled that she was unavailable as a witness. Consequently, the recorded statement given to Detective Taylor was admitted into evidence under the "Other Exceptions" provision of M.R.E. 804(b)(5) which reads:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will be best served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
¶ 11. Thornton argues that the court erred by admitting the tape of Addie Thornton's statement. He claims the State failed to prove that the statement contained the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required for out-of-court statements which fit into a "firmly-rooted hearsay exception." He contends that because of Mrs. Thornton's mental condition and her motive to fabricate, her statement fails the test for trustworthiness. Consequently, he explains that this failure violates his right to confront adverse witnesses. Further, Thornton claims that the admission of the tape was not harmless error because the tape refuted his defense that he had killed his brother by accident.
¶ 12. In reaching its decision to allow Mrs. Thornton's statement into evidence, the trial court found that Mrs. Thornton was able to give an accurate statement in March of 2000. The court further found that, under Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), it was required to find in the tape a "particularized guarantee of trustworthiness." In the trial court's opinion, Mrs. Thornton's statement was reliable because she was "an eyewitness ... and there's no reason to indicate or believe that she would be harboring any prejudice or any ill will against one son or the other."
¶ 13. We agree with the trial court that there's no reason to indicate or believe that Mrs. Thornton would harbor any prejudice or any ill will against one son or the other. Also, we reject Thornton's argument that Mrs. Thornton had a motive to lie and that her statement was self-exculpatory.
¶ 14. Mrs. Thornton's first recorded statement (the one given to Officer Mike Byrd) was not introduced into evidence; however, Officer Mike Byrd testified regarding it as follows:
¶ 15. Thornton argues that Mrs. Thornton could not bear the idea or notion that she may have had a hand in causing her son's death. Hence, he makes the subtle argument that her exclamation that "I'm not going to be accused of that" during her interview with Byrd demonstrates that her statement was both self-serving and self-exculpatory.
¶ 16. We note from Officer Byrd's testimony that he apparently questioned Mrs. Thornton extensively about the location of her hands vis-avis the gun at the time the gun discharged. In light of his persistence in this regard, it is quite understandable that Mrs. Thornton would be emphatic with him. Further, we have listened to both the unedited and redacted versions of her first recorded statement, as well as the second statement which was given to Detective Taylor, and we are satisfied that both of her statements are consistent and do not indicate in the least any concern on her part that she may have had some complicity in Shelton's death.
¶...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Smith v. State
...the admission of evidence does not require reversal unless the error "adversely affects a substantial right of a party." Thornton v. State, 841 So.2d 170, 174(¶ 17) (Miss.Ct. App.2003) (citing Stallworth v. State, 797 So.2d 905, 908(¶ 8) (Miss.2001)). In regard to whether an error is harmle......
-
Williams v. State, No. 2003-KA-01933-COA.
...the new instruction along with the original instructions and not to single out any one instruction. Shaw, 540 So.2d at 30. In Thornton v. State, 841 So.2d 170, 177-78(¶ 34) (Miss.Ct.App.2003), one of the matters we considered in affirming the conviction was the trial court's admonition befo......
-
Ainsworth v. State, 2016–KA–01019–COA
...at 596 ; see also Edlin v. State , 523 So.2d 42, 44 (Miss. 1988) (discussing the issuance of a Sharplin instruction).4 See Thornton v. State , 841 So.2d 170, 176–78 (¶¶ 30–37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's issuance of a supplemental instruction a......
-
Houston v. State, No. 2004-KA-00856-COA.
... ... Particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence of Houston's guilt, such error is harmless. See Thornton v. State, 841 So.2d 170, 174 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2003). Houston's assignment of error is without merit ... ¶ 33. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PIKE COUNTY OF CONVICTION ... ...