Thourtman v. Junior

• Decision Date: 17 March 2022
• Docket Number: SC19-1182
• Parties: Brandon THOURTMAN, Petitioner, v. Daniel JUNIOR, etc., et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

338 So.3d 207

Brandon THOURTMAN, Petitioner,

v.Daniel JUNIOR, etc., et al., Respondents.

No. SC19-1182

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 17, 2022

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, Maria E. Lauredo, Chief Assistant Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael Mervine, Bureau Chief, Magaly Rodriguez and Asad Ali, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, for Respondent, State of Florida

PER CURIAM.

In this case, we consider a question related to the application of the provision of article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution that restricts entitlement to release on bail for persons "charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment" when "the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great." Specifically, we consider whether that provision prohibits a trial court from detaining a defendant beyond first appearance for a reasonable time to conduct a hearing concerning whether the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great unless the trial court makes a preliminary finding that the standard for denial of bail has been met. We have for review Thourtman v. Junior , 275 So. 3d 726, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that a trial court at first appearance, upon a finding of probable cause that the defendant committed a crime punishable by capital punishment or life imprisonment, may defer ruling on pretrial release and detain the defendant for a reasonable time to conduct a "full" Arthur¹ hearing without violating article I, section 14. The Third District certified conflict with Gray v. State , 257 So. 3d 477, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), and Ysaza v. State , 222 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), both cases in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted the relevant portion of article I, section 14 as requiring a preliminary finding at first appearance that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great to detain a defendant beyond first appearance in order to conduct a "full" Arthur hearing without setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We approve the Third District's holding in Thourtman and disapprove Gray and Ysaza .

I. BACKGROUND

Article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution guarantees every person charged with a crime the right to pretrial release on reasonable conditions, such as bail, with two exceptions: the "capital punishment or life imprisonment" exception set forth in the first sentence of article I, section 14 and the "pretrial detention" exception, set forth in the second sentence of article I, section 14. Article I, section 14 states:

Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.

Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const.

Petitioner Brandon Thourtman was arrested for armed robbery with a firearm on November 9, 2018. The next day, at Thourtman's first appearance,² the trial court reviewed the arrest affidavit, noted that Thourtman was charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment, and announced "no bond," thereby deferring a decision on pretrial release pending an Arthur hearing, should Thourtman choose to request one.³

Thourtman was arraigned November 30, 2018, on one count of robbery using a firearm or deadly weapon, a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. At that time, Thourtman entered a plea of not guilty and requested an Arthur hearing, which was set for December 6, 2018, four working days after the arraignment. The day before the scheduled Arthur hearing, Thourtman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third District challenging his pretrial confinement.

The Arthur hearing was held as scheduled. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State's evidence that Thourtman committed a robbery rose to the level of "proof evident, presumption great," but the State's evidence that he used a firearm did not. Because unarmed robbery is not punishable by life, the court granted Thourtman pretrial release with conditions of house arrest and bail in the amount of $25,000. Although the grant of pretrial release after the Arthur hearing rendered Thourtman's habeas petition moot, the district court found that the petition presented a question capable of repetition yet evading review and nonetheless accepted jurisdiction to hear the merits.

Thourtman argued in the district court that the first sentence of article 1, section 14 creates a two-step procedure that begins with a preliminary finding at first appearance that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. This argument was based on the Fourth District's decisions in Gray and Ysaza . In those cases, the defendants were charged with crimes punishable by life imprisonment, and the first appearance courts ordered each defendant detained without setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release or making a preliminary finding that the State's evidence rose to the level of "proof evident, presumption great." In both cases, the Fourth District concluded that the trial courts’ refusals to authorize pretrial release or to make the required findings at first appearance that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption great violated article I, section 14. Gray , 257 So. 3d at 478 ; Ysaza , 222 So. 3d at 6.⁴

The Fourth District

explained that if the first appearance court finds that [the proof evident or presumption great] standard has been met and declines to set bond, the defendant can later move to set bond and request a full Arthur hearing, where the defendant has a right to present evidence and to ask the court to exercise its discretion to set bond.

Gray , 257 So. 3d at 478 (citing Ysaza , 222 So. 3d at 6 ).

The Third District disagreed with the Fourth District's interpretation of article 1, section 14 as requiring a preliminary finding at first appearance that the proof is evident or the presumption is great. The Third District noted that "there is nothing in the text [of article 1, section 14 ] that requires both a preliminary Arthur hearing at first appearance and a subsequent full Arthur hearing, as held by Ysaza and Gray " and that "[t]he right to ‘pretrial release’ in [a]rticle I, section 14 refers to release pending trial, not to release pending a constitutionally or legally required bond hearing." Thourtman , 275 So. 3d at 733.

Thourtman's "main argument" to the district court was that this Court, by stating in Arthur , "We hold, therefore, that before release on bail pending trial can ever be denied, the [S]tate must come forward with a showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great," had interpreted article I, section 14 as creating the two-step procedure. Id. at 736 (quoting Arthur , 390 So. 2d at 720 ). The Third District rejected this argument, concluding that "if interpreted in such a manner, the sentence would comprise nothing more than classic obiter dicta," id. , because the sentence was written in answer to the second certified question in Arthur , which asked whether the accused or the State bore the burden of proving that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. Id. at 737 (citing Arthur , 390 So. 2d at 719 ).⁵ In certifying conflict with Gray and Ysaza , the Third District thus held

that [a]rticle I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution does not prohibit the trial court the discretion at first appearance, upon a finding of probable cause that the defendant committed a crime punishable by capital punishment or life imprisonment, to defer ruling on bail and to detain the defendant for a reasonable time to conduct a full Arthur bond hearing. To exercise such discretion, the court is not required by the Constitution to make a preliminary finding of "proof evident, presumption great."

Id. at 739.

II. ANALYSIS

Resolution of the conflict presented requires us to determine whether the first sentence of article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution prohibits a trial court from detaining a defendant beyond first appearance without setting reasonable conditions for pretrial release unless the court has made a preliminary finding that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. We conclude that it does not.

Thourtman asserts that for a court to detain a defendant beyond first appearance without setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release under the capital punishment or life imprisonment exception in the first sentence of article I, section 14, the State must have already met its burden of showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. Thourtman considers the right to pretrial release lost if reasonable conditions for pretrial release are not set at first appearance. In support of his position that detention beyond first appearance requires a preliminary finding that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, Thourtman relies on language in Arthur stating that "before release on bail pending trial can ever be denied, the [S]tate must come forward with a showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great." Arthur , 390 So. 2d at 720. But Thourtman's view that the right to pretrial release is lost if reasonable conditions of release are not set at first appearance and his reliance on Arthur are unwarranted.

We find no basis in the constitutional text or elsewhere in the law to support ...