Thrasher v. Abernathy
| Decision Date | 24 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:16-cv-02867-JMS-DML,1:16-cv-02867-JMS-DML |
| Parties | JOHN THRASHER, Plaintiff, v. KENT W. ABERNATHY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff John Thrasher was involved in automobile accidents in 2013 and 2016 and, on both occasions, did not have valid automobile insurance. Consequently, after each accident the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") suspended his driver's license. Additionally, when Mr. Thrasher's current suspension period expires in August 2017, the BMV will require him to pay a driver's license reinstatement fee of $1,000. Mr. Thrasher, an attorney who is proceeding pro se, initiated this litigation against Kent Abernathy, the Commissioner of the BMV, asserting a constitutional claim. Commissioner Abernathy's Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 12], is now ripe for the Court's decision.
"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). The burden is on the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that subject-matter jurisdiction exists for his or her claims. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim that does not state a right to relief. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as sufficient to state a claim for relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief "to a degree that rises above the speculative level." Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
The factual allegations in the Complaint1 filed by Mr. Thrasher, which the Court must accept as true at this time, are as follows:
Mr. Thrasher lives in Indianapolis, Indiana. [Filing No. 1 at 1.] In October 2013 and June 2016, he was involved in two separate motor vehicle accidents after his mandatory car insurancehad lapsed. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] As a result of each accident, the car that Mr. Thrasher was operating at the time was damaged beyond repair. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] After both accidents, Commissioner Abernathy, "by his agency," suspended Mr. Thrasher's driver's license and, since the two accidents occurred within a single three-year span, his suspension will not expire until August 2017. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] At the end of his suspension, Commissioner Abernathy, "by his agency," will require Mr. Thrasher to pay a reinstatement fee of $1,000. [Filing No. 1 at 2.]
Mr. Thrasher cannot buy a replacement automobile without a valid driver's license, and he cannot purchase automobile insurance without a replacement automobile. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] Additionally, without proof of insurance, Mr. Thrasher cannot have his driver's license reinstated. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] Mandatory car insurance is more expensive to purchase following a license suspension because the insurer must file a Form SR-22 with the BMV as proof of coverage. [Filing No. 1 at 3.]
Mr. Thrasher initiated this litigation on October 21, 2016, alleging that it is a constitutional violation to require him to have a driver's license or to mandate that he have car insurance before he can travel on public highways. [Filing No. 1 at 3.] He alleges that "[b]y enforcing any Indiana statute requiring [him] to obtain a current driver's license and to insure his vehicle, and suspending one if he does not have the other, the Defendant impermissibly restrains [his] liberty and infringes on his Constitutional right to travel freely" and "impermissibly prohibits [him] from buying and owning a car to insure, thereby insuring that [he] will never have a car or a driver's license even after this unconstitutional suspension is lifted." [Filing No. 1 at 3.] Mr. Thrasher claims that he has paid more than $700 in "otherwise unnecessary carfare expenses," and that the only grocery store he can walk to is overpriced so he "is not eating as well as he did before the suspension and has paid hundreds of dollars in otherwise unnecessary grocery costs." [Filing No. 1 at 3.] Heseeks monetary damages, and a "writ of mandate obligating the Defendant to clear his driving record of suspensions so he...can get and use private means of transport...." [Filing No. 1 at 4.]
In his Motion to Dismiss, Commissioner Abernathy characterizes Mr. Thrasher's claim as follows:
[Mr.] Thrasher has not challenged that his driving privileges were improperly suspended or that the fees were improperly imposed under the current statutory scheme in Indiana. Instead, [Mr.] Thrasher appears to have argued, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that it is constitutionally impermissible to (1) require that he have a driver's license and car insurance, or (2) to limit his "access to public thoroughfares or restrain his liberty in any way."
[Filing No. 13 at 1-2.] Mr. Thrasher states in his response brief that Commissioner Abernathy "shows a reasonable understanding of my claim for relief," [Filing No. 14 at 1], and the Court agrees that the Complaint is consistent with this characterization.
Commissioner Abernathy sets forth four main arguments in support of his Motion to Dismiss: (1) that claims against him in his individual capacity are barred because Mr. Thrasher has not demonstrated personal involvement by Commissioner Abernathy sufficient to state a claim under § 1983; (2) that Commissioner Abernathy in his official capacity is not considered a "person" under § 1983 and cannot be sued for damages; (3) that Mr. Thrasher's remaining allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (4) that to the extent Mr. Thrasher has alleged a tort claim under state law, his claim is barred by the Indiana Tort Claims Act. [Filing No. 13 at 3-7.] In his response brief, Mr. Thrasher clarifies that he is not suing Commissioner Abernathy in his official capacity, and that he is not asserting a tort claim. [Filing No. 14 at 6.] Accordingly, the Court need only consider Commissioner Abernathy's arguments that any claim against him in his individual capacity fails because Mr. Thrasher has not sufficientlyalleged personal involvement, and that Mr. Thrasher's remaining allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
In support of his Motion to Dismiss, Commissioner Abernathy argues that a defendant can be held liable under § 1983 in his or her individual capacity only for deprivations that he or she personally caused, either by direct action or by approval of the conduct of others, and that the individual must have personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. [Filing No. 13 at 3.] He contends that Mr. Thrasher has not alleged that Commissioner Abernathy was personally involved in an alleged constitutional deprivation, but rather only alleges vicarious liability. [Filing No. 13 at 4.]
In response, Mr. Thrasher provides a letter he sent to Commissioner Abernathy shortly after his driver's license was suspended in 2016, in which he "told [Commissioner] Abernathy and his counsel the number of my operator's permit and invited them to check my driving record; advised him of the details of my objection to his agency's action; and told him I wanted my suspensions erased so I could buy a car to insure." [Filing No. 14 at 7-8 (discussing Filing No. 14-1).] He stated that [Filing No. 14 at 8.]
On reply, Commissioner Abernathy argues that Mr. Thrasher did not address the argument that he seeks to impose vicarious liability, and that Mr. Thrasher cannot supplement the allegations in his Complaint by attaching his letter to Commissioner Abernathy to his response brief. [Filing No. 15 at 4.] He also argues that, in any event, "mere knowledge of unconstitutional conditions isnot enough to establish liability without proof that the defendant took some action, or acquiesced in actions of others, which led to the perpetuation of those conditions." [Filing No. 15 at 4.]
It is well established that § 1983 "does not establish a system of vicarious responsibility[,]" Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2009), and that "a government official 'is only liable for his or her own misconduct,'" Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677). That said, supervisors "need not participate directly in the deprivation [of civil rights] for liability to follow under § 1983." Backes v. Village of Peoria Heights, Ill., 662 F.3d 866, 869-70 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation and...
To continue reading
Request your trial