Threatt v. State of North Carolina

Decision Date18 September 1963
Docket NumberMisc. No. 33.
Citation221 F. Supp. 858
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
PartiesLyman THREATT, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent.

No appearance for petitioner Lyman Threatt.

T. Wade Bruton, Atty. Gen., for the State.

CRAVEN, Chief Judge.

This is a civil action begun informally by petitioner Lyman Threatt in the form of a seven page letter dated July 30, 1963, addressed to the "Presiding Judge, United States District Court, Western District of North Carolina." Although it is not clear from a careful reading of the letter exactly what relief is sought by petitioner, it is styled a petition for a writ of mandamus. Since the petitioner is not represented by counsel, procedural niceties are of no consequence, and the court will treat the letter as a petition in proper form seeking whatever relief the facts alleged may seem to justify.

Petitioner's letter sets out a history briefly summarized as follows:

That petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment in 1952 and was examined at the Central Prison hospital and assigned to a work unit. After fifteen months, he was admitted again to a hospital at Central Prison for fifteen days of treatment and then returned to a work unit. Subsequently, he alleges he received little or no medical treatment until he contracted tuberculosis and was again sent to the Central Prison hospital, and thence to the prison sanitorium at McCain. Released for an undisclosed period, he was again sentenced to prison in June of 1962, given no medical treatment until after he personally contacted the medical director at Central Prison, and was taken to the prison hospital for an examination. Found to have an active ulcer, he was treated at the hospital and returned to a work unit with the recommendation that he be given an "ulcer diet", which was not given to him. He was, however, given milk and medication. Subsequently, he was transferred to the Dallas work unit where the guards disregarded his complaints of illness and refused to give him milk and threatened him when he requested it. As a result of his request, he was taken to "the hole", cursed by the guard, made to take off his clothes, and hit with the key ring and kicked into the cell. Transferred to the Craggy work unit, he was given no medical attention and, when he protested, was told that his guards had too much political influence for any plea of his to be heard. Threatt says he has written to the Governor and to a North Carolina Supreme Court Justice and has had no reply to his letters, and at the time of the letter to this court, he is still confined, still suffering severe illness, and still without sufficient medical attention.

After writing the first letter (July 30, 1963), Threatt subsequently has advised this court that he has been transferred to the Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Since Threatt is now at Raleigh, North Carolina, he is no longer within the territorial jurisdiction of the western district of North Carolina. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 provides, in substance, that writs of habeas corpus may be granted by courts "within their respective jurisdictions". Ordinarily this means that the presence of the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court is a prerequisite to prosecution of the writ of habeas corpus. Rikard v. South Carolina State Hospital, D.C., 202 F.Supp. 763 (1962), and case citations contained therein. However, at the time of the application to this court on July 30, 1963, it appears petitioner was within this jurisdiction so that the jurisdiction of this court attached. His subsequent removal by the State to Raleigh would not destroy the power of the district court to consider his application. See: Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243, (1944).

Assuming that everything the petitioner writes to this court is the truth, it boils down to this: (1) that on one occasion, over several years imprisonment, he was physically mistreated, i. e., hit over the head with the key ring and kicked into his cell; (2) that he has never received as much medical attention as he thinks he ought to have received, but that he has been in the prison hospital at least twice and also in the prison sanitorium at McCain; (3) that he has been given milk and medication but not a special ulcer diet, and has been required to work when he was physically unable to do so.

In habeas corpus proceedings, the district judge is not limited to a simple remand or discharge of the prisoner, but he may dispose of the party as law and justice require. Even if it be established beyond question that the alleged mistreatment of the prisoner existed and continued until the present time, the right of society to be protected from convicted criminals may well demand that, even so, the petitioner be remanded to ...

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11 cases
  • Bailey v. Turner
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • October 2, 1984
    ...was provided under North Carolina law. See N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 148-20 (prohibiting corporal punishment); see also Threatt v. North Carolina, 221 F.Supp. 858 (W.D.N.C.1963). In 1974 it was also clear that this prohibition against excessive force applied to the use of tear gas. The leading cas......
  • Wright v. McMann
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • August 31, 1966
    ...v. Thomas, 6 Cir., 336 F.2d 462; Cole v. Smith, 8 Cir., 344 F.2d 721; Ruark v. Schooley, D.C., 211 F.Supp. 921; Threatt v. State of North Carolina, D.C., 221 F.Supp. 858; Talley v. Stephens, D.C., 247 F. Supp. 683. (The last two cited cases involve the whipping of prisoners apparently autho......
  • Groppi v. Froehlich
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin
    • April 8, 1970
    ...May v. Peyton, 268 F.Supp. 928 (W.D.Va.1967); Davis v. State of Maryland, 248 F.Supp. 951 (D.Md.1965); Threatt v. State of North Carolina, 221 F.Supp. 858 (W.D. N.C.1963). 2 Title 2, U.S.C. § 192 provides that any person summoned as a witness by a Congressional committee who refuses to answ......
  • Loux v. Rhay
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 6, 1967
    ...Rights Act, the district court relied upon United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 323 F.2d 410; and Threatt v. State of North Carolina, W.D.N.C., 221 F.Supp. 858. The complaint in the Lawrence case affirmatively alleged, at great length, the very extensive and thorough medical car......
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