Three Putt, LLC v. City of Minnetonka, No. A08-1436 (Minn. App. 6/2/2009)
| Decision Date | 02 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-1436.,A08-1436. |
| Parties | Three Putt, LLC, Appellant, v. City of Minnetonka, Respondent, SouthMetro Centers VIII, LLC, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 27-CV-07-12139.
Steven K. Champlin, Christopher M. Ryan, Colin Wicker, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, Minneapolis, MN (for appellant).
George C. Hoff, Justin L. Templin, Hoff, Barry & Kozar, P.A., Prairie, MN (for respondent City of Minnetonka).
Kevin R. Coan, Brittney L. Turner, Parsinen Kaplan Rosberg & Gotlieb, P.A., Minneapolis, MN (for respondents SouthMetro Centers VIII, LLC and True North Investments, LLC).
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this land-use dispute, respondent-city first challenges the appealability of the district court's order. Appellant then challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment, arguing that zoning changes to an adjacent property (a) change the zoning of appellant's property; (b) had significant detrimental effects on appellant's property; and (c) resulted in a breach of the contract between the city and appellant. Appellant also argues that (1) the city improperly granted variances to respondent-adjacent landowner; (2) respondents interfered with appellant's easement; (3) appellant is a third-party beneficiary of a planned-unit-development agreement between the city and the adjacent landowner; and (4) the city should have been estopped from allowing the adjacent landowner from developing the property. We affirm.
This land-use dispute arises out of the redevelopment of two adjacent properties located in respondent City of Minnetonka. Appellant Three Putt, LLC, owns the property referred to as the Three Putt Property. Respondent SouthMetro Centers VIII, LLC, (SouthMetro) owns the adjacent property referred to as the True North Property, which is leased to respondent True North Investments, LLC (True North).
Two closely affiliated partnerships previously owned the properties. Cross Oak Properties (COP) owned the True North Property, and Cross Oak East Partnership (COEP) owned the Three Putt Property. The True North Property was subject to an easement, for the ingress and egress of persons and vehicles called the "declaration of driveway."
In 1987, COP and COEP applied to the city for rezoning of each property to a Planned Unit Development (PUD). The city adopted a resolution granting the applications, subject to, among other things, PUD agreements and the dedication of cross-access and parking easements between the two properties.
In August 1988, the city and COEP entered into PUD agreement 87075A for the development of the Three Putt Property, and the city and COP entered into PUD agreement 87075B for the development of the True North Property. Each agreement stated that the terms may be amended by mutual agreement of the signing parties and that the terms are binding on all successors and assigns. A master development plan (MDP) was attached to each agreement. The MDP attached to 87075A provided that it is subject to the dedication of cross-access and parking easements between the two properties. The MDP attached to agreement 87075B had no such stipulation
In September 1988, COP granted an easement for the benefit of both properties, which created northerly access and southerly access points. The purpose of the easement was to provide mutual access to and use of parking lots on the properties, but only granted an easement for ingress and egress upon the properties for the purpose of cross-access to the parking lots.
In 2004, appellant purchased the Three Putt Property. The purchase agreement was subsequently modified when appellant became concerned about inadequate parking. The seller reduced the purchase price by $50,000 in consideration of the lack of cross-parking easements. Appellant attempted to negotiate a cross-access and parking-easement agreement with the then owner of the True North Property, but was unsuccessful.
In December 2005, SouthMetro purchased the True North Property and began leasing the property to True North. In March 2006, the city council adopted Ordinance 2006-04, which amended the MDP for the Three Putt Property. In July 2006, the city council adopted Ordinance 2006-14, which amended the MDP for the True North Property. The ordinances required the property owners to execute a shared-parking and access agreement. But the parties were unable to reach an agreement. In October 2006, the city subsequently amended the ordinances eliminating the requirement that the parties reach an agreement on the shared-parking and access issues.
Prior to developing the True North Property, True North presented a construction-management plan to the city and appellant detailing how construction would proceed. True North received no objections from appellant, and the city signed off on the construction-management plan. Pursuant to the plan, True North closed the northerly access for six months, making the southerly access the only entrance.
Appellant, alleging that the development of the True North Property caused it to suffer damages, commenced this litigation. On May 13, 2008, the district court dismissed all of appellant's claims against the city, and many of appellant's claims against True North. On June 5, 2008, the district court dismissed as a matter of law appellant's remaining claims against respondents, with the exception of appellant's trespass claim against True North. True North and appellant then entered into a stipulation to dismiss the claims without prejudice, explicitly preserving them for future disposition, in order to facilitate an immediately appealable order. On June 26, 2008, an order based on the stipulation was filed. The order recited that most of the claims were disposed of by the May 13 and June 5 orders, and that the parties had stipulated to the dismissal of the only remaining claim. Per that order, judgment was entered on June 27, 2008. This appeal follows.
The city argues that the June 26, 2008 order is not appealable because it does not dispose of all claims. In multiple party actions the district court "may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Absent such a determination, an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or rights and liabilities will not be appealable. Id.
The city relies on Morgan Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., Co., for the proposition that a party cannot simply dismiss an unresolved portion of a claim in order to create an appealable order. 310 Minn. 305, 308-09, 246 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1976). Morgan, however, is distinguishable. First, in Morgan, the district court issued an order for partial summary judgment on the issue of damages alone. Id. at 308, 246 N.W.2d at 446. The supreme court noted that the district court only determined damages on the claims addressed, that liability on those claims remained open, and that review would not have been available, even if the district court had used the "no just reason for delay" and "let judgment be entered language." Id. at 308-09, 246 N.W.2d at 446. Second, the district court specifically declined to direct entry of judgment, and there was no stipulation between the parties. Id. at 307, 246 N.W.2d at 446. Instead, the plaintiff attempted to circumvent that denial and dupe the judgment clerk by unilaterally deciding to dismiss its remaining claims. Id. at 308, 246 N.W.2d 446.
Finally, despite the dubious conduct in Morgan, the supreme court actually reached the merits, in part because no one objected and in part because it apparently concluded that it would be more efficient to do so. Id. at 309, 246 N.W.2d at 446. While we do not have dubious conduct, we do have a specific determination by the district court that an appeal should be taken at this stage, and the district court had the power to authorize an interlocutory appeal. In addition, all but one of the claims was fully adjudicated. Accordingly, the district court had the power to order a final partial judgment. Although it did not do that, it did order a final judgment, based on the orders for summary judgment and the stipulation, which provided for the entry of a final judgment. Unlike Morgan, there was no attempt to circumvent a previous ruling and there is a specific district court order for entry of a final judgment. While we are leery of parties attempting to circumvent procedural rules in order to obtain premature review in this court, we do not conclude that this occurred here. Because the June 26, 2008 order disposes of all remaining issues, the resulting June 27, 2008 judgment is appealable.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. On appeal from summary judgment, this court must determine "whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and [] whether the [district] court[] erred in [its] application of the law." State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). We review the record "in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). But the party resisting summary judgment may not rest on mere averments; it must produce evidence of specific facts sufficient to raise a jury issue. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). When material facts are not in dispute, we review the district court's application of the law de novo. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989).
Appellant argues that the city's zoning changes to the...
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