Thunderburk v. United Food & Commercial Worker's Union
| Decision Date | 22 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | 4,E029765 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | NATTIE THUNDERBURK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 324, Defendant and Respondent. E029765 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH DISTRICT DIVISION TWO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA Filed |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Orange County. Eileen C. Moore, Judge. Affirmed.
Barnes, Crosby, Fitzgerald & Zeman and William M. Crosby for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gilbert & Sackman, Robert A. Cantore and Joseph L. Paller, Jr., for Defendant and Respondent.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
s/Gaut J.
Plaintiff Nattie Thunderburk appeals summary judgment entered against her and in favor of defendant United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 324 (Local 324). Plaintiff was formerly employed by Local 324 as a secretary. After Local 324 terminated her employment, she sued Local 324 for wrongful termination. Local 324 filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on the ground plaintiff's contract-based wrongful termination claims were preempted by the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19591 (LMRDA).
The trial court also denied plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to add a cause of action alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The court determined that the proposed cause of action was also preempted by the LMRDA.
Plaintiff contends her contract-based wrongful termination causes of action are not preempted by the LMRDA because she was not a policymaking or confidential employee. She further contends her proposed tortious wrongful termination claim was not subject to preemption because it was not a "contract claim in other garb" but, rather, was based on a completely different theory based on violations of her First Amendment rights.
We are confronted here with determining the extent of the union's freedom to discharge its employees, despite limitations normally imposed on employers by California wrongful termination law. We must reject plaintiff's contentions because we are constrained by federal law which provides Local 324, under the circumstances of this case, with the unfettered right to terminate confidential employees such as plaintiff.
In January 1993, Local 324's predecessor, Local 551, hired plaintiff as an executive assistant and office manager. As a condition of her employment, she became a union member.
In January 1994, Local 551 merged with Local 324. Plaintiff then became an employee of the surviving entity, Local 324. Her position and duties changed. Her new position was entitled, "executive secretary," and her job responsibilities consisted of participating in a secretary pool in which the secretaries primarily provided secretarial services to Local 324 business agents. Union business agents take care of the union's day-to-day business and are responsible primarily for ensuring that collective bargaining agreements are complied with and processing individual member's grievances.
In the spring of 1998, Local 324, along with other unions throughout California, began campaigning to defeat Proposition 226, which was placed on the June 1998 ballot. Proposition 226 prohibited unions from spending union dues money for political purposes unless each member provided written consent to do so. Local 324's campaign efforts were directed toward its members, as well as the general public.
Contrary to Local 324's position on Proposition 226, plaintiff favored Proposition 226 and made her views known at work to fellow employees and several of Local 324's business agents. She also expressed her views outside the work environment.
Shortly thereafter, she was excluded from meetings at work, began receiving unwarranted criticism, and in May 1998 was required to begin punching a time clock.
On June 22, 1998, two weeks after the voters rejected Proposition 226, Local 324 terminated plaintiff. She was told she was terminated for typing a personal memorandum during company time, which constituted theft of company time and misuse of company property.
The president of Local 324, John C. Sperry, stated in his declaration supporting Local 324's motion for summary judgment that plaintiff was terminated because she was disrupting good employer/employee relations and it was therefore in the best interests of the union to terminate her. To avoid a material dispute of fact, Local 324 assumed for purposes of its summary judgment motion that plaintiff's support of Proposition 226 was a substantial motivating factor in terminating plaintiff.
On August 4, 1998, plaintiff filed a wrongful termination complaint against Local 324, alleging (1) breach of an implied contract, (2) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) tortious discharge based on a public policy. Local 324's answer to the complaint asserted, among other things, that plaintiff's claims were preempted by federal law.
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, her third cause of action for tortious discharge based on public policy. Local 324 filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground the first and second causes of action were preempted by the LMRDA. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that she was not a confidential union employee subject to LMRDA preemption.
While Local 324's motion for summary judgment was pending, plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to reallege her previously dismissed third cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Following oral argument on both the summary judgment motion and motion to amend, the trial court granted summary judgment on the ground the two contract-based causes of action were preempted by the LMRDA because it was undisputed that plaintiff was a confidential employee. The court further denied plaintiff's motion to amend on the ground her proposed third cause of action was preempted as well.
" 2
In the instant case, the trial court granted summary judgment on the ground plaintiff's contract-based wrongful termination causes of action were preempted by the LMRDA.
A state action is preempted when it is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objectives of Congress.3 Preemption of state law may arise when Congress provides for federal protection of conduct that state law attempts to regulate or penalize.4 This is known as substantive preemption and, in such cases, state action is preempted and may be stricken by direct operation of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.5 For instance, "State law is unquestionably preempted where a valid 'act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.'"6
The instant case raises the issue of whether plaintiff's state law wrongful termination claims are preempted by federal law regulating unions, i.e., the LMRDA. This court must determine whether there is a conflict between plaintiff's state law wrongful termination causes of action and federal labor policy embodied in the LMRDA.7
In Screen Extras Guild, Inc. v. Superior Court,8 the court considered the similar issue of whether a union business agent's contract-based wrongful termination claim was preempted by the LMRDA. Our high court explained in Screen that the LMRDA
In Screen the court held that the union business agent's wrongful termination cause of action for breach of the good faith covenant was preempted by the LMRDA because the union had unfettered discretion to terminate management and policymaking employees. It was undisputed in Screen that the plaintiff was considered a management employee.9
Here, Local 324 concedes plaintiff was not a management or policymaking employee. Local 324 argues that, nevertheless, plaintiff's claims are preempted because it is undisputed that she was a confidential employee, and under Screen, wrongful termination claims by confidential union employees are also preempted by the LMRDA, even if the employee is not a policymaking or management employee. Local 324 relies in part on the following language in Screen for this proposition: ...
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